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INTRODUCTION
The Master
Party-Builder
Much has been written about the life and presidency of
Franklin D. Roosevelt. His biographers include such dis-
tinguished historians and political scientists as James
MacGregor Burns, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., William E.
Leuchtenburg, and Frank Freidel. Roosevelt is generally
praised by scholars for his inspiring and successful lead-
ership during the major crises of the Depression and World
War II. He is also widely perceived as the founder of the
modern presidency characterized by its elaborate bureauc-
racy devoted to serving presidential leadership, high public
expectations of presidential performance, and constant media
attention to presidential behavior.
Despite extensive research and publishing about Franklin
D. Roosevelt's life and presidency, no book has ever focused
exclusively on his leadership of the Democratic party. Major
biographies and histories of his presidency do provide discus-
sions of his relationship with the Party and prominent Demo-
cratic politicians. No book, however, entirely devotes its
content to explaining and analyzing Roosevelt's perception of,
plans for, and relationships within the Party. In order to
understand Roosevelt's political behavior, both before and
during his presidency, one must recognize two goals that he
wanted to achieve for the Party that extended beyond his own
political ambition for public office.
First, he wanted the Democratic party to become an elec-
torally successful, enduring majority party in national pol-
itics and public policy. This was no small task. From 1860
until 1932, the Democrats had elected only two presidents
and usually held a minority of seats in both houses of Con-
gress. Other than southern whites and Irish Catholics, few
voters felt a strong, visceral identification with the Party.
Second, Roosevelt wanted to transform the Party into a
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distinctly liberal party in its ideology and policy agenda. His
own liberalism was a product of his mentor relationships with
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Endicott Peabody,
his prep school headmaster, and his experiences in New York
state politics. Except for a brief period when progressive
legislation was promoted by the Wilson administration and
enacted by a Democratic Congress, the party was not widely
perceived as the liberal party within the American two-party
system—until Roosevelt's presidency. He hoped that liber-
alism would unite the conflicting northern and southern
wings of the Party behind an ideology and policy agenda that
would seek to address commonly-held economic grievances
through federal intervention. He also believed that trans-
forming the Party into a distinctly liberal one would expand
its electoral base by attracting non-Irish urban ethnics and
liberally-inclined Republicans, independents, and third-
party members.
By assessing Roosevelt's actions and decisions in intra-
party affairs according to his pursuit of these two goals, we
can understand why Roosevelt occasionally and consciously
threatened his own political career. For example, Roosevelt's
ideological commitment to the liberal transformation of the
Party motivated him to clash with John Raskob, the powerful,
conservative chairman of the Democratic National Com-
mittee from 1928 to 1932, who vindictively sought to deny
Roosevelt the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932.
Likewise, he launched a courageous yet quixotic attempt to
defeat well-entrenched southern conservative senators in the
Democratic primaries of 1938. This approach to studying
Roosevelt's party leadership enables us to understand that
Roosevelt did not merely intend to manipulate the Party as a
personal vehicle for his presidential candidacies. More impor-
tantly, this perspective helps to explain why the fulfillment of
his party-building objectives for the Party endured long after
his presidency.
Because existing biographies provide thorough explana-
tions of his pre-presidential life and his career in the New
York state senate and the Wilson administration, this book
begins with an explanation of the development of Roosevelt's
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party-building strategy during the 1920s. Roosevelt's efforts
to end the conservative domination of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee and to make the New York state Demo-
cratic party more attractive to traditionally Republican
upstate voters are significant as harbingers of his party-
building tactics as president. If this book began with an
analysis of Roosevelt's 1932 campaign, it would overlook the
importance of the 1920s as a period in which Roosevelt formu-
lated the party-building objectives that he wanted to achieve
for the Democratic party.
Franklin D. Roosevelt was a masterful party leader having
few, if any, equals among American presidents. He operated
within the American political system in which the separation
of powers, federalism, and primary nominations discourage
the type of strong, centralized party leadership that a prime
minister can exercise in a unitary, parliamentary system.
Still, he emerges as an unusually successful presidential
party leader. Several presidents, including Thomas Jefferson,
Andrew Jackson, and Woodrow Wilson, were able to unite and
mobilize the Democratic party enough to win federal elec-
tions and achieve major legislative victories during their
administrations. Roosevelt not only accomplished these polit-
ical goals during his presidency, but also developed an endur-
ing coalition of voting blocs and interest groups, a vibrant
party structure responsive to them, and an ideology and
policy agenda which dominated electoral politics and public
policy for over twenty years after his death. This book chron-
icles Franklin D. Roosevelt's unparalleled accomplishment of
presidential party leadership.
1 The Development of a
Party-Building Strategy
From 1921 until 1928, Franklin D. Roosevelt devoted most of
his political efforts toward improving the ideology, structure,
finances, and voter appeal of the Democratic party. Despite
the Republican landslide of 1920, he was confident that the
Democratic party could become the majority party in na-
tional politics if it developed a coherent ideology and specific
policy proposals that addressed the economic problems con-
fronted by ordinary Americans.1 The Party, he believed,
should clearly distinguish itself from the Republicans and
offer the voters a clear choice. As the 1920s progressed, he
became even more convinced that his party would chronically
lose presidential elections and remain the minority party in
national politics as long as it continued to express an ill-
defined, vacillating conservatism as the only alternative to
the Republican party's articulate, well-defined conserva-
tism.2
During the 1920s, disunity and discord within the party
intensified over the Prohibition issue. Opposing positions on
this issue exacerbated the stark, antagonistic cultural dif-
ferences between urban ethnic Democrats of the North and
rural Protestant Democrats of the South and West.3 Roosevelt
was dismayed that leading Democrats, both "wets" like Al
Smith and "drys" like William Gibbs McAdoo, focused on this
implacably divisive issue, hampering his efforts to reorgan-
ize and reunite the Party.4 Roosevelt avoided the issue by
supporting Prohibition as a local option to be determined by a
referendum.5
In October 1921, Roosevelt sent a letter to the Democratic
National Committee proposing a full-time party bureaucracy
at a national headquarters and periodic national conferences
of rank-and-file Democratic activists. He suggested that dis-
cussing issues and party principles would facilitate the de-
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velopment of a common ideology and unite the fragmented
Party.6 The DNC ignored these proposals. Following the bit-
terly divisive Democratic National Convention of 1924 and
the subsequent defeat of its nominee, John Davis, Roosevelt
submitted similar proposals, hoping they would stimulate
the Party's ideological development as a true party "of prog-
ress and liberal thought."7 Once again, he was rebuffed by
the DNC. Roosevelt enjoyed a rapport, though, with Cordell
Hull, DNC chairman from 1921 to 1924.8 He admired Hull's
success in paying off the 1920 campaign debt of nearly
$300,000, partially through his personal finances.9 He also
created Victory Clubs to raise party funds.10 Clement Shaver,
who succeeded Hull as chairman in 1924, lacked Hull's fiscal
and organizational skills. To the dismay and protest of Roose-
velt, Shaver reduced the party apparatus in order to cut
costs.11
Roosevelt realized that organizational changes within the
Party meant little if it remained so bitterly divided and
dispirited that its members could not unite behind a presi-
dential nominee and a common platform. Although he ini-
tially entered the nominating race of 1924 to prevent the
nomination of William Gibbs McAdoo, Governor Al Smith
soon became a viable candidate for the nomination. His can-
didacy inflamed anti-Catholic prejudice among Protestant
Democrats, who rallied around McAdoo. McAdoo's refusal to
repudiate the Ku Klux Klan's endorsement of his candidacy
strengthened Smith's support among urban ethnics.12 The
Democratic State Committee of New York had met in April
and pledged its delegates to Smith. Smith asked Roosevelt, a
member of the state committee since 1921, to become chair-
man of his campaign committee. Roosevelt accepted the offer,
thereby becoming the most prominent Protestant Democrat
to support Smith.13 He also agreed to deliver the nomination
speech for Smith at the convention.14 Roosevelt's "Happy
Warrior" speech was the highlight of this tumultuous conven-
tion and endeared him to the growing number of urban ethnic
Democrats. The convention itself was an egregiously raucous
affair at which 103 ballots were required to nominate a com-
promise candidate, John Davis, for president.15
6 Roosevelt the Party Leader
In an October 1924 letter to Eleanor, Roosevelt remarked
that "even if Coolidge is elected we shall be so darned sick of
conservatism . . . that we [will] get a real progressive land-
slide in 1928."16 He already perceived the electorate's
conservatism to be crumbling as Robert La Follette, the presi-
dential nominee of a progressive third party, received over 16
percent of the popular votes compared to 28.8 percent for
Davis.17 La Follette's strident big business bashing populism
attracted the support of farmers and blue-collar workers.18
His appeal to low-income Americans, rural and urban, con-
firmed Roosevelt's earlier assumption that the party must
formulate an ideology and policy platform that would address
economic grievances being ignored by the Republican admin-
istration.
In December 1924, as he had done in 1921, Roosevelt pro-
posed the creation of a permanent headquarters for the Party
and a more democratic, participatory decision-making proc-
ess for determining positions on issues and public policy. He
circumvented the Democratic National Committee by send-
ing a letter to over 3,000 Democrats, including delegates at
the recent convention.19 He asked for suggestions on how to
strengthen and reform the party.
The respondents provided a myriad of proposals and opin-
ions ranging from those of southern Bourbons like Carter
Glass and Albert Ritchie, who complained that the Demo-
cratic party was becoming too liberal, to those of western
progressives who asserted that their party was too conserva-
tive.20 Despite this continuing internal discord over princi-
ples Roosevelt remained firm in his conviction that, in order
to transform itself into the majority party in national politics,
the Party must become "by definite policy, the Party of con-
structive progress, before we can attract a larger following." 21
Addressing the New York Democratic State Convention in
1926, Roosevelt asserted that both national and state govern-
ments must be able and willing to become large enough and
active enough to solve social and economic problems.22
In his 1925 review of Claude Bowers's book Jefferson and
Hamilton, Roosevelt noted the ideological differences be-
tween these two founders and their relevance to the current
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two-party system. Jefferson, founder of the Democratic party,
expressed great faith in the wisdom of the common man's
influence in public affairs. Hamilton rejected it.
Roosevelt admired Hamilton's success in establishing the
fledgling government's finances on a sound basis. But he
criticized the Federalist for his "fondness" for "Chambers of
Commerce and his contempt for the opinion of the masses"
which made him "wholly lacking in understanding . . . the
rights of the poor, the uneducated, the average human being
who, even then, made up the mass of his countrymen."23 He
concluded his review by stating that it was fortunate that the
republic evolved according to Jeffersonian populism instead
of Hamiltonian elitism.
This review illustrates Roosevelt's desire to apply the
ideals of Jeffersonian populism to the party politics of the
1920s, and expresses his contempt for economic policies domi-
nated by business interests. His admiration of Hamilton's
administrative and fiscal skills implies that he believed a
"modern Jefferson" may be required to use the Hamiltonian
means of a strong/effective, interventionist national govern-
ment to achieve Jeffersonian ends.
In September 1928, after Roosevelt had served as floor
manager and nomination speaker at the national convention,
Smith asked him to run for governor.24 Smith and his ad-
visers realized that, in order to carry New York's electoral
votes in the presidential election, they needed an attractive
vote-getter as a gubernatorial nominee. When Roosevelt re-
fused, they enlisted Eleanor's aid in persuading her husband,
and appeals to his sense of duty to the Party finally convinced
him to run.25
With barely six weeks to campaign for governor, Roosevelt
was pessimistic about victory. Louis Howe, his top political
aide, considered his acceptance of the nomination a fatal
mistake that could destroy his political career.26 Roosevelt
assumed that Hoover's probable victory would spearhead a
Republican landslide that would elect his Republican oppo-
nent, Albert Ottinger. Smith, fearing that Ottinger, a Jew,
would attract traditionally Democratic Jewish votes, had se-
cured the nomination of Herbert Lehman, a liberal Jewish
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businessman and philanthropist, for lieutenant governor.27
Despite his reformer image created by his crusade as attorney
general against corrupt stock brokers, Ottinger was conser-
vative on economic and social welfare issues.
Facing an uphill battle, Roosevelt had public opinion on his
side on one prominent issue in particular—hydroelectric
power. While Ottinger supported private ownership of it,
Roosevelt supported public ownership so that low-cost elec-
tricity could be provided to isolated, rural areas often ne-
glected by private utility companies.28 He exploited this issue
to appeal to traditionally Republican rural New Yorkers, and
also hastily strengthened the Democratic organizations in
upstate areas. In performing this task, he relied heavily on
James Farley, secretary of the Democratic State Commit-
tee.29 TD attract women voters in upstate New York, Nancy
Cook and Caroline O'Day, members of the Women's Division
of the Democratic State Committee, joined Eleanor in estab-
lishing units of the Women's Division.30
Roosevelt conducted a whirlwind campaign in which he
occasionally addressed issues of the presidential campaign,
especially in his strident denunciation of religious bigotry.31
In general, though, his rhetoric promised a continuation and
further development of Smith's progressive policies.32 De-
spite his dynamic campaigning, Roosevelt was convinced that
he had lost the election. He was stunned to learn that, while
Smith had lost New York by 103,481 votes, he had been
elected governor by a margin of 25,564 votes.33
Because of his upset, razor-thin victory, Roosevelt imme-
diately became aware of the need to strengthen the st&ie
party organizations, especially in upstate rural areas. He
realized that the votes of independents and progressive Re-
publicans had been indispensable to his narrow victory mar-
gin. Smith's failure to attract these same votes explained why
he had lost his own state in the presidential election. Roose-
velt was so attractive to independents that contributions
to the Independent Citizens Committee for Roosevelt and
Lehman totaled more than $300,000, while contributions to
the entire state party totaled only $134,000.34
Roosevelt realized that he could not rely on the votes of
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independents and ticket-splitting Republicans to assure his
re-election as governor and the election of Democratic major-
ities to the state legislature. According to Kenneth S. Davis,
"Roosevelt strove mightily toward a consummation of his long
effort, initiated in the aftermath of his 1920 defeat, to make
the New York Democracy a smoothly functioning amalgam of
city and country, in his public image, a symbol of the process
and of its end."35 By January 1929, he had established a
permanent press bureau for the state party, with an annual
budget of $100,000. Its primary purpose was to disseminate
news to rural newspapers, especially news about agriculture
and the voting records of local state legislators on agricul-
tural issues.
Roosevelt chose James Farley, who would become chair-
man of the Democratic State Committee in 1930, to manage
the effort to increase the number of Democratic voters and
strengthen upstate Democratic organizations. Like Roose-
velt, he understood that in order to make the New York
Democracy more attractive to upstate voters it must distin-
guish itself from Tammany Hall and address issues that
concerned rural voters, such as farm tax relief, road building,
and electrification.36 As state party chairman, and later as
DNC chairman, however, Farley rarely asserted himself on
matters of public policy and party ideology.37
In addition to his focus on rural interests, Farley recog-
nized the importance of attracting women, not only as Demo-
cratic voters but also as party activists. He relied on the
efforts of Eleanor Roosevelt, Caroline O'Day, and other lead-
ing members of the state party's Women's Division to accom-
plish this task.38 Farley was confident that women in these
heavily Republican areas would become active in the state
Democratic party if it gave them a prominent, influential role
in its organization and addressed issues that concerned
them.39 O'Day's prominence and success in attracting women
into the state party later enabled her to be elected to Con-
gress.40
Farley's primary partner was Edward Flynn, the newly-
appointed secretary of state and Democratic boss of the Bronx.
Farley and Flynn did not hesitate to secure the replacement of
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upstate Democratic county chairmen whom they found to be
ineffective.41 They also tried to field a Democratic candidate
for every elective office in Republican-dominated areas. Ac-
cording to Flynn, approximately 90 percent of the people
Roosevelt appointed to state positions were registered Demo-
crats, making his patronage policy more partisan than
Smith's had been.42
As the most prominent and powerful leaders of New York's
Democratic party, Roosevelt recognized the need to project an
attractive public image that would personify his party. His
two primary methods for accomplishing this were his state-
wide radio broadcasts and his inspection cruises of the canals
and rivers of New York. In January 1929, Roosevelt directed
the Democratic State Committee to arrange for him to deliver
a one-hour, statewide radio broadcast once a month.43 Through
these broadcasts, he delivered his political messages directly
to New Yorkers, circumventing upstate newspapers, which
were often Republican-oriented.
Roosevelt's inspection cruises most dramatically symbol-
ized his cultivation of upstate political support. The official
purpose of these cruises was to inspect state construction
projects. According to Ed Flynn, these visits to remote parts
of New York inspired the development of active Democratic
organizations in these areas. Flynn stated, "Many men and
women who had never before taken an active part in politics
were attracted to party membership."44
As Samuel Rosenman, counsel to the governor, later re-
called, Roosevelt recognized party-building and his advocacy
of a liberal policy agenda as being complementary. "Roosevelt
taught me how closely these two subjects were intertwined
. . . a good affirmative liberal program and a good party
organization."45 The need to build a party organization able
to elect a Democratic majority to the state legislature was
evident as the Republican domination of both houses opposed
much of Roosevelt's policy proposals, such as farm tax relief, a
gasoline tax earmarked for rural road building, agricultural
research, and state-sponsored development of hydroelectric
power.46 The Republican control of the state legislature
forced Roosevelt to compromise his policy objectives so that
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many of his bills, when passed, were weak, diluted versions of
his original proposals.47
The stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Depres-
sion made Roosevelt realize how crucial the state election of
1930 would be, not only to his own career but also to his party
and the viability of his liberal policy agenda. Roosevelt and
Howe had originally planned for Roosevelt to run for presi-
dent in 1936 because they had assumed that Hoover would be
re-elected in 1932.48 Hoover's declining popularity and his
inability to solve the problems of the Depression convinced
Roosevelt and Howe that the governor's re-election in 1930
should be impressive enough to convince party leaders that
Roosevelt, unlike Smith, could win the next presidential elec-
tion by being equally attractive to both rural Protestants and
urban ethnics throughout the nation.49 Roosevelt's own anal-
ysis of the 1928 presidential election made him aware of the
growing importance of the urban ethnic vote, which was
confirmed by later analyses by Samuel Lubell and Kristi
Andersen.50 Therefore, during his re-election campaign,
Roosevelt focused on winning upstate rural votes in order to
strengthen the party leaders' assessment of his budding pres-
idential campaign and to facilitate the election of upstate
Democrats to the state legislature with the hope of ending its
Republican control.
In a five-page report entitled "Summary of the Situation,"
Howe pessimistically analyzed for Roosevelt the condition of
the state's party organization.51 Despite the party-building
efforts of the governor, Flynn, and Farley, Howe asserts that a
"State consciousness" was lacking in many upstate Demo-
cratic organizations. "There is no feeling in these localities
that they are members of a powerful and triumphant State
Organization to which every vote they give contributes its
share toward the general success." 52 Howe recommended the
purging of ineffective Democratic county chairmen, the crea-
tion of local Democratic clubs coordinated by the state com-
mittee, and a major expansion of the state committee's
publicity division.
Roosevelt agreed with this analysis and granted Howe,
Farley, and Flynn discretion in removing county chairmen
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who were ineffective and even disloyal through their collab-
oration with local Republicans. These chairmen tried but
failed to re-elect William Bray, the sluggish, lackluster state
chairman, at the 1930 Democratic state convention. Roosevelt
secured the removal of Bray and the appointment of Farley as
state chairman. Farley then created the Union of Democratic
Clubs, which would purge anti-Roosevelt local chairmen.53
Sharing a flair for the dramatic in campaigning, Roosevelt
and Farley arranged to have talking movies, then a novelty,
made of speeches given by Roosevelt, Smith, and Senator
Robert Wagner. These movies were especially attractive and
effective in remote rural counties in which many people had
not yet seen "talkies." Mrs. Merritt Van de Bogart, the associ-
ate chairman of the Democratic Committee of Tioga County,
confidently told Howe that, because of these movies, the "age
old serenity of this rock ribbed Republican County seems to
be broken. We Democrats must make the most of it."54
Despite the Roosevelt campaign's special attention to
rural, upstate WASPs, the Democratic State Committee
strengthened its Naturalized Citizens Bureau to cultivate the
urban ethnic vote. It was divided into twenty-eight divisions,
one for each major ethnic group. In a letter to James J. Hoey,
vice chairman of the Democratic State Committee, Howe
estimated that this bureau needed an additional $40,000 for
increased activity and $140,000 for publicity.55 Campaign
literature was printed in Yiddish, Italian, and other foreign
languages. Howe also revealed to Hoey that this bureau
would be a model for organizing a nationwide effort to culti-
vate urban ethnic voters for the 1932 presidential campaign.
Roosevelt's re-election in 1930 was a massive landslide. He
defeated his Republican opponent, Charles H. Turtle, by over
725,000 votes. He carried 41 of the 57 counties outside of New
York City and his upstate margin of victory exceeded 167,000
votes.56 He had received 62 percent of the total votes.
Despite Roosevelt's impressive ability to attract tradition-
ally Republican upstate voters to his own candidacy, his party
failed to win a majority of seats in either house of the state
legislature in the 1930 election. The Democrats' failure to
gain control of the state legislature can be attributed to the
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highly-publicized Tammany corruption uncovered by Judge
Samuel Seabury's investigation of Mayor Jimmy Walker's
administration and New York City's court system. While
Roosevelt's party-building efforts had expanded and revi-
talized Party organizations in upstate, rural counties, his
personal popularity and party-building efforts could not over-
come the resurgence of anti-Tammany (and thus anti-
Democratic) sentiment among upstate voters.
In 1930, upstate voters expressed their approval of Roose-
velt's leadership; he carried upstate counties by over 167,000
votes. They also expressed their antipathy toward Tammany
Hall that year by re-electing Republican legislators. In 1932,
however, Democrats won a majority of seats in the state
senate. Party-building efforts in upstate New York finally
came to fruition in 1934 when Democrats won majorities in
both the Assembly and the Senate.57
Meanwhile, Howe and Farley were busy building a nation-
wide network of supporters and endorsements for Roosevelt
for the 1932 presidential election.58 Their party-building
efforts within New York were suspended as they busied them-
selves with national party relations. Roosevelt himself ori-
ented his policy initiatives and speeches toward attracting
favorable national attention. Earlier, at the 1930 Governors'
Conference, he had increased his national prominence by
being the first governor to advocate unemployment insur-
ance and old-age pensions.59 He was careful, though, to bal-
ance this social welfare liberalism with the assertion that
public works programs should be conducted only by state
governments, not by the federal government.60 His address of
August 28, 1932, outlined his unemployment program and
revealed the increasing welfare-state emphasis of his liber-
alism. The more abstract passages of this speech illustrate
what would become the ideological foundation of the New
Deal. "One of these duties of the State is that of caring for
those of its citizens who find themselves the victims of such
adverse circumstances as makes them unable to obtain even
the necessities for mere existence without the aid of others." 61
Exploratory, pre-campaign communications by Howe and
Farley indicated that there would be widespread party sup-
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port for Roosevelt's presidential candidacy, especially in the
South and West.62 The governor, however, faced opposition
from the leadership of the Democratic National Committee.
John Raskob, DNC chairman, attempted to embarrass Roose-
velt and damage his appeal among "dry" Democrats by hold-
ing a DNC meeting on March 5, 1931, to propose that the
party's 1932 platform advocate the repeal of Prohibition.63
Farley sought to undermine the impact of the DNC resolution
by holding a Democratic State Committee meeting in Albany
whose resolution asserted that "the national committee had
no authority to pledge or advise the party on controversial
political questions."64
Despite Roosevelt's personal dislike and ideological antip-
athy toward Raskob, the former Republican had proven to be
an effective party chairman. As Roosevelt had long advo-
cated, Raskob created a permanent Publicity Division for the
DNC in 1929 and appointed Charles Michelson as its direc-
tor.65 Michelson "fed statements to Senators and Congress-
men, circulated cartoons unfavorable to the Republican
cause,. . . sent clip-sheets of news items and editorial sugges-
tions to newspapers, and generally made and interpreted
news to hurt Hoover."66 During the 1928 campaign, Raskob
led the Democratic fund-raising effort, which exceeded the
Republican effort.67 He then managed the successful liquida-
tion of the approximately $1.5 million campaign debt.68
Raskob also created a permanent Executive Committee and
selected Jouett Shouse as its chairman.69
Meanwhile, Smith's animosity toward Roosevelt first be-
came public in 1931 when he criticized Roosevelt's forest
conservation proposal as being "Socialistic."70 Although
Smith would not announce his presidential candidacy until
February 1932, it was apparent that Raskob would use his
position as DNC chairman to promote Smith's candidacy and
obstruct Roosevelt's. This maneuvering clearly violated the
long-held DNC principle that its chairman remain neutral
toward candidates competing for the nomination.71
Despite problems during the 1932 campaign, Roosevelt
succeeded in winning his party's nomination and the election.
His platform and rhetoric were criticized, not only by the
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Republicans but also by some Democrats, as being ambigu-
ous, contradictory, and even deceitful. It is certainly true
that, combined, Roosevelt's campaign promises were perplex-
ing for their inconsistency and dichotomy. While accusing
Hoover of not doing enough to address the problems of the
Depression, he also criticized him for higher taxes, deficit
spending, and a bloated federal bureaucracy. He promised to
balance the budget and streamline the bureaucracy, but also
to use more federal action to combat the Depression.72
The most famous indictment of Roosevelt's inconsistent
promises was given by columnist Walter Lippmann, who
described Roosevelt as "a pleasant man who, without any
important qualifications for the office, would very much like
to be President."73 Roosevelt's rhetoric, which sometimes
reflected the conservatism of states' rights, balanced budgets,
and bureaucracy bashing, might be perceived as a retreat
from his liberalism. We must recognize, however, that during
his campaigns Roosevelt had always been careful to subordi-
nate his idealism about the ends of government (i.e., his
liberal policy objectives) to his pragmatism about the means
necessary to achieve them (i.e., winning nominations and
elections by appealing to a diverse coalition of supporters). As
he once bluntly told Samuel Rosenman, "You have to get the
votes first—then you can do the good work." 74 To appeal to
all conflicting factions and elements of his party, Roosevelt
knew that he had to harmonize and unite the Democratic
party by being all things to all Democrats—urban ethnics
and rural Protestants, southern conservatives and western
populists, machine bosses and reformers.
Long before his first presidential campaign, Roosevelt rec-
ognized the importance of making the Party more attractive
to the voters by developing a consensus-building, liberal pol-
icy agenda. He simultaneously built party organizations that
could be effective in recruiting candidates and activists com-
mitted to a liberal identity and policy agenda and in mobiliz-
ing the voters necessary for electoral victories. As a party-
builder in New York, Roosevelt expanded the voter appeal of
the state party beyond New York City by addressing the
specific interests of traditionally Republican upstate New
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Yorkers through his policy agenda and expanding the party
structure in upstate New York. He would now apply these
methods to the national Democratic party so that it would
become not only an electorally successful majority party but
more coherently, consistently liberal in its ideology and pol-
icy agenda. The New Deal would alter not only the role of the
federal government in American society but also the ide-
ology, voter appeal, coalition, electoral strength, and organi-
zation of the Democratic party.
2 The New Deal:
A Foundation for
Party-Building
Development of a Democratic Policy Agenda
As part of his party-building strategy, Franklin D. Roosevelt
hoped that by addressing the diverse economic interests and
grievances of both rural and urban voters, the New Deal
policy agenda would expand and unite the Democratic party,
transforming it into the enduring majority party in national
politics. His assumption that the New Deal would be a con-
sensual, inclusive means for party-building appeared to be
correct during his first term and first re-election campaign.
After 1936, however, additional New Deal policy initiatives
divided the Party, especially in Congress, as northern urban
Democrats proved to be more supportive of a liberal, interven-
tionist federal government than rural southern Democrats.
The economic crisis of the Depression and Roosevelt's over-
whelming victory in 1932 made most Democrats, despite
their intraparty differences, receptive to strong presidential
leadership in policy-making and party-building. If Roosevelt
and the Democratic-controlled Congress failed to induce eco-
nomic recovery, the credibility of the Party as a source of
effective leadership and public policy might very well disinte-
grate. Nevertheless, even in the aftermath of the stock mar-
ket crash, it was not evident that the Party would sharply
distinguish itself from the pro-big-business, anti-big-
government orientation of the Republican party and the
Hoover administration. In 1931, University of Chicago econo-
mist Paul Douglas asserted that "both the Republican and
Democratic parties are now primarily business parties, oper-
ating consciously or unconsciously through their policies and
ideas to protect the interests of the owners of industrial and
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commercial capital, and they do not represent the interests of
. . . the urban and town wage-workers and the farmers."1
On May 19,1932, Raymond Moley, a Columbia University
professor and head of the Brains Trust, Roosevelt's inner
circle of economic advisors, sent the governor a memo in
which he first suggested the term "new deal."2 Moley in-
tended these words to signify a major change not only in the
relationship between government and the economy but also
in the policy agenda, ideology, and coalition of the Party. In
his memo, Moley expressed his belief that a policy agenda of
economic planning and redistributive social welfare, agri-
cultural, and public works programs could effect a realign-
ment of the party system by attracting the bulk of middle-
and low-income Americans into the Party, transforming it
into the enduring majority party in national politics. In short,
Moley proposed in 1932 that the Democratic party adopt an
economic policy agenda that would be more responsive to
modern economic problems as well as the economic needs and
grievances of lower-income Americans.3
The policy ideas which Roosevelt and the Brains Trust
sought to instill in the Party were contained in the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Passed on June 16,1933, the
NIRA sought to stimulate economic recovery by promoting
cooperation among government, business, and labor.4 De-
spite the NIRA's apparently impartial approach toward
business and labor by granting concessions to both, its em-
powerment of labor through Section 7a and the creation of the
National Labor Board in August 1933 greatly strengthened
the position of labor in the event of a conflict between busi-
ness and labor.5 This reflected Herbert Croly's earlier asser-
tion that labor's right to organize and engage in collective
bargaining must be protected so that unions could not only
protect the economic interests of their members but also
serve as a powerful force to check and balance the power of
business.6 Croly's vision of labor becoming an effective coun-
terorganization against business seemed plausible as union
membership grew rapidly from 2.8 million in 1933 to 3.7
million in 1935.7 According to Donald Brand, "New Dealers
insisted that the abstract legal rights of individuals could not
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protect real choices unless those choices were legitimated and
upheld by the power of organization."8
The Works Progress Administration, created on May 6,
1935, was originally intended to serve only the limited func-
tion of supervising and inspecting the existing public works
programs, namely the projects conducted by Federal Emer-
gency Relief Administration's Work Division, which had
absorbed the activities of the dismantled Civil Works Admin-
istration. The FERA administrator, Harry Hopkins, was ap-
pointed administrator of the WPA as well. Although it was
originally intended merely to monitor existing public works
programs, the WPA soon became the largest and most promi-
nent public works and relief program because of an obscure
clause in Executive Order 7034. This clause stated that the
WPA had the authority to suggest "and carry on small useful
projects designed to assure a maximum of employment in all
localities."9
With the creation of the WPA, Hopkins, never previously
active in Democratic politics, was determined not to have the
WPA publicly discredited and rendered ineffective by being
exploited and manipulated for partisan purposes.10 By cen-
tralizing the approval of work projects proposed by state and
local governments in the WPA's Washington headquarters,
Hopkins hoped close scrutiny of these proposals would mini-
mize the possibility of WPA projects becoming boondoggles
for Democratic partisans. Therefore, the main function of the
WPA's Division of Investigation was to investigate charges
that particular WPA projects were being used for patronage
by local politicians.11
The rapidity with which Hopkins had to implement the
first WPA projects, and the necessity of cooperating with
state and local governments, made the WPA's immersion in
Democratic politics inevitable.12 More importantly, Con-
gress had mandated provisions regarding the appointment
of WPA administrators. The Emergency Relief Appropria-
tion Act of 1935 stipulated that any WPA state or regional
administrator whose salary was $5,000 a year or more "must
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate."13 This requirement reflected the
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tradition of senatorial courtesy in making federal appoint-
ments.
Hopkins realized that he needed to comply with senatorial
courtesy in his appointments because Congress appropriated
WPA funds on a monthly basis until 1938. Recognizing the
need to cooperate with Democratic members of Congress and
their state party organizations, Hopkins began to defer to
them more in the selection of state administrators and the
approval of WPA project proposals.14 He began to abandon
the defiantly nonpartisan approach he had pursued as
FERA-CWA administrator and cooperate with Democratic
politicians and organizations in order to cultivate and solidify
political support for the WPA and the New Deal in general.
According to Paul Kurzman, a Hopkins biographer, "For
while he felt that patronage and nepotism had no place in
personnel management, he was convinced that one of the
crucial skills of the public administrator was an ability to
engage in the political arena to sell a program to the Con-
gress and to the public."15 Hopkins' role as a political advo-
cate of the New Deal became apparent by early 1936 as he
realized the need to re-elect Roosevelt and pro-New Deal
Democrats in Congress to assure the continuation of the WPA
and the rest of the New Deal policy agenda.
Despite Hopkins's increasingly political role, Congress
had laid the foundation for the use of the WPA payroll as
patronage. Section 3 of the Federal Emergency Relief Act of
1933 made the employees of the so-called emergency agencies
(the PWA, FERA, and later the WPA) exempt from the U.S.
Civil Service Commission's merit system and grade classi-
fication.16
Of the sixty-five new federal agencies that Congress cre-
ated by the end of 1934, sixty were exempt from existing civil
service laws.17 This exemption covered about 100,000 new
federal positions. Paul Van Riper found that by 1936 "only
about 60 per cent of a total federal public service of more than
800,000 was on the classified list."18 The exemption of the
personnel of the "emergency agencies" from civil service laws
was partially caused by the need to staff as quickly as possible
this vast bureaucracy created to dispense relief funds and
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public works jobs. Morris Fiorina, in a detailed statistical
analysis of this sharp decline in civil service coverage, con-
cluded that the gradual expansion which began in the late
nineteenth century was reversed and that unclassified fed-
eral employment became an integral tool of party-building
for New Deal Democrats.19 The Democrats' desire to exploit
such a vast number of unclassified federal jobs was evident
when Senator Kenneth D. McKellar of Tennessee proposed in
January 1933 that a book be compiled and published that
would list federal jobs that did not require civil service tests
for appointments.20 This book soon became known as the
"Plum Book," and journalist Herbert S. Hollander remarked
that the "New Gold Rush" began as the "Plum Book," and
became "the spoilsman's bible."21
Patronage and Party-Building
With thousands of politicians, party organizations, and cam-
paign workers clamoring for federal patronage, James A.
Farley, Roosevelt's campaign manager, became the chief dis-
tributor because of his dual roles as Postmaster General and
Democratic National Committee chairman.22 Unlike Harry
Hopkins, who evolved from a defiantly nonpartisan adminis-
trator to a major force in using New Deal programs to benefit
the Party, Farley had always been an organization Democrat
who firmly believed in what he called "party government."23
He believed that the Roosevelt administration had not only
the right but the obligation to appoint as many loyal Demo-
crats as possible to unclassified federal jobs. Farley believed
that since Roosevelt had been elected by a landslide it was
appropriate for patronage jobs to be given to Democrats who
had been active in his campaign.24 Furthermore, he claimed
that a rigidly partisan patronage policy was a good adminis-
trative practice, ensuring that Roosevelt's policies would be
administered by officials who were loyal to him and his party.
According to Farley, "My conception of politics is that it is the
mechanism through which the program of a political party is
translated into legislation. . . . The most important thing in
any organization—industrial, governmental, or political—is
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the loyalty of its workers. We are more likely get that loyalty
for the Administration if we appoint Democrats than if we
appoint Republicans."25
Farley believed that appointees who were loyal, active
party members had a strong incentive to perform their duties
honestly and competently because they "work for a higher
thing than mere self; they want to have the party and the
principles it stands for to succeed."26 Nevertheless, it was
still possible for a person who was not a registered Democrat
to receive an appointment from Farley. From the Democratic
National Committee chairman's perspective, a job seeker's
sponsorship could be even more important than his party
affiliation. If a Republican or an independent was sponsored
by a Democratic congressman, especially one who had been
an early and vigorous supporter of Roosevelt, he could receive
a patronage job. Farley bluntly told journalist Henry E. Prin-
gle that giving patronage jobs to such applicants was an
effective means of converting pro-New Deal Republicans and
independents into loyal Democrats.27 While recognizing the
importance of patronage in increasing the number of Demo-
cratic voters and effecting a realignment, Farley was still
primarily concerned with using patronage to reward politi-
cally active, loyal Democrats because it was "an assistance in
building party machinery for the next election."28
Farley was not the first person to serve simultaneously as a
cabinet member and his party's national chairman to facili-
tate distribution of patronage. He was the first patronage
dispenser to formally and publicly systemize the process of
selecting applicants. The applicants obtained "clearance" by
acquiring letters of recommendation from their Democratic
congressmen or local Democratic party organizations. They
also submitted forms specifying their qualifications.
With unemployment so widespread, Farley was inundated
with over 250,000 letters of application by November 1934.29
He conducted the selection process from his office at the
Democratic National Committee's building and later at the
main Post Office building.30 As much as possible, Farley
secured the appointments of applicants who were both well-
qualified and strongly endorsed by their Democratic con-
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gressmen and local committees. Of those who fulfilled both of
these qualifications, preference was given to applicants who
were recommended by Democratic politicians and party or-
ganizations recognized as being F.R.B.C.—"For Roosevelt Be-
fore Chicago."31
Thus, the Democratic national chairman was careful to
channel federal patronage to Democratic activists, party or-
ganizations, and members of Congress who had been early,
diligent supporters of Roosevelt's candidacy before the
Chicago convention.32 Both Farley and Roosevelt had the
foresight to realize that it was necessary to staff the greatly-
expanded bureaucracy with the staunchest Roosevelt sup-
porters because New Deal policies could elicit opposition from
anti-Roosevelt factions within the Party who might under-
mine the administration of the New Deal if they received
important patronage jobs. According to Paul Van Riper,
"Franklin D. Roosevelt fully understood the intricate rela-
tionship of party, program, and patronage . . . Roosevelt re-
warded and punished to support his social program and to
bind together the discordant party he had inherited."33
Despite the proliferation of "emergency agencies" and
their vast number of unclassified administrative and clerical
jobs, Farley estimated that there were still about twenty
applicants for every position.34 His chief assistant in con-
sulting with Democratic members of Congress, national and
state committee members, and the various federal agencies
on patronage was Emil Hurja. Hurja, who first worked as a
personnel director in the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion and later as an administrative assistant to Harold Ickes
in the PWA, was the Democratic National Committee's ex-
ecutive director and statistician.35 An article in Time had
caustically asserted that he "was put into the R.F.C. as per-
sonnel officer to weed out Republicans, replant Demo-
crats."36
Farley realized the potential of patronage distribution to
fragment and divide the Democratic party into squabbling
factions. In September 1933 he asked Louis Howe to help
him secure centralized control over patronage so that the
heads of all government agencies and departments would
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have to defer to the Democratic National Committee for the
selection of applicants for patronage jobs.37 Although Farley
exercised a more direct, centralized control over patronage
than previous national party chairmen had, he still had to
share power with agency heads and Democrats at congres-
sional, state, and local levels.38
The patronage policy of the Roosevelt administration was
not used only to reward Democrats who had been active in the
1932 campaign. It was also used to recruit unprecedented
numbers of economists, agricultural scientists, social work-
ers, college professors, and other "service intellectuals" into
government service.39 The appointment of these individuals
to administrative and technical positions represented what
Paul Van Riper called "ideological patronage."40 He found
that the "great influx of personnel into the federal government
in the thirties contained a smaller than usual proportion of
ex-precinct workers, party hacks, and unemployables."41
Patronage, therefore, was now being used to attract into
the federal bureaucracy academics who, while perhaps not
Democratic activists or even registered Democrats, supported
the New Deal policy agenda and its ideology of greater federal
intervention to effect social and economic reforms. Tradi-
tional recipients of patronage were often party committee
members, lawyer-lobbyists, and campaign contributors who
used their public offices for personal gain. But the service
intellectuals were usually less self-interested and more ide-
alistic while serving as administrators, technicians, or policy
advisors. Their efforts were often motivated by an ideological
desire to implement the ideas of "positive government" they
had studied and to participate in a major reform movement.42
Conflicts occurred as organization Democrats resented the
appointment of professionals who had not been active in
campaigns and party organizations.43 The party regulars
believed that patronage must be earned by long, faithful,
effective service to the Party. They argued that a patronage
policy that bypassed "deserving Democrats" in favor of pre-
viously apolitical intellectuals would cause resentment and
disharmony within the ranks of those who had worked dili-
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gently and faithfully for the Democracy during the long, lean
years out of power.44
Roosevelt realized the potential of patronage distribution
for disrupting party expansion efforts and even the efficacy of
policy implementation if two conflicting factions were formed
within the administration and the party. To mitigate such
internal squabbling, he carefully distinguished the task of
developing and implementing New Deal policies from that of
"selling" these policies to the public, Congress, and party
organizations.45 Roosevelt had established a similar division
of labor during his presidential campaign. While he relied
on the Brains Trust to provide him with policy ideas and
speeches, he relied on Farley, Flynn, and Howe to coordinate
campaign efforts.46
Because this division of labor worked well during the
campaign, Roosevelt hoped that it would work as successfully
and harmoniously within the operations of his administra-
tion. During the First Hundred Days, this separation of policy
and politics proved to be impressively effective. After the
service intellectuals formulated and drafted New Deal legis-
lation, Farley and other appointees from the party apparatus
would vigorously lobby Congress and generate grass-roots
support by mobilizing state and local organizations on behalf
of these bills. Once agencies were established to implement
New Deal policies, the duties of an appointed position deter-
mined whether a service intellectual or a party regular was
appointed to it. Jobs requiring technical expertise, especially
in agriculture and public works engineering, were given to
service intellectuals.47 Administrative and clerical positions
in programs requiring cooperation with state and local of-
ficials were often given to party regulars.
Conflicts between these two groups intensified when some
of the service intellectuals began to perform tasks that
had been reserved for party regulars. Hopkins began to politi-
cize his administrative role in 1936. His speeches not only
defended the WPA and the New Deal in general but also
Roosevelt and the Democratic party.48 He was especially per-
suasive among pro-New Deal Republicans and independents
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who had grown skeptical of the integrity and efficacy of New
Deal programs amidst charges of partisan exploitation.
As a recipient of Felix Frankfurter's ideological patron-
age, Thomas G. Corcoran's power and prominence within the
White House increased as he served as a legislative drafts-
man and, by 1935, Roosevelt's chief liaison and lobbyist with
Congress. Securing passage of bills that he and Benjamin
Cohen, a fellow protege of Frankfurter, had written, combin-
ing the roles of policy-maker and policy-seller, Corcoran over-
shadowed both the Brains Trust and Jim Farley. He built his
own network of political allies within the administration by
hiring other alumni from the Harvard Law School. Achieving
his peak of power and access to the president by 1938, Cor-
coran attracted the resentment of the remnants of the Brains
Trust, Jim Farley, and the increasingly ambitious Harry
Hopkins.49 As Patrick Anderson stated in his study of White
House staff members, "During his heyday, Corcoran wielded
a far-ranging, free-wheeling power that few presidential
aides have ever matched."50
Corcoran moved beyond his multi-purpose policy role and
became the president's chief operative within the party, es-
pecially during the failed "purge" of 1938. Corcoran's inter-
vention on internal party matters was one of the major causes
of Farley's growing alienation from Roosevelt and his resig-
nation as DNC chairman in 1940.51 The brilliant legal mind
and gregarious nature that had served Corcoran well as a
legislative draftsman and lobbyist failed to compensate for
his inexperience in party affairs and the enmity of the party
regulars toward him. Meanwhile, Hopkins's allies within the
administration spread stories of Corcoran's alleged state-
ments of disloyalty toward Roosevelt in order to reassert
Hopkins's position as the president's chief confidant.52 With
his heavy reliance on the machine bosses and party regulars
for his renomination and re-election in 1940, Roosevelt recog-
nized the decline in Corcoran's usefulness and agreed to Ed
Flynn's request that Corcoran be given an insignificant role
in the campaign.53 In 1941, Corcoran left the administration
and entered private practice.
The rapid rise and fall of Tommy Corcoran demonstrated
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the limits of ideological patronage in instilling the liberal
ideology of the New Deal into the Democratic party. In their
assessment of the New Deal intellectuals in 1939, Joseph
Alsop and Robert Kintner stated that because of their inex-
perience and incompetence in internal party affairs they
should become "political eunuchs" who limit themselves to
public policy matters.54 Despite their failure to seize control
of the party apparatus, the recipients of ideological patron-
age, through the application of their intellectual talents,
integrity, and idealism to public service, strengthened the
public credibility of the New Deal as both a reform effort and
the essence of the Party's new ideology. If only self-interested
party hacks had received political appointments, the legit-
imacy of both the above policy and partisan aspects of the
New Deal might have collapsed, given the complex nature of
its policy efforts and the need to enlist the public's trust in
this national reform effort amidst the domestic crisis of the
Depression. Because of the precedent set by ideological pa-
tronage, political appointments would no longer be the exclu-
sive domain of party regulars as academic elites became
influential members of the Democratic coalition.55
Congress: The Intraparty Politics of the New Deal
Roosevelt's success in achieving a close correlation between
the substance of New Deal policies and the new ideology,
policy agenda, and coalition of the Party depended on key
allies in Congress. The leading initiators and supporters of
major New Deal bills in Congress were often urban liberals
or, more frequently, agrarian populists who had long sought
the economic policy objectives that the New Deal repre-
sented. In short, they had been New Dealers even before there
was a New Deal.
Like Roosevelt, these congressional leaders, often products
of the Populist and Progressive movements, wanted not only
to make the Democratic party the enduring majority party in
national politics but also to make its ideology and policy
agenda a distinctly liberal alternative to the Republican
party. They now perceived Roosevelt's presidency and the
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economic crisis of the Depression to be their opportunity to
finally implement reforms such as rural electrification, the
stabilization of farm prices, and the strict regulation of
banks, utilities, and the stock exchange.56
The identification of the Democratic party with urban and
labor interests during the New Deal era was facilitated by the
legislative leadership of Senator Robert F. Wagner of New
York. His vigorous advocacy of labor reform and social wel-
fare measures in both the New York state senate and the
United States Senate was inspired by his own experiences as
the son of working-class German immigrants. In 1938, John
C. O'Brien observed that "Wagner cannot be grouped with
other sycophantic officeholders who have beaten the New
Deal drum to keep up with the procession. Throughout thirty
years of public life he has been a consistent advocate of most
of the objectives now proclaimed from every New Deal
pulpit."57
During Roosevelt's First Hundred Days, Wagner cooper-
ated with the administration in assuring passage of the Fed-
eral Emergency Relief Act of 1933 which distributed $500
million to the states as grants, not loans, for relief.58 With the
establishment of extensive public works and relief, Wagner
focused his efforts on permanently strengthening the posi-
tion of organized labor in the American economy. The New
York senator participated with the Brains Trust in drafting
the bill that became the National Industrial Recovery Act on
June 16,1933. When Wagner had introduced the bill for this
act in May, the most vocal opposition came from Senator
William Borah and other western progressives who con-
tended that the bill's relaxation of anti-trust laws would
create oppressive monopolies.59
Wagner, though, was confident that big business could not
exploit the NIRA if this act also legitimized organized labor
so that it could check and balance the power of big business.
In helping to formulate the bill for the NIRA, he focused his
efforts on Section 7. This section contained provisions for the
establishment of minimum wages and maximum hours in
each industry through industrial codes. More importantly,
Section 7 granted labor the right to organize and engage in
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collective bargaining. Wagner hoped that these provisions
would enable labor unions to protect and promote members'
interests in relationships with employers. "The NRA had
done a great deal to liberate workers and establish a climate
in which they could directly challenge the interests of their
employers," states Donald Brand, a contemporary authority
on New Deal economic reforms.60
Wagner's leadership on labor issues influenced both Roose-
velt and fellow Democrats in Congress to become more favor-
able toward organized labor as an economic interest group
and a source of political support. Throughout his political
career, Roosevelt, like Wagner, had been supportive of social
welfare measures and work safety regulations that benefited
factory workers.61 Roosevelt, though, initially feared that a
powerful labor movement might form its own political party,
depriving the Democratic party of the votes of union mem-
bers. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., found that "Roosevelt
thought instinctively in terms of government's doing things
for working people rather than giving the unions the power to
win workers their own victories."62
Consequently, Wagner's role in attracting northern urban
voters and union members into the Party cannot be overesti-
mated. Although Al Smith had received a majority of votes in
the twelve largest cities in 1928, Roosevelt expanded and
solidified the Party's ability to attract urban voters, espe-
cially working-class ethnics and blacks who had previously
been staunch Republicans, in such cities as Philadelphia and
Chicago.63 Wagner's successful efforts on behalf of social
welfare, public housing, and labor issues enabled urban
voters to perceive a clear correlation between their economic
interests and the electoral success of the Democratic party.64
His accomplishments in these policy areas helped to trans-
form the urban, industrial areas of the Northeast and Mid-
west into Democratic bastions and to identify clearly the
national Democratic party's ideology and policy agenda un-
der the New Deal with labor and urban interests.65 James
Sundquist, in his study of the Democratic realignment under
Roosevelt, concludes that "the Democratic party of the indus-
trial North found itself with an extraordinarily high degree
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of philosophical and ideological unity—for an American
party."66
The emergency atmosphere of the Depression combined
with the Democrats' desire to prove their ability to govern
well as the new majority party provided an impressive degree
of party unity for passing early New Deal legislation.67
While Roosevelt's initial legislation received the support of
most congressional Democrats—liberal and conservative,
northern and southern, urban and rural—an inner circle of
prominent southern Democratic senators consistently op-
posed most New Deal bills during the 1933—1935 session. Led
by Carter Glass and Harry Byrd of Virginia, these conserva-
tives were immediately suspicious of and hostile toward the
New Deal. As early as August 10,1933, Carter Glass referred
to the New Deal as "an utterly dangerous effort of the federal
government to transplant Hitlerism to every corner of the
nation."68 Whereas most southern opposition to the New
Deal developed gradually and did not become blatant until
Roosevelt's second term, Glass and his like-minded Demo-
cratic colleagues in the Senate already held an unyielding
ideological predisposition against the New Deal's philosophy
of greater federal intervention in the economy. They firmly
believed that identifying the Party's principles with the New
Deal would betray the Jeffersonian tradition of states' rights
and minimal federal intervention in the economy.
The conservative Democrats, however, were too few in
number to thwart New Deal legislation during Roosevelt's
first term.69 As E. David Cronon and Dewey W. Grantham,
Jr., have cogently and persuasively contended, the perception
of the South as monolithically conservative in its politics is
misleading.70 Such a misperception neglects the populist
strain of southern politics which pervaded chronically de-
pressed, more remote areas of southern states.71 Resentful of
the political influence that business and landowning inter-
ests wielded through conservatives like Glass and Byrd, pop-
ulist politicians sought to improve public services, such as
public education, while increasing taxes and regulations on
business, especially utilities and railroads. The conservative
elites often succeeded in thwarting the reform efforts of the
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populists by suggesting that their opponents' policy proposals
were threats to racial segregation.72 Populism, therefore,
tended to be more prevalent in hill country areas with fewer
blacks, where race relations were not the major issue.73
Nevertheless, Roosevelt's vigorous cultivation of the black
vote in 1936, the presence of the Black Cabinet, and the First
Lady's outspoken advocacy of civil rights made increasing
numbers of southerners, including pro-New Deal populists,
fear that the New Deal would eventually threaten segre-
gation.74 In addition, the 1938 congressional elections sub-
stantially increased Republican representation in Congress.
Republicans and southern conservatives now formed a coali-
tion to obstruct further New Deal initiatives.75
Intraparty Legislative Battles
Roosevelt's landslide re-election in 1936 emboldened him to
announce a court reorganization proposal shortly after his
second inauguration. He was confident that he would have
enough support from public opinion and in Congress to as-
sure passage of this bill.76 Although nothing in this bill
violated Article III of the Constitution, Roosevelt's apparent
desire to "pack" the Supreme Court with a pro-New Deal
majority seemed to confirm the conservatives' accusation that
Roosevelt was a power-hungry demagogue who threatened
the constitutional system of checks and balances. Within
Democratic ranks in Congress, the most damaging impact of
the court reorganization bill on party cohesion occurred
among moderate Democrats who had generally supported
New Deal legislation during Roosevelt's first term. They had
chafed under their campaign opponents' charges that they
were merely Roosevelt's puppets who rubber-stamped the
administration's bills. As the emergency of the Depression
stabilized and as public opinion reacted unfavorably to this
bill, a substantial bloc of moderate Democrats in Congress
decided to assert their independence from the White House
on this issue.77
Unlike the small conservative cabal of Senate Democrats
led by Carter Glass, most Democrats in Congress did not have
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an ideological antipathy toward the court reorganization bill.
Like Roosevelt, they were infuriated by Supreme Court deci-
sions overturning laws and programs they had struggled to
enact and regarded as crucial for economic recovery and
reform. They knew that the New Deal could not endure unless
the Supreme Court became more favorable to it.78
Most of Roosevelt's bill dealt with reassigning lower court
federal judges and increasing their numbers to a maximum of
fifty in order to expedite the appeals process and make the
overall federal court system more efficient and expeditious in
handling its case load.79 The controversial section of this bill
provided the president with the power to appoint up to six
new justices on the Supreme Court if justices reaching the
age of seventy did not retire.80 In his February 5,1937, mes-
sage to Congress and in his March 9, 1937, radio address,
Roosevelt suggested that the Supreme Court, by striking
down laws necessary for economic recovery and reform, was
unjustifiably interfering in legislative affairs.81
What bothered most Democrats about the court reorgan-
ization bill was not its substance or even its political objective
of obtaining a pro-New Deal majority on the Supreme
Court.82 Instead, they were angry with the arrogant, clumsy,
and deceitful manner in which Roosevelt pursued this issue
and sought their support.83 In particular, House Speaker
William B. Bankhead and House Majority Leader Sam Ray-
burn resented the fact that Roosevelt did not consult them
well beforehand about the feasibility of such a bill being
passed and about how this bill should be written and pre-
sented.84 On the day before he announced the court reorgan-
ization bill to the press and presented it to Congress, he
summoned Vice President Garner and the Democratic lead-
ership of Congress into his office. After briefly explaining the
content of this bill, the president asked for their opinions.
Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson and Henry F. Ashurst,
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, expressed their
agreement with the bill while their colleagues remained
silent.85 Roosevelt was confident that they could muster
enough votes in Congress to pass this bill.
As a Texas populist and chairman of the House Interstate
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Commerce Committee, Sam Rayburn had been instrumental
in securing passage of strict regulations on securities and
utilities. Now, as the Democratic floor leader in the House, it
was his responsibility to mobilize a Democratic majority fa-
vorable to the bill. Since Representative Hatton Sumners,
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, opposed the
court reorganization bill, Rayburn advised the president to
have the Senate consider the bill first.86 Roosevelt agreed and
promised Joe Robinson the first vacancy on the Supreme
Court in exchange for motivating the Senate majority leader
to persuade the Senate to pass the bill.87
Senate opposition to this bill, however, emerged from un-
expected sources.88 John Garner began quietly lobbying sen-
ators to oppose the court reorganization bill as well as
upcoming administration bills on public works and relief
spending.89 The most damaging public expression of opposi-
tion by Garner occurred when he abruptly deserted Roosevelt
for an extended vacation at his ranch in Texas. In a July 7th
letter to Garner, the president pleaded with the Texan to
return to Washington "pretty soon, timing it so that it would
not be said that you were rushing back to save the amended
Court Bill."90 After this issue ended, though, Garner con-
tinued openly opposing Roosevelt's bills on labor, taxation,
and relief spending. Throughout Roosevelt's second term,
Garner would serve as the center of anti—New Deal sentiment
within the administration.
What was more surprising than Garner's recalcitrance
was the fact that the opposition movement within the Sen-
ate was led by Democratic Senator Burton K. Wheeler of
Montana, a maverick progressive who had been a reliable
New Dealer.91 Republicans and conservative Democrats
shrewdly realized that they would be more likely to defeat
the bill if the opposition was led by a prominent liberal.
They hoped that the divisiveness of this issue within the
liberal ranks would permanently weaken Roosevelt's abil-
ity to secure the enactment of further New Deal legisla-
tion.92 Consequently, Carter Glass and his fellow anti-New
Deal conservatives quietly coalesced with the Republicans
while letting moderates Thomas Connally of Texas and
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Bennett Clark of Missouri lead lobbying efforts against the
court reform bill.93
Besides his growing personal antagonism toward Roose-
velt, Wheeler was primarily motivated by an ideological con-
viction that "court packing" threatened the system of checks
and balances and could be used by future presidents to dam-
age the constitutional order. As a rural progressive hostile
to centralized power in both economics and government,
Wheeler was convinced that the court reorganization bill
must be defeated. In testifying before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Wheeler read a letter from Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes which persuasively contended that Roosevelt's
proposed "reform" of the judiciary would hamper rather than
expedite the appeals process.95
Meanwhile, the most prominent urban New Deal liberal,
Robert Wagner, remained silent and neutral as hardball lob-
bying tactics by Tommy Corcoran and Assistant Attorney
General Joseph Keenan on behalf of the bill alienated some
undecided, wavering Democrats.96 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court had upheld several New Deal laws in March and
April, including the Social Security Act and the National
Labor Relations Act. Liberal Democrats, therefore, no longer
felt that passage of the court reform bill was crucial to saving
the New Deal. Justice Owen Robertas "conversion" to the
New Deal, as expressed by his decisions in these cases, and
conservative Justice William Van Devanter's announcement
on May 18 of his retirement, further convinced New Deal
Democrats that the Supreme Court was no longer a threat to
New Deal legislation.97
On July 14, one month after the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee's report condemned the court reorganization bill, Senate
Majority Leader Joe Robinson died. Roosevelt had now lost
his most powerful ally in the Senate struggle. One week later,
the Senate decided, by a vote of 70 to 21, to return the court
reform bill to the hostile House Judiciary Committee.98
Shortly thereafter, the Senate passed and Roosevelt signed
the Logan-Hatch bill which reformed lower court procedures
but did not increase the number of Supreme Court justices.99
It had been apparent as early as March that Roosevelt's bill
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was doomed. Roosevelt persisted so relentlessly because he
realized that his position as party leader was at stake among
congressional Democrats. It was evident by the end of 1937
that the bitter division over the court issue had inhibited the
passage of any significant New Deal legislation.100 Even
though Roosevelt's party enjoyed a substantial majority in
both houses, this tediously prolonged, bitter legislative battle
had permanently fragmented party cohesion.101 Roosevelt
and his most stalwart supporters in Congress were now con-
fronted by a strengthened conservative coalition and by
moderate Democrats who increasingly asserted their inde-
pendence from the White House regarding the administra-
tion's bills.102 Furthermore, the 75th Congress's overwhelm-
ing Democratic majorities in both houses served to accentuate
the ideological and regional differences among the Demo-
crats by weakening their incentive to unite behind the White
House against the Republican opposition in Congress.103
The death of Joe Robinson resulted in another test of
Roosevelt's party leadership in Congress—the election of a
new Senate majority leader. As a matter of personal loyalty to
Roosevelt, Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky was one of the
few senators who had remained supportive of the court re-
form bill throughout the struggle, despite misgivings about
Roosevelt's clumsy tactics.104 First elected to the Senate in
1926, Barkley was an early supporter of Roosevelt's can-
didacy and served as temporary chairman of the 1932 Dem-
ocratic national convention.105 He had also delivered the
keynote speeches at both the 1932 and 1936 conventions.106
During his 1936 keynote address, Barkley fired the opening
salvo for the court reform attempt by denouncing the Su-
preme Court's decisions overturning New Deal laws. The
Kentuckian asserted that the Supreme Court should regard
the Constitution "as a life-giving charter, rather than an
object of curiosity on the shelf of a museum. . . . Is the Court
beyond criticism? . . . May it be regarded as too sacred to be
disagreed with?"107
Although Barkley's tenure as Robinson's assistant and his
experience as a party insider were assets in his candidacy for
majority leader, his position as both a "100 percent New
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Dealer" and an operative for Roosevelt in the Senate was
perceived by many of his colleagues as a liability.108 His
formidable opponent in the contest to succeed Robinson was
Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi. As chairman of the Sen-
ate Finance Committee, Harrison had been a valuable ally of
the New Deal on budgetary matters during Roosevelt's first
term.109 The first indication of his growing disenchantment
with New Deal fiscal policies occurred when he expressed his
reservations about Roosevelt's Wealth Tax Act of 1935.110
Nevertheless, he remained loyal to the president and helped
secure its enactment.111
Although Harrison had not been part of the Glass-Wheeler
coalition opposing the court reform bill, he had remained
silent and sullen on the issue. Roosevelt perceived Harrison's
silence and his growing fiscal conservatism to be signs of a
budding disloyalty toward himself and the New Deal policy
agenda. Despite the president's public statement of neutral-
ity in this contest, he had sent a letter to Barkley (which was
made public) in which he recognized the Kentuckian as
"acting majority leader" and urged him to continue the strug-
gle for passage of the court reform bill.112 Harrison's support-
ers, therefore, recognized Roosevelt's bias for Barkley and
resented his interference in the contest for majority leader.
Perceiving the turbulent events of the court reform battle
to be a harbinger of future congressional opposition to his
legislation, Roosevelt was determined to make sure that
Barkley, a New Deal loyalist, would be elected Senate major-
ity leader. It was apparent that a slim majority of senators
was committed to Harrison.113 Unlike Roosevelt, many Sen-
ate Democrats did not perceive the Barkley-Harrison contest
as a matter of ideology and a test of their loyalty to the New
Deal and Roosevelt's party leadership. Instead, they regarded
the election of a new majority leader as an internal matter of
their institution which should be immune from presidential
intervention. According to the norms of the Senate, Har-
rison's greater seniority, personal popularity, and network
of quid pro quo obligations based on his power as Finance
Committee chairman made him more deserving of being
elected.114
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With Farley refusing to lobby senators on Barkley's behalf,
Roosevelt relied on Tommy Corcoran to pressure a targeted
number of pro-Harrison senators.115 In particular, Roosevelt
used his connections with the Democratic machines of Chi-
cago and Kansas City to pressure Senators William Dieterich
of Illinois and Harry Truman of Missouri. Both men, es-
pecially Dieterich, felt a sense of personal loyalty toward
Harrison and had committed themselves to his election. The
combined pressure of Corcoran and Kansas City boss Tom
Pendergast failed to deter Truman from voting for Harri-
son.116
Chicago boss Ed Kelly, though, proved to be a more effec-
tive ally of the White House. Kelly and Howard Hunter, the
WPA regional director for the Midwest, informed Dieterich
that WPA funds for Illinois might be reduced if Barkley were
not elected and that the Chicago machine would deny the
senator renomination if he voted for Harrison.117 Dieterich
succumbed to this heavy pressure and switched his vote to
Barkley.
Dieterich's "conversion" proved to be indispensable as
Barkley was elected Senate majority leader by a vote of 38 to
37.118 Barkley's victory signified an important reassertion of
Roosevelt's party leadership and influence in Congress, es-
pecially since it occurred toward the end of his humiliating
defeat over the court reform bill. Despite his proven leg-
islative skills and populist commitment to the New Deal,
Barkley's effectiveness as Senate Majority leader was under-
mined since many of his pro-Harrison colleagues contemptu-
ously perceived Barkley as a White House errand boy.119
Embittered by Roosevelt's lobbying for Barkley, Harrison
now used his Finance Committee chairmanship to oppose
upcoming tax and spending bills.
Although the Barkley-Harrison contest further exacer-
bated the party factionalism wrought by the court reform bill,
it more clearly distinguished the most pro-Roosevelt New
Deal liberals in the Senate from their more conservative and
independent Democratic colleagues. The issue served as
another litmus test of congressional Democrats' fidelity to
Roosevelt's party leadership and policy goals. However,
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Farley and other party regulars feared that any more intra-
party battles Congress would further fragment the unity
necessary for victory in the next elections.120 Unfortunately
for Farley and other regulars desiring intraparty harmony,
Roosevelt and his liberal allies in Congress continued to
pursue policy objectives that forced the Democratic party in
Congress to reflect more closely the New Deal's liberal ide-
ology of increased federal intervention on welfare, economic,
and labor issues.121
The prolonged, bitter struggle over the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 was the type of economic and labor reform
legislation which more clearly defined the liberalism of the
Democratic majorities in Congress while further alienating
the southern conservative wing of the Party. Since the
NIRA's provisions for minimum wages and maximum hours
had been eliminated by the Supreme Court in the Schechter
decision, Roosevelt, labor leaders, and New Deal Democrats
in Congress wanted to replace these provisions through new
legislation. Although his influence in Congress had weak-
ened, Roosevelt was confident that a new minimum wages-
maximum hours bill could be passed during the 1937-1938
session of Congress.
Despite the Schechter decision of 1935, Congress succeeded
in passing the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act of 1936.
This act required that all workers employed by businesses
with federal contracts receive at least the prevailing mini-
mum wage established by the Department of Labor. All fed-
eral contractors for supplies and equipment exceeding
$10,000 in value had to pay overtime wages if their employees
worked more than eight hours a day or forty hours a week. It
also forbade federal contractors from using the labor of chil-
dren and convicts. Roosevelt and his allies in Congress hoped
that this act provided both the legal and political precedent
for a labor bill which would cover all workers in the private
sector.122
The administration drafted such a bill and had it intro-
duced in June 1937, by Hugo Black in the Senate and by
William Connery in the House.123 Because the more liberal
House of Representatives contained a larger proportion of
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urban liberals and southern populists than the Senate,
Roosevelt and the other supporters of the labor bill hoped
that if the House first passed it then the Senate would be
pressured to pass it also. However, the anti-union chairman of
the House Rules Committee, John O'Connor, formed a major-
ity of Republicans and southern Democrats on his committee
to bottle up the bill and prevent it from reaching the House
floor for a vote. All but the most pro-New Deal southerners in
both houses, such as Representatives Lyndon Johnson and
Maury Maverick of Texas and Senator Claude Pepper of Flor-
ida, opposed the Black-Connery bill.124 They feared that this
bill would destroy the competitive advantage of the South's
lower labor costs and would force southern employers to pay
blacks the same wages as whites.125 With their pro-union
northern colleagues supporting this bill, they became even
more convinced that northern labor leaders were dominating
Roosevelt's policy agenda and the national Democratic party.
House Majority Leader Sam Rayburn finally succeeded in
getting the House members to pass a discharge petition forc-
ing the Black-Connery bill out of the Rules Committee.126
But when the House voted on the bill, it voted to recommit it
to the Labor Committee.127 The compromise bill was finally
passed by the House and Senate in June 1938 and signed into
law by Roosevelt as the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The compromises and amendments needed to get both
houses to pass this bill reflected concessions to both southern
and western agricultural interests. In order to reflect the
lower cost of living in rural areas, regional wage differentials
were added. In addition, farm laborers and domestic servants
were exempted from the provisions of this act.128 The mini-
mum wage was set at twenty-five cents per hour for 1938 and
would rise to forty cents per hour by 1945. The maximum
work week would gradually decline from forty-four hours for
1938 to forty hours by 1940. Time-and-a-half wages would be
required for any work performed beyond these limits.129
In both houses, Democrats divided along regional-
ideological lines once again.130 Curiously, though, support-
ers of the Black-Connery bill were aided by several northern
Republicans.131 Although they shared the anti-union atti-
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tudes of many of their southern colleagues, these Republi-
cans hoped that the Black-Connery bill without the regional
wage differentials would weaken the labor cost advantages
that growing southern industries had over northern indus-
tries. With northern liberal Democrats like Robert Wagner
and Joseph Guffey supporting this bill as well as the more
controversial public housing and anti-lynching bills, many
southerners in Congress felt alienated from the national
Democratic party and Roosevelt's party leadership as the
legislative agenda became dominated by bills responding
to the interests and demands of labor, blacks, and urban
areas.132
These intraparty legislative battles resulted in a perma-
nent bifurcation in Congress. This division emerged as more
conservative Democratic members defied the White House
and sought to block further New Deal legislation through
their power in the committee system. Meanwhile, liberal
Democrats in Congress remained loyal to Roosevelt's party
leadership on domestic policy issues. They represented
mostly urban industrial districts and states and, therefore,
sponsored and supported legislation that redefined the New
Deal as a policy platform and ideology in which such issues as
civil rights, public housing, labor reform, and federal aid to
central cities became more prevalent.133 Nevertheless, these
mostly northern liberals were joined by a small number of
southern liberals, such as Lyndon Johnson and Claude Pep-
per, who did not feel compelled to balance their economic
liberalism with strident race-baiting as earlier populists had
done.134 Likewise, western populists especially supported
stricter regulations on banking, investment, and electric util-
ity interests.
After the 75th Congress ended, the clear intraparty divi-
sion in Congress would be obscured by Roosevelt's focus on
foreign policy and defense matters. Southern conservatives
who had been powerful enemies of his bills during the 75th
Congress became some of his staunchest supporters on such
prewar defense issues as the Lend-Lease Act, the Selective
Service Act, and higher military spending.135 While the war
effort induced both bipartisan and intraparty unity behind
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Roosevelt, the resumption of domestic policy concerns during
the Truman administration made the division between lib-
eral and conservative Democrats even more evident as south-
ern Democrats frequently cooperated with Republicans to
defeat or weaken the Fair Deal.136 Although the divisive
domestic policy issues that Roosevelt and his allies pursued
during the 75th Congress permanently weakened intra-
party harmony and cohesion among congressional Demo-
crats, it did serve to define more clearly the national party
as distinctly liberal in its ideology, policies, and coalition
membership. Consequently, the term "party loyalty" for
Democrats in Congress would now be even more closely corre-
lated to a Democratic member's support of the increasingly
divisive ideology and policy objectives of New Deal liberalism
represented by Roosevelt's party leadership and often op-
posed by conservative committee chairmen.137
The New Deal and Black Voters
Blacks who could vote (i.e, those living outside of the South)
were willing to end their long-held allegiance to the Republi-
can party and become the most loyal of all Democratic voting
blocs once they realized that their political and economic
interests would be better served by an increasingly liberal
party. Suffering the highest incidence of unemployment, pov-
erty, and malnutrition, black Americans were most receptive
to the New Deal's policy agenda of social welfare measures
and labor reforms.138 The U.S. Census Bureau did not com-
pile separate economic statistics for black Americans in 1930.
Private surveys, however, clearly indicated that unemploy-
ment rates among blacks in major northern cities sub-
stantially exceeded the national unemployment rate of 25
percent. The unemployment rate among black males in 1931
ranged from approximately 43 percent in New York City,
Chicago, and Philadelphia to over 60 percent in Detroit.139
Despite their dissatisfaction with Hoover and their peren-
nial complaint that the Republican party neglected them on
patronage matters, most blacks remained loyal to the Repub-
lican party in 1932 as 65 percent of them voted for Hoover.140
42 Roosevelt the Party Leader
Although Robert L. Vann, Julian Rainey, and a few other
black leaders bolted to Roosevelt in 1932, most black news-
papers and community leaders endorsed Hoover, although
reluctantly and ambivalently.141 Other than New York City,
Hoover had won from two-thirds to three-fourths of the black
vote in the major cities of the Northeast and Midwest.142
Roosevelt, though, had won a higher percentage of black
votes than any Democratic presidential nominee since the
Civil War.143 It was too early to conclude whether this minor
defection from the Republican party would develop into
a permanent realignment of blacks with the Democratic
party.144
Concerned about quickly alleviating the economic suffer-
ing of all Americans, the Roosevelt administration did not
make the prevention of racial discrimination a high priority
in the administration of the FERA and PWA while these two
programs were being formulated. Since the FERA heavily
depended on state and local governments to distribute its
relief funds, racial discrimination in this program was com-
mon, especially in the South. Black applicants were often
denied relief payments and public works jobs or were given
lower payments and wages than white recipients.145
By September 1933, however, Harold Ickes had issued an
order forbidding racial and religious discrimination in the
PWA and established racial quotas which required contrac-
tors to hire a percentage of black workers that correlated to
the 1930 census statistics for the area in which a PWA project
was being constructed.146 Outside the PWA, Aubrey Wil-
liams, administrator of the National Youth Administration
(NYA), was most receptive to the appointment of a racial
adviser and chose Mary McLeod Bethune, a black educator,
as the NYA's racial adviser.147 In August 1936, Bethune
organized other black officials into an informal lobbying
group that became known as the Black Cabinet. It sought to
prevent, or at least mitigate, racial discrimination in the
implementation of New Deal programs.148 The Cabinet in-
creased its power by applying external pressure to the admin-
istration through news leaks to Congress and the media
about discriminatory practices in federal agencies.149
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With both parties and the media initially anticipating a
close presidential election in 1936, the black vote, for the first
time in history, was perceived as the key to victory.150 In order
to compensate for its silence on civil rights and segregation,
the Democratic strategy in 1936 effectively used political
symbolism to convey the impression that the national party
was giving blacks political recognition and status in national
politics that they had not received during their long affilia-
tion with the Republican party.151 Southern white antag-
onism against these ingratiating gestures toward blacks was
exemplified by Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith's statement that
he could not support a party that provided "acceptance of the
Negro on terms of political equality."152
Approximately 76 percent of all black voters cast ballots
for Roosevelt on election day.153 Compared to the fact that
nearly 65 percent of all black voters had voted for Hoover in
1932, this figure revealed the most rapid, massive party re-
alignment of any voting bloc in American political history. It
became clear that the vigorous cultivation of the black vote by
the national Democratic party was not merely a temporary
tactic employed for this election.154 This would become a
permanent element of Democratic campaign strategy in pres-
idential elections.155
During his second term, Roosevelt became even more
aware of the importance of black political support as increas-
ing numbers of southern Democrats in Congress openly re-
sisted his attempts to transform the Party into a more
consistently liberal one through the enactment of such meas-
ures as the Fair Labor Standards bill, higher WPA spending,
and the Wagner-Steagall public housing bill.156
As black leaders became aware of their race's growing
political power and importance to Roosevelt and northern
liberal Democrats in Congress, they became more assertive
and persistent in lobbying for the passage of civil rights
legislation, the desegregation of the armed forces, and
stronger efforts by the Roosevelt administration to prevent
discrimination in New Deal programs and in civil service
hiring.157 Most initial lobbying efforts by black leaders and
interest groups had focused on ensuring that blacks received
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their fair share of relief and public works jobs. During the
1936 campaign, though, the black masses' adoration of Roose-
velt contrasted with black intellectuals' ambivalent, equiv-
ocal endorsement of him. The intellectuals focused more on
Roosevelt's neglect of civil rights issues than on the economic
relief that the New Deal provided.158
Despite some defections to Wendell Willkie from the black
middle class and intelligentsia, Roosevelt received approx-
imately 67 percent of the black vote in 1940.159 For most black
Americans struggling to earn a living, Roosevelt's record on
economic and social welfare issues was still the deciding
factor for their voting behavior.160 Except for Jewish voters,
blacks had demonstrated themselves to be the most loyal
ethnic voting bloc for Roosevelt, because some Catholic eth-
nics defected to Willkie over foreign policy issues.161 As many
non-southern white Protestants returned to the Republican
fold in 1940, Walter White of the NAACP hoped that this loss
of white middle-class support for Roosevelt and the national
Democratic party would further strengthen black influence
within the Party, thereby pressuring northern liberal Demo-
crats into finally adopting effective civil rights measures.162
Roosevelt's re-election in 1944 revealed a substantial decline
in electoral support for the president in the midwestern farm
belt, but the level of black electoral support remained un-
changed from 1940 as 68 percent of all black voters cast
ballots for Roosevelt.163
As Roosevelt attempted to transform the national Demo-
cratic party into a clearly and consistently liberal party,
blacks emerged as the most cohesive, loyal voting bloc in
supporting such an ideological transformation. More than
any other ethnic group, blacks unequivocally supported the
New Deal's ideology and policy agenda of greater federal
intervention to solve social and economic problems. Through
their power as a dependable, united voting bloc for Demo-
cratic presidential nominees, blacks eventually achieved a
degree of influence within the national Democratic party and
over its policy agenda that exceeded their proportion of the
general population.164 Although Roosevelt's presidency did
not achieve the civil rights objectives of black leaders, it gave
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black Americans the political recognition they needed in
order to eventually transform the national Democratic party
from their worst enemy on civil rights issues into their most
powerful ally.165
A New Democratic Party under the New Deal
During the 1920s, Roosevelt had hoped to transform the Party
into the enduring majority party in national politics by unit-
ing its northern urban and southern rural factions and at-
tracting progressive Republicans and independents through
the formulation of a policy agenda that appealed to them.166
He had assumed that by focusing on economic and social
welfare policies, which party members generally agreed
upon, intraparty unity and cooperation would be maintained;
religious and cultural issues that divided this diverse coali-
tion would be avoided.167 During his first term as president,
it appeared that his objective—forming a cohesive Demo-
cratic majority united behind a liberal policy agenda—was
achievable.168 Except for a handful of outspoken conservative
critics like Carter Glass and Harry Byrd, most southern
Democrats in Congress enthusiastically supported New Deal
legislation. Traditional party loyalty, the populist strain of
southern politics, and the economic backwardness and pov-
erty of their region all combined to make them the most
important bastion of support in Congress for the early New
Deal.169
However, the development of the Party as the new majority
party in national politics also initiated the steady decline
of southern power and influence within it. As Democratic
strength in Congress and the electoral college grew outside
the South especially in urban-industrial areas of the North-
east and Midwest, southerners lost the disproportionate
amount of power within the national party that they had
wielded during the Party's chronic minority status. In 1920,
southerners comprised 82 percent of the Democratic repre-
sentation in the House of Representatives and 70 percent in
the Senate. By 1936, only 35 percent of the Democrats in both
houses of Congress were southerners.170 Likewise, in the
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election of 1920, the South provided the Democratic presiden-
tial nominee with 90 percent of his electoral college votes. In
the 1936 presidential election, only 23 percent of Roosevelt's
electoral college votes came from the South.171
The effects of the New Deal and Roosevelt's leadership in
changing the ideology, policy initiatives, and coalition mem-
bers of the Party became apparent during his second term.
The decline of southern influence within the national party
coincided with the rise of northern urban liberals in Congress
who were responsive to the policy interests and demands
of labor unions and blacks. Intraparty conflicts over the
Wagner-Costigan anti-lynching bill, the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, increased WPA spending, and other divisive bills,
exacerbated the sectional, economic, and ideological differ-
ences between the northern and southern wings.172
The northern Democratic dominance of the New Deal pol-
icy agenda during Roosevelt's second term strengthened the
liberal identity of the national party, emphasizing greater
federal intervention to regulate and reform the economy by
improving working conditions and wages, empowering labor
unions, increasing public housing, and assuring federal aid to
central cities.173 The growing importance of the black vote to
northern Democrats in Congress induced the overwhelming
majority of them to oppose their southern colleagues by sup-
porting anti-lynching legislation.174 During his "purge" in
the 1938 Democratic primaries, Roosevelt also proved to be
less deferential to the southern Democrats on racial issues as
he publicly compared the "feudalism" of southern society to
fascism in Europe.175
By the end of Roosevelt's second term, it was evident that
the New Deal policy agenda and ideology did not have the
unifying effect within the national party that he had assumed
it would. Intraparty discord intensified as conservative mem-
bers, mostly southerners, realized that the New Deal's em-
phasis on expanding the role of the federal government in the
economy and its power in federal-state relations through
regulatory controls, matching-fund formulas, higher taxes,
social welfare programs, and grants to state and local govern-
ments sharply contradicted and threatened the party's long-
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held Jeffersonian tradition of states' rights and minimal
federal intervention in domestic affairs.176
Most disturbing to anti-New Deal Democrats was the
growing emphasis on the development of a social democracy
and a liberal Party. Southern conservatives and business
interests realized that their power within the Party was de-
clining. Meanwhile, the Democratic party under Roosevelt
was becoming a pluralistic, populist party which served as a
source of power, status, and access for blacks, women, urban
ethnics, and labor unions.
As Samuel Beer has convincingly argued, the New Deal
policy agenda and the ideology that it reflected combined
democratizing and nationalizing elements. New Deal liber-
alism sought to further democratize the political system by
increasing the political power of previously disadvantaged
groups.177 It sought to achieve this democratization through
governmental nationalism, formulating and implementing
domestic policies which centralized more authority in the
federal government and often benefited the political and
economic interests of the coalition members.178
The New Deal policy agenda served to expand the size of
the national party and more clearly define it. The growing
opposition of southern conservatives toward Roosevelt's party
leadership and the New Deal made the Party's liberal iden-
tity even more evident. The accomplishments of and conflicts
over New Deal policies would serve to identify the national
Democratic party for the American electorate long after
Roosevelt's presidency.179
3 Roosevelt and
the Machine Bosses
The Bosses' Role in the Democratic Party
One of the ironies of Roosevelt's expansion and liberal refor-
mation of the Democratic party is that many political ma-
chines not only survived but even thrived during the New
Deal era. How could his leadership inspire and induce the
development of a more humane economy and society if cor-
rupt, even anti-democratic, machines were bolstered by fed-
eral funds, patronage, and programs? He had, after all, based
his first political campaign on the issue of bossism, present-
ing himself to the voters of Dutchess County as an idealistic
crusader opposed to machine politics in both parties. Follow-
ing his opposition to the Tammany Hall sponsored attempt to
nominate William Sheehan to the U.S. Senate, Roosevelt
adapted himself to the political reality of Tammany's con-
tinuing power in the New York Democracy. During the 1920s,
he quietly cooperated with Tammany Hall while trying to
limit its influence in New York state politics.1
This dichotomous approach to machine politics, following
his previously unconditional, outspoken opposition to ma-
chines, resulted in part from two realizations. First, as a state
senator, he began to respect and admire Al Smith and Robert
Wagner, the Tammany-connected leaders of the New York
state legislature who successfully and sincerely led the pas-
sage of progressive legislation. Roosevelt understood that
without machine support such capable men of humble origin
could not have entered and succeeded in politics. Their de-
votion to progressive policy objectives, especially in social
welfare and labor reforms, made him realize that machine
politicians could support the same policy agenda that he
advocated.2
Second, Roosevelt's political struggles and conflicts with
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Tammany Hall had taught him a harsh yet valuable lesson.
No matter how corrupt and inefficient machines might be in
spending public funds and managing public services, they
were impressively effective and powerful in their ability to
deliver united blocs of delegates at nominating conventions
and to mobilize masses of urban voters on election day.3
During his governorship and presidency, he maintained a
relationship with Democratic machines in which he gave
them patronage and influence within their jurisdictions in
exchange for their support at nominating conventions and in
mobilizing voters. After 1936, he became even more depen-
dent on machine-controlled political support to secure his
renomination and re-election in 1940 and 1944, when many
non-southern WASP voters returned to the Republican
party.4
By relying on the bosses to maintain his electoral support,
Roosevelt was able to focus on national policy objectives. He
believed that, as president, he must avoid entangling himself
in state and local matters of corruption and bossism. A dele-
gation of civic reformers from New Jersey once conferred with
him about weakening the power of Frank Hague, dictatorial
mayor of Jersey City, by manipulating federal patronage in
their state. Roosevelt refused to comply with their request,
suggesting that they focus on convincing Jersey City voters to
defeat Hague in the next mayoral election.5 Roosevelt under-
stood that he needed the political support of notorious bosses
like Hague in order to remain in office and to help elect
Democrats to Congress supportive of his national policy objec-
tives.6
Unlike many uncompromising reformers who shared his
political ideals and policy objectives, Roosevelt was willing to
cooperate with and even benefit politicians and organizations
within the Party whose political practices sharply contra-
dicted values that the New Deal ideology encompassed. Rec-
ognizing his need for their political support, the Democratic
bosses were also dependent on Roosevelt and the New Deal.
Unconcerned about the ideological aspects of the New Deal's
policies and Roosevelt's leadership, they highly valued his
position as an appealing vote-getter at the top of the ticket
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who would attract votes to obscure machine-backed candi-
dates on the same ballot. More importantly, though, the cities
governed by Democratic bosses had been economically devas-
tated by the Depression.7 The bosses needed a friendly rela-
tionship with the White House in order to receive enough
federal funds and patronage to maintain their machines. The
sharp drop in property tax revenues and the overwhelming
demands of their constituents for economic relief made them
desperate for federal aid, especially if their state govern-
ments were unable or unwilling to provide it.8 Tammany
Hall's humiliating loss to Fiorello La Guardia and his Fusion
ticket in New York City's municipal election of 1933 was
caused mostly by the unpopular layoffs of city employees and
reduction in public services that the Tammany-controlled
city hall implemented in order to adapt to fiscal retrench-
ment.9
It is not surprising that the Democratic bosses became the
leading supporters of the cooperative federalism that became
part of the Party's liberal ideology and policy agenda during
the New Deal.10 With federal funds and programs, the ma-
chines were not only able to alleviate the economic suffering
of their constituents and provide patronage jobs for their
party workers, but also able to improve and expand their
cities' public infrastructure substantially. Through the WPA,
PWA, and, later, the U.S. Housing Authority, Chicago, Jersey
City, Kansas City, and other machine-controlled cities built
new public schools, public hospitals, water and sewer sys-
tems, bridges, expressways, subway extensions, parks, and
housing projects.11 In his analysis of the New Deal's policy
impact on cities, historian Zane Miller estimated that, by
1936, all of the federal programs combined created about 500
points of contact between the federal government and the
cities.12
During and after World War II, the federal government's
partnership with municipal governments in major cities ex-
panded to include urban planning and urban renewal.13 Fed-
eral influence in urban affairs grew as the amount of federal
funds in municipal budgets increased.14 Democratic bosses
became even more dependent on federal funds and programs
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as low-income southern blacks migrated to their cities to
work in defense plants and as tax-paying middle-class home
owners left for the suburbs.15 With their local tax bases
shrinking and the service demands of their constituents in-
creasing, big city mayors, mostly Democrats, recognized the
necessity of having a president responsive to their cities'
interests in order for them to stay in power.16
Initially, though, the Democratic machine bosses were not
certain if a Roosevelt presidency would be sensitive to the
economic needs and policy interests of their cities. As a state
senator and governor of New York, his policy efforts had
revealed a greater concern for rural areas. His focus on the
problems of these areas was linked to his political objective of
expanding the state Democracy in upstate New York in order
to reduce Tammany Hall's disproportionate power in the
state's Democratic party. His policy agenda as governor had
focused on forest conservation, rural electrification, tax relief
for farmers, road-building in rural areas, and other programs
intended to attract traditionally Republican upstate voters
into the Democratic party.17 As a presidential candidate in
1932, his rhetoric was directed more at ending the farm de-
pression than at the economic and structural problems pecu-
liar to the cities.18 His concentration on agricultural issues
during the campaign also reflected his belief that rural living
was a more wholesome, healthy, and socially stable way of life
for Americans.19
But the machine bosses were bothered more by his alliance
of supporters than by his personal rural orientation. His base
of support at the national convention in Chicago consisted of
the same southern Bourbons and western progressives who
had opposed Al Smith in 1924 and 1928.20 Despite his quiet
cooperation with Tammany Hall on patronage matters, Gov-
ernor Roosevelt was still suspected by many bosses of being
an anti-machine progressive. They feared that he might use
federal patronage to strengthen their progressive opponents
within the party. Although Roosevelt procrastinated about
getting the state government involved in investigating the
corruption of New York City mayor Jimmy Walker's admin-
istration, he finally capitulated to public pressure and ap-
52 Roosevelt the Party Leader
pointed Judge Samuel Seabury to investigate the Walker
administration.21 This incident and his vacillation on the
Prohibition issue until 1930 solidified the bosses' suspicion
that he would not be a reliable ally in the White House.22
After Tammany Hall endorsed Al Smith for the Demo-
cratic presidential nomination, most machine bosses promi-
nent in national party affairs also announced their support of
Smith. Smith's position in the nomination campaign was
strengthened by the fact that John Raskob, his campaign
manager in 1928, was still chairman of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee. Through his position as DNC chairman,
Raskob could influence the DNC to choose as a convention
site a city whose machine supported Smith. Regardless of
what city was selected, and no matter how many big city
machines supported him with their delegates, it was highly
unlikely that Smith could win the two-thirds majority
needed to secure the nomination. Smith's attraction of ma-
chine-controlled delegations, however, could deny Roosevelt
the two-thirds majority he needed to be nominated.23
The only nationally prominent machine boss who com-
mitted his delegates to support Roosevelt was Tom Pender-
gast of Kansas City.24 Roosevelt, therefore, hoped that the
Democratic National Committee would choose Kansas City
as the site of the 1932 Democratic national convention.25
Instead, the Smith supporters on the DNC succeeded in se-
curing Chicago as the site of convention. This meant that the
convention would be held in a city governed by a staunch
Smith ally, Mayor Anton Cermak.26 Elected in 1931, Cermak
did not want to offend his pro-Smith Irish colleagues and
refused to commit his delegates to Roosevelt until his nomi-
nation became inevitable.27
Roosevelt's most formidable opponent among the machine
bosses at the 1932 convention was Mayor Frank Hague of
Jersey City, Smith's floor manager. In a speech delivered on
June 24, he bluntly declared that Roosevelt was the weakest
presidential candidate at the convention and could not carry
any state east of the Mississippi River.28 Despite the efforts
of Hague and other pro-Smith leaders, Roosevelt received
enough delegate support for the nomination after Speaker
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John Garner created a bandwagon effect by releasing Texas's
delegates to him. Like the other pro-Smith bosses, Hague
quickly reconciled himself with the Roosevelt camp after the
convention.29 He organized a rally in Sea Girt, New Jersey
for Roosevelt in August and mobilized over 100,000 people to
attend it.30 The Hague machine's support enabled Roosevelt
to carry New Jersey in 1932 and in his three re-election
campaigns.31
The political relationship between Roosevelt and the Dem-
ocratic bosses gradually became stronger during Roosevelt's
presidency as the New Deal policy agenda and the president's
party leadership became more controversial and divisive.32
With many southern conservatives, progressive Republicans,
and independents abandoning and even opposing Roosevelt
after 1936, the Democratic machine bosses and their urban
constituents emerged as the most stalwart supporters of his
party leadership and New Deal liberalism.33 Four Demo-
cratic bosses in particular became influential partners with
Roosevelt in national party affairs and during his 1940 and
1944 re-election campaigns. They were Frank Hague of Jer-
sey City, Ed Kelly of Chicago, Tom Pendergast of Kansas City,
and Ed Flynn of the Bronx. Ironically, Roosevelt's liberal
reformation of the national Democratic party would receive
its strongest base of political support from the types of urban
machines which he had regarded as the chief nemesis of
liberalism during his early political career.34
Frank Hague: "Hitler on the Hudson"
The infamous Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City exemplified
the notoriously corrupt, repressive machine boss whose polit-
ical support Roosevelt needed. Hague's machine not only
controlled the Democratic party politics and municipal gov-
ernment of Jersey City but also dominated the politics and
public policies of the surrounding Hudson County and the
state government of New Jersey through the administration
of A. Harry Moore, a Hague puppet.35 Besides being able to
"deliver" New Jersey to Roosevelt at national party conven-
tions and in presidential elections, Hague's power in national
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party politics was solidified by his positions as Democratic
national committeeman from New Jersey, state chairman of
New Jersey's Democratic party, and vice-chairman of the
Democratic National Committee. Furthermore, the Hague-
controlled Democratic delegation in Congress, especially
Representative Mary T. Norton, comprised one of the most
loyal bastions of support for Roosevelt.36 In a 1942 letter,
Hague assured the president that liberal Democratic Senator
William H. Smathers of New Jersey "will be re-elected in
accordance with your wish."37
For the mayor of a medium-sized city, Hague achieved a
disproportionate degree of power and influence over Roose-
velt's party leadership and in national party affairs because of
his machine's efficiency in producing overwhelming Demo-
cratic majorities in local, county, and statewide elections.
Because southern New Jersey was mostly Republican, a
Democratic presidential nominee needed a large proportion
of votes in Hudson County in order to carry New Jersey in the
electoral college.38 Likewise, Democratic candidates for gov-
ernor and senator often perceived the Hague-controlled Hud-
son County vote as the key to victory in New Jersey, a state
with a competitive two-party system. Realizing the impor-
tance of having a governor loyal to him with the state legis-
lature often controlled by Republicans, Hague used his
organization to help elect most of New Jersey's governors
during his thirty-year career, including one Republican,
Harold G. Hoffman.39
Hague's vast supply of patronage jobs extended into the
private sector. He had a network of political allies in most of
the banks, insurance companies, industries, hospitals, and
other private concerns. To obtain employment, an applicant
often had to acquire a job card from city hall through his ward
leader.40
Hague's patronage power was further strengthened by the
Depression and the New Deal. The Depression had made
thousands of unemployed Jersey City residents desperate for
the economic security of government jobs, no matter how low-
paying. Through his control of the governorship, Hague had
thousands of New Deal public works jobs and an abundance of
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federal patronage at his disposal.41 The WPA in New Jersey
employed approximately 76,000 to 97,000 people a year dur-
ing the New Deal era. From 1935 to 1939, the WPA spent over
$47 million in Hudson County.42 The PWA, CCC, NYA, and
other New Deal programs provided even more funds and jobs
for the Hague machine.43
PWA grants and loans helped Hague expand the Jersey
City Medical Center. Besides using this two thousand bed
facility to provide even more patronage, Hague used it to
strengthen the machine's humanitarian image among Jersey
City's needy residents by providing them with free medical
care. On October 2, 1936, Roosevelt visited Jersey City to
dedicate the new hospital. Hague made the day a public
holiday. In his dedication speech, Roosevelt stated, "Frank
Hague has done a great service not only to you good people
who are alive today in Jersey City and Hudson County, but a
service that is going to last for many, many generations to
come."44
A month later, Hague's voter mobilization efforts helped
provide Roosevelt with over 60 percent of the popular votes in
New Jersey in the 1936 presidential election. Although he
remained quietly cooperative with Hague concerning federal
patronage and New Deal programs in New Jersey, Roosevelt
avoided public meetings with him after 1937. The Jersey
City mayor's repressive tactics and controversial statements
against CIO organizers and anti-machine dissidents stimu-
lated a barrage of unfavorable, nationwide newspaper pub-
licity against him and prompted the media's characterization
of him as an American Hitler.45 By the late 1930s, Roosevelt
found himself under increasing pressure from liberal allies
and prominent journalists to weaken Hague's power by deny-
ing him patronage or by publicly condemning his police state
tactics. Identifying himself as a New Dealer, a New Jersey
resident urged Roosevelt "to squelch the embers of Nazism in
Jersey City."46
But Hague's political control of Hudson County remained
intact. His national reputation as a major power broker
within the Party was enhanced by his key role in securing
Roosevelt's renomination in 1940.47 Hague joined bosses Ed
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Kelly of Chicago, Ed Crump of Memphis, and Ed Flynn of the
Bronx in assuring substantial machine support for Roose-
velt's renomination at the 1940 national convention.48 With
Roosevelt's renomination secured, the Hague machine's pow-
erful voter mobilization system delivered New Jersey's elec-
toral college votes to the president in the general election.
Hague again delivered his state's votes for Roosevelt in
1944, although by a narrower margin. Hague's machine be-
gan to weaken internally during World War II as its reputa-
tion among Jersey City residents for "efficiency" in the
delivery of services crumbled because of manpower shortages
and Hague's neglect.49 Organizational discipline and obe-
dience to the mayor among the machine politicians slackened
as Hague spent most of his time in Florida and conducted city
business by telephone. Throughout the 1940s, the Republi-
cans controlled the governorship and the state legislature
and filled the state's courts and commissions with anti-
Hague members who investigated Hague's cronies.50 Recog-
nizing his decline in power, Hague voluntarily resigned in
1947 and chose his nephew, Frank Hague Eggers, to replace
him. John V. Kenny, a disaffected machine member, estab-
lished a fusion ticket and defeated Eggers in the 1949 may-
oral election.51
Roosevelt's party leadership and the New Deal's relief and
public works programs consolidated Hague's power through-
out New Jersey during the 1930s. His decline and fall can be
attributed to his own neglect and to political forces and issues
peculiar to his city.52 Despite his personal dislike of Hague,
Roosevelt realized how indispensable Hague's machine was
in delivering New Jersey's electoral college votes and dele-
gates at the national conventions and in electing pro-New
Deal senators and congressmen from New Jersey.
Ed Kelly and the Rise of the Chicago Machine
At the beginning of Roosevelt's presidency, the Democratic
machine of Chicago was a struggling, fledging organization.
Unlike the Hague machine of Jersey City, it was not a well-
entrenched political organization or a one-man fief. The Chi-
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cago machine was developing as a party organization that
depended on consensus and harmony among its politicians
rather than on a single charismatic or autocratic leader.53
This consensual approach resulted partially from the
multi-ethnic character of Chicago's population and the lead-
ership style of Democratic mayor Anton J. Cermak.54 Defeat-
ing Republican "Big Bill" Thompson in 1931, Cermak sought
to alleviate Chicago's Depression-spawned fiscal crisis and
expand the voter appeal of the local Party beyond its predomi-
nantly Irish base. During the bitterly contested race of 1931,
Cermak presented himself as a reformer while denouncing
the bootlegging, gangsterism, corruption, and fiscal chaos
that had occurred under Thompson's Republican machine.
Thompson worsened his own position by sarcastically refer-
ring to his Czechoslovakian-born opponent as "Pushcart
Tony" and "Tony Baloney." The Republican mayor had hoped
that such ethnic-baiting would alienate Irish Democrats from
Cermak and attract them to his own candidacy.55 Instead,
large numbers of Slavic ethnics and traditionally Republican
Jews flocked to support Cermak's candidacy.56 During the
1920s, Cermak had carefully cultivated the support of Irish
ward leaders, especially Pat Nash, and thus received the
support of most Irish voters.57 With Thompson attracting
majorities only from blacks, Italians, and staunch WASP
Republicans, Cermak was elected by a plurality of nearly
200,000 votes.58
Cermak, who founded and served as chairman of the Cook
County Democratic Central Committee since 1928, chose Pat
Nash to succeed him. Nash was an Irish-born ward commit-
teeman and a wealthy sewer contractor who was highly re-
spected by Irish Democrats in Chicago. Although Cermak
opened up leadership positions in the party and in the city
and county governments to non-Irish ethnics, especially
Slavs and Jews, he strove to maintain a cooperative relation-
ship with Irish leaders. Nash, because of his long absences
from Chicago and his unassuming personality, usually de-
ferred to Cermak's leadership, but Irish Democrats on the city
council and in the county and ward committees began to
chafe under the mayor's aggressive leadership.59
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Cermak revealed an obsession with efficiency in the opera-
tions and structure of both the city government and the Cook
County Democratic organization. He alienated some party
regulars through a fiscal austerity program that included
budget cuts and layoffs of municipal employees. Cermak had
the machine publish its own newspaper, The Public Service
Leader, and conduct statistical analyses of voter turn-out in
Chicago's fifty wards. He used these analyses to reward or
punish precinct captains and ward committeemen according
to their ability to "deliver" for the Democratic ticket.60 Cer-
mak sought to convey the impression to Chicagoans that a
well-organized political machine was synonymous with an
efficient, cost-effective city government.61
The mayor realized, though, that efficiency alone would
not maintain harmony and unity behind his leadership
within the Democratic machine. Mostly to appease the Irish,
Cermak distinguished himself at the 1932 Democratic na-
tional convention in Chicago as a steadfast, diehard sup-
porter of Al Smith. After Roosevelt's nomination was secured,
Cermak sought to impress Roosevelt and Farley by delivering
a huge plurality of votes.62 Although Cermak had conferred
with Roosevelt at Hyde Park, he was concerned about rumors
that Democratic Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois would
receive all of his state's federal patronage.63 He traveled to
Florida in February 1933 to confer with Roosevelt and Farley.
A deranged gunman intending to assassinate the president-
elect mortally wounded Cermak instead.64
With Cermak's death, Nash became titular head of the
city's Democratic party and secured the appointment of Fran-
cis Corr, an obscure alderman, as acting mayor until a special
election could be held. Nash, though, began to fear that fierce
competition in a special election would badly fragment the
machine. He succeeded in convincing the state legislature to
pass a bill granting the Chicago city council the authority to
elect a mayor who would finish Cermak's term.65
Nash did not want any one of the ambitious aldermen
competing to succeed Corr to be elected mayor by the city
council. He feared that such a situation would irreparably
divide and weaken both the machine and the city council and
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decided that the ideal compromise candidate for mayor would
be someone who was not an elected official yet was well-
known to the machine members and had few enemies. His
choice, who was quickly elected by the city council, was Ed-
ward J. Kelly, chief engineer of the Metropolitan Sanitary
District.66
The new mayor managed to end a bitter, almost riotous
teachers' strike by securing a $25 million loan from the Re-
construction Finance Corporation.67 Kelly soon realized that
the fiscal health of the city government—as well as the
political health of the Democratic machine—depended on a
substantial, steady flow of federal funds for Chicago. Con-
sequently, he immediately began to cultivate close, cooper-
ative relationships with Roosevelt, Jim Farley, and Harry
Hopkins. In September 1933, Hopkins insisted that the Illi-
nois state legislature raise adequate matching funds in order
to receive FERA funds. Kelly was instrumental in lobbying
and pressuring the reluctant state legislature into appropri-
ating the necessary funds.68
By successfully using federal funds and public works pro-
grams to provide jobs, relief, and structural improvements
for Chicago, Kelly received over 82 percent of the votes cast
in Chicago's 1935 mayoral election. Impressed by Kelly's
overwhelming margin of victory and increasingly concerned
about carrying Illinois in the upcoming presidential election,
Roosevelt and Hopkins decided to grant Kelly more federal
patronage and discretion over the the selection of WPA proj-
ects.69 This decision was solidified by Kelly's success in again
pressuring the Illinois state legislature into adopting a tax
increase in order to raise the matching funds necessary for
receiving WPA funds.70 Hopkins had cut off WPA funds to
Illinois on May 1 after Governor Henry Horner and the state
legislature had failed to appropriate enough matching funds.
Kelly's proven ability to "deliver" for the White House had
now made him the top Democrat in Illinois for Roosevelt.
Through his relationship with Hopkins, Kelly was able to
control the approximately two hundred thousand WPA jobs
in Illinois, a rich source of patronage which extended his ma-
chine's influence beyond Cook County.71 Hopkins appointed
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Robert Dunham, a Kelly ally, as Illinois's WPA director,
thereby strengthening Kelly's influence over the selection of
WPA projects and the appointment of administrative person-
nel.72 Jim Farley bypassed other Democratic politicians in
Illinois and dealt exclusively with Kelly concerning patron-
age and DNC matters.73
Having secured a beneficial political rapport with the
White House, Kelly now focused on consolidating and ex-
panding the Democratic machine's power in Chicago so that it
would endure beyond his mayoralty. Just as Cermak had
made membership in the local Democratic party attractive to
more non-Irish ethnics, Kelly sought to coopt the black com-
munity of Chicago. This was a formidable task. Compared to
the black voters of other major northern cities, Chicago's
blacks were the most staunchly Republican.74 Only 21 per-
cent of them voted for Roosevelt in 1932. In the Roosevelt
landslide of 1936, approximately 76 percent of all black voters
throughout the United States voted for Roosevelt; however,
only 49 percent of Chicago's blacks did.75
Unlike the bosses of other Democratic machines that culti-
vated black support during the New Deal, Kelly did not limit
his realignment strategy to the distribution of relief and
patronage. He also aroused white antagonism toward himself
by advocating racially integrated public schools. When black
parents complained about segregation at the Morgan Park
High School in 1934, Kelly rescinded the school board's policy
allowing such segregation. He refused to withdraw this deci-
sion despite an unruly protest by white students. Similar
anti-integration protests by whites occurred in 1945, but
Kelly refused to yield to them.76
Although his close identification with Roosevelt and the
New Deal certainly made him more attractive to black voters,
most of Kelly's success in coopting Chicago's black commu-
nity can be attributed to his own initiative. Affectionately
known as "Big Red" by Chicago blacks, Kelly convinced many
that their support of and participation in the Democratic
machine would enhance their personal ambitions and their
community's interests.77 As the black proportion of Chicago's
population began to increase steadily during the 1930s, Kelly
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realized that the electoral support of Chicago blacks would
become even more important for the future political strength
of the machine. Kelly consistently received a significantly
higher percentage of black votes in Chicago than Roosevelt
did. Whereas Roosevelt received only 49 percent of the black
vote in Chicago in 1936 and 52 percent in 1940, Kelly received
80 percent in 1935, 59 percent in 1939, and 61 percent in
1943.78
Regardless of his personality and skills, Kelly's appeal
among Chicagoans, was greatly enhanced by his success in
assuring a substantial flow of federal funds into the city.79
Kelly was able to build a subway, a modernized municipal
airport, expressways, new parks, public housing projects, and
thirty new public schools from 1933 to 1940.80 During his first
two years as mayor, the city government contributed only 1.4
percent of the relief funds spent in Chicago while the federal
government contributed 87.6 percent and the state 11 per-
cent.81 With the federal government paying for most relief
and public works projects, Kelly was able to appease busi-
nessmen and home owners by avoiding increases in property
taxes.82 When campaigning for re-election, Kelly and other
machine politicians were able to claim that they had created
many construction jobs and structural improvements while
also keeping local taxes low.
Harry Hopkins's indulgent attitude concerning the re-
quirement of local matching funds for the receipt of WPA
funds resulted partially from his own presidential ambitions
for 1940. By 1938, Jim Farley also hoped to succeed Roose-
velt.83 With both the WPA administrator and the DNC chair-
man competing for Kelly's political support, the mayor was
assured of receiving further preferential treatment.84
Chicago hosted the 1940 Democratic National Convention.
In 1939, Kelly built a national network of support for a third
term while Roosevelt was still denying that he was interested
in one.85 Kelly "managed" the convention, creating enthusi-
asm for Roosevelt that united Democrats behind the presi-
dent and defeated the two prominent hopefuls, Farley and
Garner.86
As the 1944 election approached, Chicago was again cho-
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sen as the site of the national convention. Absorbed in his
foreign policy and military responsibilities, Roosevelt relied
on Kelly to manage another "controlled" convention united
behind his renomination. Kelly realized, though, that not
even his political prowess could assure Roosevelt's re-election
if Henry Wallace was his running mate. DNC chairman Rob-
ert Hannegan, Kelly, and other machine bosses convinced
Roosevelt to choose Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri as
the best possible compromise candidate for vice president.
While Kelly's political skills had been instrumental to
Roosevelt's success in the 1940 and 1944 campaigns, his con-
trol of the Chicago machine began to falter during World War
II. Ironically, his political power in Chicago eventually be-
came a victim of his own success in building a stable, endur-
ing Democratic machine. As was Kelly's goal, his leadership
was no longer crucial to the life of the machine. The machine
forced him into retirement in 1947, partially because of his
liberal policies toward racial integration in housing and
public schools. Even so, Kelly willingly campaigned for his
successor, Martin H. Kennelly, a previously apolitical busi-
nessman chosen by the anti-Kelly coalition as the machine's
candidate.87 Kelly's support of Kennelly illustrated a charac-
teristic that distinguished the Cook County Democratic or-
ganization—an emphasis on intraparty cohesion, continuity,
and a stable mayoral succession.88 This characteristic would
become even more apparent during the twenty-one year reign
of Richard J. Daley, a Kelly protege.89 Despite occasional
internal conflicts, the machine's politicians realized that
maintaining their own power depended on maintaining a
cohesive, stable structure for the machine.
Roosevelt's favoritism toward Chicago was a crucial factor
in transforming the fledgling machine of 1933 into a stable,
enduring party organization by the end of his presidency.
Besides the tangible benefits that the New Deal provided in
the form of relief, jobs, and an improved public infrastruc-
ture, the steady flow of federal funds into Chicago enabled
Kelly and the Democratic machine to claim to the Chicago
electorate that machine rule was conducive to the effective
management of the municipal government's finances and its
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delivery of services. This federal subsidy of municipal spend-
ing helped Kelly and the Democratic-controlled city council
gain the support of previously anti-machine Republican busi-
nessmen by avoiding sharp property tax increases and under-
taking structural improvements that stimulated economic
growth.90
Federal aid, therefore, solidified the durability of the Dem-
ocratic machine's control of Chicago's municipal government
by convincing most voters that the machine's control of city
hall was synonymous with capable public administration.91
After Kelly's administration, the Chicago machine not only
maintained control of city government but remained a key
player in presidential politics. While the Roosevelt-Kelly
partnership proved to be highly beneficial to Roosevelt's
party leadership, its most enduring impact was the strong
foundation that it helped to develop for the resilient Demo-
cratic machine of Chicago.92
Tom Pendergast and the Demise of a Machine
Tom Pendergast never enjoyed the rapport with Roosevelt
that Ed Kelly did. Nor was he indispensable, as Frank Hague
was, for delivering his state's electoral college votes to Roose-
velt. Pendergast, however, was the first major Democratic
machine boss to support Roosevelt in the 1932 campaign.93
During Roosevelt's first term, Pendergast was rewarded for
his delegate support at the convention by being given control
over most federal patronage in Missouri. Matthew S. Murray,
a member of the Pendergast machine, was appointed WPA
director for Missouri, thereby giving Pendergast power over
the WPA payroll and the selection of public works projects.94
Shortly after the 1936 election, though, Roosevelt funneled
federal patronage to anti-Pendergast Democratic politicians
in Missouri and allowed federal authorities to investigate and
prosecute Pendergast for income tax evasion. Imprisoned in
Leavenworth by 1939, his machine crumbled as it candidates
lost control of Kansas City's municipal government to a re-
form ticket.95
The brevity of Pendergast's beneficial relationship with
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the Roosevelt administration and the humiliating demise of
his machine can be explained partially by the position that
Pendergast held in the Missouri Democratic party. Unlike
Frank Hague and Ed Kelly, Pendergast, even at the peak of
his political prowess, did not control his state's Democracy. He
was forced to compete with powerful politicians and factions
from St. Louis and the rural areas. His machine, therefore,
represented only a balance of power in statewide elections.96
Consequently, Pendergast could not consistently maintain
control of his state's governorship during the 1930's, as Hague
had done in New Jersey. This lack of hegemony by Pendergast
in the Missouri Democracy enabled Democratic Governor
Lloyd Stark to launch a vigorous legal attack on the Kansas
City machine after 1936 and motivate Roosevelt to ally him-
self with Stark.97
In July 1931, Jim Farley visited Kansas City to solicit
Pendergast's support for Roosevelt at the upcoming Demo-
cratic national convention, perceiving Pendergast as the dom-
inant power in the Missouri Democracy.98 Al Smith also
believed Pendergast to hold the power and, during one of
Pendergast's 1931 visits to New York, tried to obtain the
support of his fellow Irish Catholic by appealing to a sense of
ethnic solidarity.99 By the fall of 1931, Pendergast had de-
clared his support of Roosevelt's nomination.100 According to
Ike Dunlap, a Harvard classmate of Roosevelt and the gover-
nor's first contact in Missouri, Pendergast felt compelled to
support Missouri's favorite son, Senator James A. Reed, on
the first ballot at the national convention.101
Despite his public facade of supporting Reed's candidacy,
Pendergast worked behind the scenes to assure that the
Missouri delegation would vote for Roosevelt.102 Throughout
May 1932, Pendergast visited Roosevelt and Farley in Albany
and frequently conferred with them by telephone to arrange
a plan to prevent Reed's candidacy from threatening Mis-
souri's support of Roosevelt.103 Roosevelt had suggested that
he offer Reed the vice-presidential nomination, but Pender-
gast rejected the idea. According to the plan they formulated,
the Missouri delegation would support Reed until a critical
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point in the nominating process and then switch its votes to
Roosevelt.104
On the second ballot at the Chicago convention, Missouri
gave Roosevelt his biggest increase in delegate support from
the first ballot.105 By the fourth ballot, Roosevelt's nomina-
tion was assured. In the presidential election of 1932, Roose-
velt carried Missouri by over 460,000 votes. Over 140,000 of
these came from Kansas City alone.106
Grateful for Pendergast's early support and impressed by
his ability to mobilize voters, Roosevelt and Farley were
generous in granting patronage, legal favors, and discretion
over New Deal programs in Missouri to the Kansas City boss.
Through his influence with the White House, Pendergast
managed to secure a presidential pardon for Conrad Mann, a
political associate who was convicted of involvement in an
illegal lottery and was about to be sent to a federal prison.107
Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins had intended to appoint a
Republican, Martin Lewis, as Missouri's director of Federal
Re-employment. Pendergast intervened and secured the ap-
pointment of Harry S. Truman, a county judge and Pen-
dergast ally. Truman formed a close relationship with Harry
Hopkins while working in this position and became a com-
mitted New Dealer.108
As it was for Hague and Kelly, the WPA served as a rich
source of patronage jobs and funds for civic improvements.
The number of Missourians on the WPA payroll fluctuated
between 87,727 in 1936 and 88,884 in 1940.109 Under strong
pressure from Farley and Pendergast, Harry Hopkins agreed
to appoint Matthew Murray as the WPA director.110 Murray
had previously worked as the city manager's director of pub-
lic works and for a construction company affiliated with the
Pendergast machine.111 Entering the Senate in 1935, Tru-
man had used his influence with Hopkins to secure Murray's
appointment. Kansas City, therefore, was assured of a dis-
proportionate share of Missouri's allotment of WPA jobs,
funds, and construction projects.112 Governor Guy Park, a
Pendergast ally, would simply refer Missourians seeking fed-
eral jobs to Pendergast.113
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With his control of one Senate seat and the governorship,
and his beneficial relationships with Hopkins and Farley,
Pendergast had reached his peak of power by 1936. Intimida-
tion and beatings of anti-machine voters by Pendergast's
henchmen, however, stimulated a growing public demand for
an investigation of the blatant ballot fraud which customarily
occurred in Kansas City elections. The leadership of this
reform movement came from an unlikely source, Governor
Lloyd Stark. Pendergast had endorsed Stark in 1936, assum-
ing that he could be as easily manipulated as Guy Park had
been.114 Stark's political objective, though, was to be elected
senator in 1940. Assuming that Truman would run for re-
election in 1940, Stark hoped that he could defeat him in the
primary by generating anti-Pendergast sentiment. Conse-
quently, the governor would devote his administration to the
destruction of the Pendergast machine.
The political showdown between Pendergast and Stark
occurred over the nomination of a candidate to the state
supreme court in 1938. The White House paid close attention
to this intraparty conflict because it would perceive the win-
ner as the dominant power in the Missouri Democracy. Stark
supported the renomination of James M. Douglas, while the
Pendergast machine supported James V. Billings, his oppo-
nent.115 Both the governor and the Kansas City boss used
hardball tactics in mobilizing voters for their respective can-
didates. State employees were intimidated into making cam-
paign contributions for Douglas. Stark purged the state
payroll of suspected supporters of Billings and ordered state
officials to display Douglas bumper stickers.116
Likewise, Pendergast exploited his major asset—the WPA
payroll. WPA foremen warned workers that they would lose
their jobs if they did not vote for Billings. Stark wrote to
Roosevelt frequently during the campaign, informing him of
the Pendergast machine's political use of the WPA and com-
plaining that Hopkins was doing little to stop it.117 Despite
Pendergast's dominance of the WPA, the governor generated
enough anti-Pendergast sentiment to win the primary for
Douglas. The governor confidently told Roosevelt that Doug-
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las's victory "crushed the Pendergast machine by a land-
slide."118
Even before the primary, Roosevelt had been embarrassed
and annoyed by the unfavorable publicity about ballot fraud,
police collusion with gangsters, and other scandals associ-
ated with the Pendergast machine. With the election of Doug-
las, Roosevelt was convinced that Stark, not Pendergast,
would now be the dominant power in the Missouri Democ-
racy. In sharp contrast to his earlier suppression of federal
court action against Pendergast associates, Roosevelt now
supported a vigorous federal investigation of Pendergast's
finances.119 The Treasury Department investigated the
boss's tax returns while the Justice Department continued its
investigation of his acceptance of an insurance bribe.120
The political uses of the WPA and federal patronage had
demonstrated Roosevelt's ability to strengthen and expand
Democratic machines favored by the White House. Conversely,
the full force of the Justice Department and the federal court
system applied against the Pendergast machine demon-
strated the president's ability to destroy a boss who was
regarded as a liability. By contrast, Roosevelt had prevented
federal prosecution of Frank Hague's mail tampering. De-
spite the public outcry stimulated by the Jersey City mayor's
arrogant suppression of CIO activities, Roosevelt had recog-
nized that Hague maintained effective control of his state's
party and was essential for a Democratic victory in the 1940
presidential election. Pendergast may have been less despica-
ble as a machine boss than the autocratic Hague, but he was
no longer indispensable to Roosevelt as Stark began to super-
sede him in the Missouri Democracy.
Roosevelt's ultimate treatment of Pendergast reveals the
ambivalent and conditional nature of Roosevelt's relation-
ship with the Democratic machine bosses while pursuing his
strategy of expanding and liberalizing the Party. He was
willing to cooperate with the bosses and benefit their ma-
chines in order to maintain the party's cohesion and electoral
base in urban areas and to assure his own re-election. Roose-
velt's support, however, was contingent on a boss's ability to
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contribute to the Party's unity and strength without tainting
the White House.121 Therefore, as Pendergast's power de-
clined and his machine's sordid scandals became intolerable
to the White House, Roosevelt did not hesitate to use federal
investigatory powers to accelerate the destruction of the Pen-
dergast machine.
Ed Flynn and New York Politics
Edward J. Flynn, the Democratic county leader of the Bronx,
was similar to Hague, Kelly, and Pendergast only in his party
affiliation, ethnicity, and church affiliation. His father was an
Irish immigrant who graduated from Trinity College in Dub-
lin and became a successful businessman in the Bronx.122
Flynn, who was born into a comfortable, middle-class home,
graduated from Fordham College and Law School. He was an
articulate, urbane, and well-read man. Eleanor Roosevelt
remarked that Flynn, unlike Farley and the other Irish pol-
iticos, could understand the ideological and policy aspects of
the New Deal that transformed the Party during her hus-
band's presidency.123
By 1918, Flynn was operating a successful law practice and
had not considered a political career. Bronx Democrats,
though persuaded him to run for assemblyman. In 1922, with
the support of Tammany chief Charles F. Murphy, the young
assemblyman was elected sheriff and Democratic county
leader of the Bronx.124 Flynn first became acquainted with
Roosevelt at the 1924 Democratic state convention. During
Roosevelt's governorship, he served as secretary of state and
traveled throughout New York with Jim Farley, expanding
the state party and strengthening its party apparatus.125
Though Flynn and Farley were somewhat successful in
making the New York Democracy under Roosevelt's lead-
ership more attractive to upstate voters, Tammany Hall had
been plagued by bitter, divisive factionalism since Boss Mur-
phy's death in 1924.126 Al Smith's governorship and presiden-
tial candidacies in 1924 and 1928 provided some degree of
harmony and unity,127 but it would never again possess the
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degree of citywide unity, cohesion, and discipline that it had
enjoyed under Murphy's firm, capable leadership.128
In a 1928 article, journalist Joseph McGoldrick expressed
his hope that under Smith's de facto leadership through
George Olvany a "New Tammany" would emerge in which
"idealism rather than private gain is the dominating motive
of its effective leaders."129 The prospect, though, of a "New
Tammany" emerging as an honest, progressive party organi-
zation soon appeared unlikely.130 Busy with his governorship
and presidential ambitions, Smith ignored much of the self-
serving corruption and internecine conflicts that occurred
among the Tammany leaders after Murphy's death.131 He
agreed to the nomination and subsequent election of Jimmy
Walker for mayor in 1925 and again in 1929.132 As mayor,
Jimmy Walker became known to the public mostly for his
flamboyant personality and utter incompetence as adminis-
trator of the city's finances.
But even with a more competent mayor, the changing
demography of New York City made it more difficult for a
Tammany leader to exercise the strict, centralized control
over Democratic politicians that Murphy had. As the Man-
hattan proportion of New York City's population steadily
declined, the populations of other boroughs, especially the
Bronx and Queens, grew quickly.133 Feeling secure in their
bailiwicks, the Democratic leaders in the growing, outlying
boroughs sought to remain independent of centralized con-
trol.134
Besides having embarrassed Roosevelt's presidential can-
didacy through the Walker scandals, Tammany delegates at
the Democratic National Convention remained loyal to Smith
and refused to make Roosevelt's nomination unanimous.
John Curry, elected Tammany leader in 1929, spitefully tried
to prevent the gubernatorial nomination of Herbert Lehman,
Roosevelt's choice as his successor in Albany in 1932.135
Smith intervened and forced Curry to accept the nomination
of Roosevelt's lieutenant governor.136
With Tammany Hall's record of seamy corruption and re-
lentless defiance toward Roosevelt, it is not surprising that
the newly-inaugurated president did not feel obligated to
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funnel federal patronage to Tammany Democrats. Instead, he
and Farley gave the bulk of federal patronage in New York to
the three leading anti-Curry Democrats: Ed Flynn; Frank
Kelly, the Democratic county leader in Brooklyn; and Eddy
Ahearn, a district leader on the Lower East Side. Roosevelt
hoped to spawn an intraparty purge of the Curry Democrats
by strengthening these party organizations.137 By coordinat-
ing his efforts with Farley, Flynn hoped to build a reformist,
pro-Roosevelt Democratic organization that could win city-
wide elections, namely the mayor's office.138
Flynn made his first attempt to implant such a Democratic
organization in city hall during the mayoral election of 1933.
At the request of Flynn and Farley, John J. McKee, an anti-
Curry Tammany politician, was nominated as the mayoral
candidate of the Recovery party.139 Through this third party,
Flynn and Farley hoped to attract enough voters that Tam-
many Hall would at least be pressured into reforming itself,
even if McKee was not elected. Besides attracting the votes of
Democrats alienated from Tammany Hall, Flynn and Farley
hoped that the Recovery party would attract independent
voters who were anti-Tammany yet pro-Roosevelt.140
Since Walker's resignation, the mayor's office had been
held by John O'Brien, a Tammany judge. O'Brien's lackluster
leadership and the unpopularity of layoffs among municipal
employees made victory by McKee seem plausible. The Irish
working class, more dependent on municipal employment
than other ethnic groups, and Tammany's bastion of electoral
support, was especially bitter toward O'Brien's fiscal aus-
terity policy.141 New York City Jews, who represented a
disproportionate number of public school teachers and social
workers, were also angry about the Depression-induced lay-
offs.142
McKee, though, only succeeded in splitting the Tammany
vote among Irish voters. In the race between O'Brien, McKee,
and La Guardia, McKee placed second with approximately 32
percent of the vote while O'Brien received about 27 percent
and La Guardia won with 41 percent.143 La Guardia had
built a patchwork coalition of middle-class reformers, Repub-
licans, anti-Tammany Democrats, and non-Irish ethnics,
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especially Italians and Jews, through the Fusion party.144
Throughout his administration, La Guardia provided Ital-
ians and Jews with a degree of involvement and employment
in New York City's politics and government that they had not
enjoyed during Tammany's previous hegemony of city hall.145
With La Guardia's widespread popularity and accomplish-
ments as a progressive mayor, Roosevelt realized that there
was little hope of a revitalized, reformed Tammany Hall
emerging soon and defeating La Guardia.146 He, therefore,
gave La Guardia the same degree of discretion over New Deal
programs in New York City, especially the WPA, that he had
given such Democratic mayors as Ed Kelly and Frank Hague.
Throughout his political career, Roosevelt had been able to
attract the votes of independents and progressive Republi-
cans who usually did not vote Democratic. During his gov-
ernorship, much of his party-building strategy consisted of
making the state party attractive to such voters in upstate
New York. Now, as president, Roosevelt realized the impor-
tance of La Guardia in attracting such voters to his own
candidacy.
Consequently, La Guardia played a leading role in attract-
ing pro-New Deal Republicans and independents to Roose-
velt in the president's three re-election campaigns.147 Except
for his support of Ed Flynn through a generous flow of federal
patronage, Roosevelt maintained a position of benign neu-
trality in New York City politics. He did, however, become
favorable toward Tammany Hall by 1942 when he supported
the election of Mike Kennedy, a liberal Democratic congress-
man, as Tammany leader.148 The maverick, charismatic
mayor remained defiantly independent by refusing to en-
dorse Republicans for state and national offices while sup-
porting the re-election of Democratic Governor Herbert
Lehman in 1938.149
Even if Tammany Hall was doomed to disintegration and
political impotence, Roosevelt still hoped to stimulate a
strong, liberal Democratic organization in New York City. His
chief instrument in trying to pressure that city's Party into
becoming more liberal and attractive to pro-New Deal voters
was the American Labor Party (ALP).150 With the help of
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Farley and Flynn, the ALP was organized in 1936 by two
Socialist labor leaders, Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers union and David Dubinsky of the Interna-
tional Ladies' Garment Workers Union.151 The original pur-
pose of this party was to attract Socialists and workers from
unions outside of the AFL to Roosevelt's candidacy. Hillman
was also a leading member of Labor's Non-Partisan League
and used the ALP to solicit an impressive amount in cam-
paign contributions and votes for Roosevelt's re-election.152
Although the ALP helped to re-elect Roosevelt and Leh-
man in New York, it was soon evident that the ALP would not
allow itself to merely be a liberal-labor wing of the local
Democratic party. Flynn was ambivalent about helping to
establish the ALP, fearing that it might detract from, rather
than contribute to, the electoral support of Democratic candi-
dates.153 The ALP endorsed La Guardia over Democratic
mayoral nominees in 1937 and 1941 and later helped to elect
the maverick leftist Vito Marcantonio to Congress.154 By
1944, liberal political strength in New York City became even
more fragmented when the Liberal party was established by
more moderate members of the ALP.155
After Fiorello La Guardia decided not to run for re-election
in 1945, the importance of the ALP for Democratic victory in
the race for mayor became evident.156 La Guardia had de-
feated Tammany Democrat William O'Dwyer by a very narrow
margin in 1941, and the ALPs votes had been indispensable
for his second re-election.157 By adopting more liberal posi-
tions, O'Dwyer gained ALP support in 1945 and won an
overwhelming victory.158 Roosevelt's objective of having the
ALP become an independent source of electoral support that
would pressure the city's Democratic party to become more
liberal and reformist had been realized.
With his Democratic organization in the Bronx secure and
local politics dominated by La Guardia, Flynn devoted most of
his time to national party affairs.159 This was especially true
after 1936 as relations between Roosevelt and Farley became
strained.160 Like Farley, Flynn opposed Tommy Corcoran's
idea of "purging" selected anti-New Deal Democrats in the
congressional primaries of 1938. He agreed with Farley that
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such unprecedented intervention by Roosevelt would create
resentment and rebelliousness among Party regulars and
weaken the president's influence within the Party appara-
tus.161
Despite his reluctance, Flynn agreed to "purge" New York
Representative John J. O'Connor, the chairman of the power-
ful House Rules Committee, who had obstructed New Deal
legislation, and help elect James H. Fay to replace him. Flynn
made it clear to Roosevelt, though, that he did not want any
interference from Corcoran or the other "amateurs."162 The
election of Fay was the only success in the otherwise disas-
trous purge of 1938.
As Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner once wrote, the White
House "amateurs" like Corcoran and Hopkins were "palace
politicians" who were inexperienced and inept in conducting
such intraparty operations. Although Roosevelt did rely on
political advice from Corcoran and Hopkins during his sec-
ond term, he realized that the actual execution of a political
strategy within the Party should be led by an experienced
Party professional like Flynn. With Farley defiantly con-
testing him for the Democratic presidential nomination in
1940, Roosevelt relied on Flynn to organize support for his
renomination from the machine bosses and Party regulars at
the national convention. Flynn was initially reluctant to be-
come national chairman, but he was persuaded by Frank
Walker, the DNC treasurer who succeeded Farley as Post-
master General.163
After Flynn managed Roosevelt's re-election campaign, he
was determined to maintain the strength and cohesion of the
Party apparatus that Farley had built as DNC chairman.
Like his predecessor, Flynn disliked the interference of the
White House New Dealers in patronage distribution and
party affairs. Flynn, however, was more persuasive and suc-
cessful than Farley in persuading Roosevelt to check with the
DNC and Democratic state committees before making federal
appointments. Flynn hoped that this would prevent the New
Deal "amateurs" from appointing federal officials who were
unacceptable, or even hostile, to Party organizations within
their jurisdictions.
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During his less than three years as DNC chairman, Flynn
tried to improve communications and coordination between
the DNC, Democratic state committees, and Democrats in
Congress. Whereas Farley had focused on increasing the size
of the Party apparatus by expanding special divisions for
specific voting blocs, Flynn was trying to achieve greater
consolidation and coordination among the disparate elements
of the Party.164 He especially sought greater cooperation be-
tween Democratic members of Congress and the DNC on
raising funds for the Party treasury. Roosevelt, though, busy
with foreign policy and defense matters, could not always give
Flynn the attention and support that he needed to accomplish
these objectives for the party apparatus.165
Although he did develop a friendly, productive political
relationship with Harry Hopkins, Flynn experienced cold,
strained relations with the other New Dealers, especially
Harold L. Ickes.166 While Ickes and other New Dealers in the
administration contemptuously regarded Flynn as a Party
hack, the DNC chairman perceived them as pretentious and
politically inept "prima donnas" who threatened intraparty
harmony by their clumsy intrusion into Party affairs. For
example, to reduce DNC expenses, Flynn decreased the num-
ber of paid radio broadcasts for Ickes, Hopkins, and other New
Dealers.167 Being both more assertive and more persuasive in
his relationship with Roosevelt than Farley was, Flynn often
received Roosevelt's support in his conflicts with the New
Dealers over patronage and party matters.168
The controversy in the Senate over Flynn's aborted nomi-
nation as ambassador to Australia in 1943 impelled the Dem-
ocratic national chairman to submit his resignation. This
quiet, bookish Bronx politician had never really enjoyed
being in the public eye. Nevertheless, he continued to serve
Roosevelt in Party affairs after he was succeeded by Frank
Walker as DNC chairman. With Bob Hannegan, the new
DNC chairman in 1944, and leading machine bosses, Flynn
helped to organize Roosevelt's re-election campaign in 1944
and to persuade him to choose Harry S. Truman as his run-
ning mate.169 After Roosevelt's death, Flynn withdrew from
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national politics yet remained chairman of the Bronx County
Democratic Committee until his death in 1953.
Unlike Kelly, Hague, and Pendergast, Flynn was not a
machine boss who controlled the margin of victory in his state
for determining electoral college and delegates' votes at na-
tional conventions. Instead, he was important to Roosevelt's
party leadership because of his political skills in serving as
the president's liaison with Democratic bosses and party reg-
ulars. Because La Guardia dominated New York City politics
during Roosevelt's presidency, Flynn immersed himself in
national party affairs.170 With his experience in party organ-
izations and his intellectual grasp of the ideological and pol-
icy aspects during the New Deal era, Flynn used his talents
as an intermediary and coordinator for the benefit of Roose-
velt and the Party.
The Bosses and a Liberal Democratic Party
Roosevelt's dependence on the political support of the ma-
chine bosses and their urban constituents grew steadily
during his presidency. The bosses, who had been the presi-
dent's opponents at the 1932 convention, were his most power-
ful allies in his 1944 campaign. In the 1932 election, only 25
percent of Roosevelt's plurality of votes came from the na-
tion's twelve largest cities. In the 1944 election, however,
approximately 65 percent of his margin of victory came from
these cities.171
As the New Deal became more controversial and divisive
after 1936, it seemed to lose the consensual appeal it had
previously held among the electorate. This was especially
true among rural, non-southern white Protestants, who re-
turned to the Republican party in presidential elections after
1936.172 Urban voters, especially working-class ethnics and
blacks, however, remained loyal to Roosevelt and the more
liberal Democratic party that had emerged from the New
Deal policy agenda.173
While Roosevelt had become more dependent on machine
bosses and their constituents for electoral support, the major
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cities of the Northeast and Midwest had become permanently
dependent on the federal government for their fiscal health.
In 1933, Harold F. Gosnell wrote that urban party machines
thrived during periods of rapid economic growth and that
"the economic crisis which began in 1929 has greatly reduced
our national income and has made the burden of taxation
appear relatively much greater than it did in the past."174
Thus, the survival of urban party machines was threatened
by the greater demand for relief combined with the sharp
drop in property tax revenues during the Depression.
But Gosnell did not anticipate the massive infusion of
federal funds into the cities in the form of federal programs
for relief, public works, education, public health, public hous-
ing, and other policy areas which affected both the cities'
public infrastructure and the welfare of their low-income
residents.175 By subsidizing municipal budgets, New Deal
programs helped the urban machines to maintain their cred-
ibility with constituents and thus stay in power. Many ma-
chines, therefore, not only survived but even thrived and
expanded during the New Deal era. The Chicago machine, for
example, used New Deal programs and public works jobs not
only to satisfy the demand for relief and jobs among its low-
income constituents but also to coopt traditionally Republi-
can businessmen and middle-class home owners by avoiding
property tax increases.176
A Democratic machine emerged in traditionally Republi-
can Pittsburgh in 1933, cultivated an especially close rela-
tionship with Roosevelt, and enjoyed a generous flow of fed-
eral funds and patronage. During the New Deal era, the
astute use of federal aid by the Pittsburgh Democratic ma-
chine enabled it to establish an enduring credibility with the
city's residents. It remained in power until the 1970s.177
Cities' dependence on federal aid and their machines' sym-
biotic political relationship with Roosevelt resulted in a new
federal-city relationship. Consequently, the city bosses be-
came the most ardent advocates of the New Deal's form of
cooperative federalism in which the federal government
played a greater role in the cities' public policies, public in-
frastructure, and fiscal affairs.178 It would not be until the
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Great Society programs of the 1960s that Democratic mayors
would begin to object to federal intervention in their cities.179
During Roosevelt's presidency, though, they recognized the
political advantages of claiming credit for the policy accom-
plishments and economic benefits that New Deal programs
provided for their cities.
The political relationship which developed between Roose-
velt and the Democratic bosses was not just a matter of mu-
tual self-interest, however. The perception of "bosses" and
"reformers" in urban politics as being clearly distinct from
each other can be misleading because these opposing political
leaders may use similar tactics and seek similar policy objec-
tives.180 Tom Pendergast, for example, strongly supported
the adoption of a city manager government for Kansas City
while Frank Hague vigorously suppressed drug dealing and
prostitution in Jersey City. Ed Kelly's forced retirement as
mayor of Chicago in 1947 was partially caused by the opposi-
tion of machine politicians and their white ethnic constitu-
ents toward Kelly's liberalism on the racial integration of
public schools and housing.
The multi-ethnic and, by the 1940s, increasingly black
demography of major northern cities made the Democratic
urban bosses more receptive than their southern colleagues
to Roosevelt's objective of making the national Democratic
party a more liberal, pluralistic, and inclusive party. Unlike
demagogic, race-baiting southern Democrats, the machine
bosses and machine-supported members of Congress were
sensitive and responsive to the ethnically, religiously, and
racially diverse political environments in which they oper-
ated. The major anti-lynching bill of the 1930s was sponsored
by Robert Wagner, the Tammany-affiliated Democratic sen-
ator from New York, and was strongly supported in the House
of Representatives by such machine-supported members as
Mary T. Norton of Jersey City and Adolph Sabath of Chicago.
Roosevelt found the northern, machine-connected members
of Congress to be his most reliably and consistently liberal
supporters, on both domestic and foreign policy issues. They
not only supported New Deal programs which benefited their
constituents but were among the first members of Congress
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to denounce Nazi aggression and support the controversial
defense build-up and the Selective Service Act of 1940.181
In 1942, political scientist E.E. Schattschneider stated that
"the fact that the local boss engages in politics at all levels of
American government is one of the foundation stones of his
authority and longevity."182 Because of the ability to influ-
ence national party politics Democratic bosses and the mem-
bers of Congress affiliated with their machines became the
most crucial supporters of public policy initiatives, which
more clearly defined the national party as a liberal party.
This was especially true of the civil rights issue during Tru-
man's presidency. The intraparty struggle over the adoption
of a strong civil rights plank at the 1948 Democratic National
Convention was led by machine-connected liberal Democrats
like Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois and Joe Clark, an ADA
activist and later a senator from Pennsylvania.183 In order to
maintain friendly relations with Democratic presidents, the
Democratic machine bosses recognized the importance of
helping the political careers of such well-respected, nation-
ally prominent liberals as Paul Douglas and Adlai Stevenson.
By providing a substantial and reliable base of electoral
support for both Roosevelt and liberal Democratic members of
Congress, machine bosses contributed to both the expansion
and the liberalization of the national Party during Roosevelt's
presidency. A diversity of factors led major machine bosses to
embrace New Deal liberalism: their cities' fiscal dependence
on federal aid, the use of the WPA for patronage and struc-
tural improvements, and the economic needs and multi-ethnic
composition of their working-class constituents. Roosevelt
was grateful for the crucial political support that the machine
bosses provided for his campaigns. Consequently, he was
willing to ignore the machines' political exploitation of New
Deal programs, especially the WPA.192
Lyle Dorsett, a scholar of Roosevelt's relationships with
machine bosses, exaggerates the quid pro quo nature of
Roosevelt's relationship with the machine bosses. He per-
ceives Roosevelt as a self-centered opportunist who cultivated
the bosses only for the purpose of his own renomination and
re-election campaigns.193 He fails to explain that Roosevelt
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also needed the machine bosses and their congressional dele-
gations to receive support for controversial, liberal domestic
policy initiatives and his pre-Pearl Harbor foreign policy and
defense measures. Roosevelt's motives, therefore, for forging
and maintaining an alliance with the machine bosses went
beyond a self-centered concern with his own political career.
The alliance enabled him to develop the urban-industrial
areas of the Northeast and Midwest as enduring bastions of
support for a more liberal Democratic party and for later
liberal, national policy initiatives, such as civil rights for
blacks.186
In a 1950 article in Commentary, Irwin Ross analyzed the
role of the Democratic machine bosses in presidential party
leadership and liberalism during the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations. On almost every policy issue during the
New Deal and Fair Deal, the bosses and their congressional
delegations were the most powerful and reliable supporters of
Democratic liberalism. Ross persuasively contends that the
more astute, successful Democratic machines adapted to the
political changes of this era by becoming advocates of liberal
reforms and closely allying themselves with these two liberal
Democratic presidents.187 Ross concludes that the political
support of machine bosses and their urban constituents will
remain indispensable to the liberal identity of the national
Democratic party and that "the changes that have overtaken
the machine have in turn had a significant impact on Amer-
ican liberal politics. That impact can be simply phrased: for
the foreseeable future, the Democratic party will probably
remain the main vehicle for liberal advance—and the new
streamlined Democratic urban machines will be there to keep
the party in power."188
4 Roosevelt and the
Democratic National
Committee
FDR's Concept of the DNC's Role
As a private citizen during the 1920s, Roosevelt worried that
the Democratic party would remain a chronically weak, mi-
nority party unless it clearly distinguished itself as a liberal
organization and improved its appeal among voters dissatis-
fied with Republican policies. He suggested the Party ad-
dress economic grievances and interests ignored or damaged
by Republican policies and recognized the importance of
building Party organizations that could influence the selec-
tion of delegates for conventions, the choice of party nomina-
tions, and the formulation of policy platforms. Believing that
the masses of Democratic activists were more liberal than the
wealthy elites who dominated the DNC, he frequently pro-
posed that the national committee democratize its decision-
making and fund-raising processes through such reforms as
issues conventions and the solicitation of small campaign
contributions through local party committees. He believed
the liberal activists could influence the formulation of the
Party's policy platforms if such proposals were adopted.
While the Democratic party was out of power in Congress
and the presidency, Roosevelt wanted the DNC to serve as a
vehicle for making economic policy proposals more liberal
and thus more attractive to the electorate. The DNC chair-
men during this time, however, rejected his proposals. Roose-
velt feared that, without such democratic reforms for the
economic policy preferences of rank-and-file Democrats and
become a vehicle of conservative reaction that would make
the Party's policy platforms as subservient to big business
interests as those of the Republican party. Because it would
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fail to provide the American electorate with a clear alter-
native in ideology and public policy, the Party would remain
an electorally unsuccessful minority party.
After he overcame DNC chairman John J. Raskob's opposi-
tion to his presidential candidacy and received the Demo-
cratic nomination in 1932, Roosevelt adopted a new concept of
the role of the DNC. Because he could now appoint the DNC
chairman, he no longer had to fear that the committee would
become a vehicle for conservatism within the Party. With the
Committee now under his control, he agreed with Jim Farley
and his successors that the DNC should be used for maintain-
ing intraparty harmony instead of used for democratizing the
Party's apparatus and decision-making process. Also, be-
cause the Democrats now controlled the presidency and both
houses of Congress, Roosevelt no longer found it necessary for
the DNC to become a major vehicle for liberalizing Party
ideology. The formulation and pursuit of the New Deal policy
agenda by the Roosevelt administration and Democrats in
Congress and the emergence of interest groups and voting
blocs favoring New Deal liberalism would become the chief
means for the liberal transformation of the national Demo-
cratic party.
The DNC created or expanded special divisions whose
purpose was to cultivate the electoral support of specific vot-
ing blocs and interest groups, namely, women, blacks, labor,
and young voters. The most politically active and effective
special division of the DNC during Roosevelt's presidency was
the Women's Division under the leadership of Mary Dewson.
Dewson won the respect and support of Roosevelt, Farley, and
other male Democratic politicians by convincing them that
the voting power and political activism of Democratic women
could contribute to the overall electoral strength of the Party.
In 1936, approximately 80 percent of all Democratic cam-
paign literature was produced and distributed by the Wom-
en's Division. The assiduous, effective efforts of the Women's
Division in fund raising, publicity, and voter mobilization
resulted in Democratic women gaining greater influence in
formulating platforms at the national conventions and
greater success in receiving patronage jobs.
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While the Labor Division sought to cultivate the electoral
support of the rapidly increasing number of unionized work-
ers during the 1930s, its role in attracting voters and cam-
paign contributions from organized labor was overshadowed
by Labor's Non-Partisan League in 1936 and the CIO under
Sidney Hillman's leadership in 1940 and 1944. While the CIO
was technically independent of the DNC, it would become a
major source of campaign funds for Roosevelt as the propor-
tion of contributions from business interests sharply declined
after 1932. Thus, the national Party's growing dependence on
organized labor for financial contributions and campaign
services, such as canvassing and mobilizing voters, would
accelerate its liberal transformation by solidifying its com-
mitment to labor reforms and social welfare measures.
Besides its growing dependence on organized labor for
raising funds during presidential campaigns, the DNC also
became more dependent on contributions of less than $100
each. Thus, the DNC was beginning to achieve Roosevelt's
objective, conceived and proposed during the 1920s, of in-
creasing the number of small contributions from individual
voters and decreasing its financial dependence on large con-
tributions from a small number of wealthy patrons. During
the 1944 campaign, the CIO conducted a vigorous effort,
urging its approximately six million members to make indi-
vidual contributions to the DNC's campaign treasury for
Roosevelt. With financial independence from big business
interests, the Party could formulate and pursue New Deal
policy objectives opposed by big business but supported by
labor unions.
The four DNC chairmen who served during Roosevelt's
presidency neither initiated nor opposed the liberal trans-
formation of the Party under Roosevelt's leadership and the
stimulus of the New Deal policy agenda. Instead, they focused
on maintaining the intraparty cohesion necessary for raising
funds—rewarding Party activists with patronage jobs, man-
aging national conventions, and mobilizing voters. During
Roosevelt's first term, Jim Farley strengthened and expanded
the Party apparatus by distributing a vast supply of federal
patronage to Party regulars and improving its fund-raising
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ability through the establishment of annual Jackson Day
dinners held in Washington and by state and local Demo-
cratic committees as well as by the sale of campaign books,
which was finally prohibited by the Hatch Act of 1940. Far-
ley's alienation from Roosevelt after 1936 and his resignation
as DNC chairman in 1940 was impelled by his personal re-
sentment about being neglected by Roosevelt and not by an
ideological antipathy toward New Deal liberalism.
Because of the decline of intraparty harmony and the
growth of southern conservative opposition to Roosevelt's
party leadership by 1940, Farley's three successors would
focus on improving the intraparty harmony and cooperation
among the various factions and interest groups necessary for
assuring Roosevelt's renomination and re-election in 1940
and 1944. DNC Chairman Ed Flynn sought to improve coop-
eration and coordination between the committee and congres-
sional Democrats, while his successor, Frank Walker, helped
to resolve a bitter conflict between the Democratic and
Farmer-Labor factions of the Minnesota Democratic Farmer-
Labor party. During the 1944 campaign, Chairman Bob
Hannegan would oversee the micromanagement of voter mo-
bilization efforts by the thousands of Democratic precinct
committees in order to assure a voter turn-out high enough to
re-elect Roosevelt.
By 1945, the DNC's apparatus was smaller and had fewer
funds than it had during its peak of size and wealth during
the 1936 campaign. The growing power of the CIO within the
Party and the proliferation of pro-Roosevelt campaign com-
mittees technically independent of the DNC—formed in order
to evade campaign finance reform laws—reduced the role of
the DNC and its special divisions in raising funds and can-
vassing voters. However, the special DNC divisions that had
been created or expanded during Roosevelt's presidency had
helped to make the Party's fund-raising efforts and decision-
making processes more open, democratic, and participatory.
Thus, interest groups and voting blocs that favored a more
liberal Party gained more active and influential roles in
national Party affairs. The DNC, especially its special divi-
sions, responded to the growing power and influence of such
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liberal groups by granting them a greater role in Party ac-
tivities, especially at national conventions. Consequently, by
creating a more democratic Party, Roosevelt achieved his
objective of removing the threat of the DNC as a vehicle for
conservative reaction and of making the Committee reflective
of a more inclusive, liberal Party.
The DNC under Parley
After 1932, Roosevelt no longer focused on transforming the
DNC into a vehicle for liberalizing the Party. Instead, he
agreed with Farley's policy of using the DNC to maintain
intraparty harmony and unity while expanding its apparatus
in order to consolidate the Party's gains among women,
blacks, labor, and young voters.1
In particular, Farley oversaw the expansion of special DNC
divisions.2 The activities and structural changes of the com-
mittee during Roosevelt's presidency would reflect both the
expansion of the Party's electoral base and the growth of
intraparty conflicts over the changes the New Deal and Roo-
sevelt's leadership induced.3
The extent to which Farley could make the DNC and the
other Party committees responsive to his leadership de-
pended on the extent to which he could control the distribu-
tion of federal patronage and maintain a close relationship
with Roosevelt and Democrats in Congress. Farley first
sought to achieve a more centralized relationship with local
Party committees during the 1932 campaign. He had the
DNC compose a list of the approximately 140,000 Democratic
activists and a description of their campaign duties,4 then
sent campaign literature directly to these Party workers
instead of sending it in bulk form to state committees.5
Farley, who also served as Postmaster General, gained
even more patronage power than previous DNC chairmen
who served during Democratic administrations. The high
unemployment rate, the sharp increase in the number of
federal jobs, and a declining proportion of federal jobs covered
by the civil service merit system all combined to enhance
Farley's patronage power and thus his influence within the
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Party apparatus.6 Emil Hurja, the DNC's assistant chairman
and statistician, became a personnel director in the PWA,
thereby extending Farley's power into an agency whose direc-
tor, Harold Ickes, was hostile to him.7 In 1933, he tried but
failed to formalize his patronage power with a centralized
system in which the heads of all federal agencies and cabinet
departments would have to defer to the DNC on appointed
positions.8
Despite the substantial patronage power he possessed,
Farley wielded it cautiously and tactfully. He was careful to
consult Democratic senators and congressmen about making
appointments in their states and districts because he re-
garded as his chief function the maintenance of intraparty
harmony and cooperative relations between the DNC and
Democratic politicians at the congressional, state, and local
levels. Until his later alienation from Roosevelt and the emer-
gence of his own presidential ambition after 1936, Farley's use
of his patronage power was further tempered by his self-
subordination to Roosevelt and his role as the president's
loyal representative in internal Party affairs.9
In addition to the distribution of federal patronage, the
DNC chairman's major responsibilities between presidential
campaigns entailed managing the activities of the national
Party headquarters. A full-time, permanent Democratic na-
tional headquarters had been established by John Raskob,
Farley's predecessor. Prior to Raskob's chairmanship, a na-
tional party headquarters existed only during presidential
campaigns.
The purpose of the Executive Committee was to manage
the funding and operations of the DNC's staff. Jouett Shouse
focused on managing a publicity campaign against Hoover.10
He and Raskob created a full-time Publicity Division with
Charles Michelson as its director.11 Shouse and Michelson
then created a Research Bureau to provide information for
anti-Hoover publicity. Having expanded the DNC's activities
and functions between presidential campaigns, Raskob left
Farley an active and well-funded organization.12 Farley
would seek to maintain the strength and efficacy of this party
apparatus through the astute distribution of federal patron-
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age; the maintenance of cordial, cooperative relations with
Democrats in Congress, urban machines, and state and local
party committees; and diversification of the sources of funds
for the DNC.
DNC Finances (1932-1944)
Despite Raskob's organizational and financial accomplish-
ments for the DNC, Farley needed a steady flow of contribu-
tions to the DNC to maintain its various political activities,
especially publicity. The DNC's growing financial depen-
dence on organized labor and many small contributions en-
abled it to adapt to and reflect the liberal transformation of
the Party. The DNC treasurer was elected by the membership
of the Committee and, according to its 1936 convention rule,
was "empowered to perform all the necessary duties of his
office . . . in such a manner and under such terms as he may
deem proper and advisable."13
With this high degree of discretion in fulfilling his duties,
the DNC treasurer was often a close associate of the Commit-
tee chairman and perhaps the presidential nominee as well.
He was usually a corporate lawyer, banker, or businessman
with contacts in big business. Frank Walker, the treasurer in
1932, was a lawyer and an executive in the motion picture
industry.14 Lawrence W. "Chip" Robert, Jr., the owner of a
large engineering firm, served as assistant treasurer under
Walter Cummings from 1936 to 1940. Oliver A. Quayle, Jr.,
was a printing company executive who served as treasurer
from 1937 to 1941. He was succeeded by Richard J. Reynolds, a
tobacco tycoon who loaned approximately $300,000 to various
Democratic state committees during the 1940 campaign.15
Despite the domination of this office by wealthy Demo-
cratic businessmen, the proportion of the DNC's funds con-
tributed by business interests steadily declined after 1928. In
1928, the DNC spent a total of $5,342,350; 25.3 percent of this
was derived from bankers and stockbrokers. In 1932, the
Committee only spent $2,245,975; yet a similar proportion,
24.2 percent of its funds was derived from these financial
interests. However, the DNC spent over $5 million in 1936,
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even though only 3.3 percent came from bankers and stock
brokers. The figures for the total DNC expenditures for the
1940 and 1944 campaigns were, respectively, $2,783,654 and
$2,169,077. Campaign contributions from the foregoing fi-
nancial interests accounted for 3.1 percent and 5.2 percent of
the total expenditures, respectively.16 V.O. Key, Jr., observed
in 1947 that as business hostility to the New Deal and to an
increasingly liberal Democratic party intensified, "the gen-
eral sharpening of political conflict along class lines man-
ifested itself in the pecuniary loyalty of finance and heavy
industry to the Republican party."17
Besides the sharp drop in business contributions to the
DNC during Roosevelt's presidency, there was also a signifi-
cant decline in financial support from large individual con-
tributors. In 1928, 52.7 percent of the cash contributions to
the DNC came from individuals giving $5,000 or more. Sur-
prisingly, only 45.8 percent of the Republican National Com-
mittee's cash contributions in 1928 came from this source.
During the 1940 campaign, as a result of businessmen's antip-
athy toward Roosevelt and the campaign finance reforms of
the second Hatch Act, only 13 percent of the DNC's cash
contributions came from individuals giving $5,000 or more.18
Meanwhile, the DNC became more dependent on large
numbers of contributors giving less than $100 each. The
proportion of cash contributions received from these small
donors nearly doubled, from 12.5 percent in 1928 to 23.3
percent in 1940.19 The Party appeared to be moving gradu-
ally toward Roosevelt's objective of making it more dependent
on small contributors in order to make it more responsive to
its rank and file's policy preferences.20
The DNC also devised new fund-raising methods after
1932. In order to financially prepare for and then liquidate
the debts of the 1936 presidential campaign, Farley arranged
to have a campaign book published for the 1936 convention.21
Copies of this book and advertising space within it were sold
to raise funds for the DNC. Three editions of the book sold at
different prices: $2.50, $5.00, and $100. After the election,
though, some deluxe editions of this campaign book sold for
$250 each.22 Louise Overacker, an authority on campaign
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finance during the Roosevelt presidency, estimated that
the 1936 Democratic campaign book netted the DNC about
$250,000.23
To raise funds for the 1940 campaign, Farley began to sell
advertising space for the next campaign book. Sales netted
the DNC $170,000.24 The Hatch Act of 1939, however, pro-
hibited the DNC from selling copies of and advertising space
in such books.25 Because the committee began planning and
selling advertising space for the 1940 campaign book prior to
the passage of the first Hatch Act, it considered contesting
this provision, but instead gave away copies, thus realizing
little profit in the venture.26
After the prohibition of revenue from campaign books, the
DNC relied more on the Jackson Day dinners as a source of
funds.27 Farley also wanted to use the dinners in Washington
as a way of promoting intraparty unity and camaraderie and
of attracting favorable publicity. The first annual dinner of
this kind was held in 1936, cost those who attended $50 per
plate, and raised about $100,000 for the DNC. In 1937 and
thereafter, Roosevelt supporters paid $100 each to attend. In
early January of every year, while the Jackson Day Dinner
was being held in Washington, similar dinners were spon-
sored by state and local Party committees nationwide at as
little as $2 per plate. Approximately 300,000 Democrats at-
tended these dinners in 1936.29
Except in 1939, when the DNC received only $322,000,
these dinners attracted about $400,000 annually, peaking at
$422,000 in 194O.30 Besides being an effective form of fund
raising, the Jackson Day dinners enabled the DNC to build
closer ties with state and local committees. The DNC also
sought to solidify the loyalty of these Democrats to Roose-
velt's party leadership by broadcasting his speech at the
Washington dinner to them.
Although Farley wanted Roosevelt to use his Jackson Day
speeches to promote intraparty harmony, the president often
used the occasions to speak on controversial and divisive
topics. In his 1937 address he sought Party support for the
"court packing" bill that he claimed was essential for the
Party to "long remain a natural rallying point for the cooper-
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ative effort of all those who truly believed in political and
economic democracy."31 Following the Republican resur-
gence and the failed "purge" of conservative Democrats in the
1938 congressional elections, the president used his 1939
Jackson Day address to urge fellow Democrats to "give in-
tense and genuine devotion to the cause of liberal govern-
ment."32 In these speeches, Roosevelt revealed a common
theme—the compatibility of the Party's liberalism under the
New Deal with the populism of Jefferson and Jackson.
Despite the success of the Jackson Day fund raisers, these
dinners did not compensate for the sharp decline in financial
support from large individual contributors and business in-
terests. Consequently, throughout Roosevelt's three re-elec-
tion campaigns, the DNC became increasingly dependent on
organized labor as its largest single source of campaign con-
tributions. Total union expenditures on behalf of Roosevelt's
re-election increased from over $770,000 in 1936 to over
$1,300,000 in 1944.33 Much of the labor contributions in the
1936 campaign came from Labor's Non-Partisan League
whose major contributors were three CIO unions: the United
Mine Workers, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and Inter-
national Ladies Garment Workers union.34 Besides indi-
rectly benefiting from pro-Roosevelt campaigns financed by
the American Labor Party, by Labor's Non-Partisan League,
and later by the CIO's Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC),
the proportion of DNC campaign funds derived from labor
unions increased from 10.2 percent in 1936 to approximately
16 percent in 1940. These figures, however, do not include
"unclassified" and "unidentified" individual contributions
from labor leaders and union members.
Throughout Roosevelt's presidency, organized labor stead-
ily strengthened its position as a major source of Democratic
campaign funds and thus strengthened its position in na-
tional Party affairs, solidifying the Party's commitment to
social welfare and labor reform legislation favored by labor
unions.35 Daniel J. Tobin, president of the Teamsters' union
and vice-president of the AFL, served as chairman of the
DNC's Labor Division during all four of Roosevelt's presiden-
tial campaigns.36 Despite Tobin's top positions in the AFL
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and DNC, his stature in the Democratic party was over-
shadowed by Sidney Hillman, vice president of the CIO from
1936 to 1940. After John L. Lewis decided to support Wendell
Willkie in 1940, Hillman became Roosevelt's chief contact in
the CIO. A cofounder of the American Labor Party in New
York, Hillman molded the CIO into a tightly disciplined,
politically active labor organization which superseded the
AFL in its impressive ability to raise campaign funds and
mobilize voters for Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944.37
Special DNC Divisions
Although "advisory committees" for foreign language groups,
small businesses, and other specific voting blocs dissolved
immediately after a presidential election, other groups,
namely women, blacks, youths, and labor unions, were
granted permanent divisions within the DNC's apparatus.
Foreign language groups did not receive a permanent DNC
division until 1952, whereas a Women's Division was estab-
lished in 1922, shortly after the membership of the DNC was
doubled to include a national committewoman from every
state and territory.38 After the 1932 presidential campaign,
the DNC's Labor Division became a permanent organization
under Daniel J. Tobin, the Teamsters' president.39 During the
1932 campaign, the Young Democratic Clubs of America were
established in 32 states in order to "form a self-governing
organization of young people interested in taking an active
and purposeful part in politics and public affairs."40 This
association of clubs was formally recognized as the DNC's
division for youth at the 1936 national convention. In order to
attract traditionally Republican black voters into the Demo-
cratic party, the DNC established the Colored Advisory Com-
mittee during the 1932 campaign and then expanded it into
the Colored Division.41
Not all of these divisions, however, were equally successful
in advancing their constituents' public policy interests and
influence within the Party. The major factor influencing a
division's effectiveness as an advocate of its constituency's
interests and as a mobilizer of its voters on election day was
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the quality and continuity of its leadership. Of these four
divisions, the Labor Division had the most stable, enduring
leadership pattern during Roosevelt's presidency. Tobin
served as its director during all four of Roosevelt's presiden-
tial campaigns.
The quality of a director's leadership and of the division's
political efficacy was often determined by the amount of time,
concentration, and innovation that a director applied to his
division's activities during presidential campaigns as well as
the period between elections. Tobin, though, like most direc-
tors of DNC divisions, did not consider his duties as a division
director to be his chief responsibility during the years be-
tween presidential elections. His duties as president of the
Teamsters' union and vice-president of the AFL as well as a
brief term as an administrative assistant to Roosevelt in 1940
kept him busy.42
Unlike other directors of DNC divisions, Mary W. Dewson
regarded her positions as the Women's Division director
(1932-1934) and as chairman of its Advisory Committee
(1934-1937) to be important responsibilities that required the
full use of her time, effort, and ingenuity. Under her vigorous
leadership, the division became the most politically effective
of the DNC. She accomplished this by expanding the purpose
of the division's activities beyond increasing the power and
influence of women within the Party. She shrewdly realized
that the Women's Division would gain the respect and sup-
port of Roosevelt and Farley if its activities contributed to the
overall electoral strength of the Party.43
During her early career as an activist in reform move-
ments for women's suffrage and minimum wages—max-
imum hours legislation for female workers, Dewson
recognized the importance of bread-and-butter policy issues
for attracting voters into the Party.44 She believed that if the
Women's Division conducted an information and public rela-
tions campaign between presidential elections that explained
and promoted the benefits of the New Deal to women it could
attract independent and liberally inclined Republican
women into the Party. Dewson wrote to Roosevelt, "I still
believe the Women's Division is on the most fertile ground for
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winning independent, stay-at-home and possible Republican
voters."45
Her close friendship with Eleanor Roosevelt was another
valuable asset in her development of the division as a major
force within the DNC. At Eleanor Roosevelt's press con-
ference on January 15,1934, Dewson announced the Women's
Division's new "Reporter Plan."46 Two weeks later, she ex-
plained the details of the plan in a circular letter to all Demo-
cratic committeewomen.47 Every Democratic county women's
organization would assign a "reporter" for each federal agen-
cy. Her duties would be to become knowledgeable about that
agency's programs and to be prepared to explain and defend
its programs to voters when she visited them or spoke at
public meetings. The ultimate objective of the plan was to
facilitate the election of Democratic candidates by generating
a favorable image of the New Deal, especially for undecided
voters. Almost one year after the inception of this publicity
program, Dewson stated that the Reporter Plan made Demo-
cratic women "the mouth to mouth, house to house inter-
preters and apostles of the New Deal."48
The division's publicity efforts were accelerated and ex-
panded during the 1936 campaign. Its chief propaganda cam-
paign consisted of the distribution of Rainbow Fliers. These
colorful leaflets explained and defended various New Deal
programs.49 Fliers on the Social Security program were dis-
tributed to blue-collar workers to counter Republican
charges that contributing workers would never receive Social
Security benefits.50 With approximately 80,000 Democratic
women active among the state, county, ward, and precinct
Party organizations, over $1 million worth of Rainbow Fliers
were distributed during the 1936 campaign,51 accounting for
approximately 80 percent of all Democratic campaign liter-
ature in 1936.52
In addition to fliers, the Women's Division published the
Democratic Digest on a monthly basis. This newsletter had
first been established by the Women's National Democratic
Club during the 1920s. The Women's Division assumed re-
sponsibility for publishing it in 1935 and increased its cir-
culation from 1,600 to 16,500 by 1938.53 The Democratic
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Digest provided facts to Reporter Plan activists about federal
programs, Supreme Court decisions, legislation in Congress,
and other public policy matters. It also publicized the politi-
cal accomplishments of Democratic women.54
With the Women's Division more active during the years
between presidential elections than any other DNC division,
Dewson expected female Democratic activists to be rewarded
for their contributions to the Party. To finance the division's
expanded, ongoing activities, Dewson requested a $50,000
budget in 1934. Farley refused, but Roosevelt mediated a
compromise so that the division received $36,000.55 In 1935,
the Donkey Bank program was introduced to help local
women's organizations to finance their political activities.56
Besides demanding adequate funding for the Women's Di-
vision from the DNC, Dewson asserted that Democratic
women should have equal representation on state, district,
county, and precinct Party committees. "No state can claim
perfect organization that has not a chairman and vice chair-
man of opposite sex, or a committeewoman wherever it has a
committeeman." 57 She led the effort of Democratic women to
pressure state organizations to adopt rules requiring "50-50
representation" on committees at all levels as well as in
leadership positions such as chairman and vice-chairman.58
In a letter to Caroline O'Day, elected to Congress in 1935 and
a veteran of New York Democratic politics, Dewson even sug-
gested that the Women's Division and other separate Demo-
cratic organizations for women be dissolved once the "50-50"
goal was attained and women were fully and equally inte-
grated into the Party apparatus and its decision-making
process.59 By 1939, only nine states did not ensure that
women would have equal representation on all Democratic
committees.60
Dewson also expected the DNC to allow women to wield
more influence at national conventions. At her insistence,
women were appointed as alternates to members of the Reso-
lutions Committee for the first time at the 1936 convention.61
The Women's Advisory Committee formulated planks and
lobbied the Resolutions Committee for their adoption in the
Party platform. The women drafted and submitted planks
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concerning consumer rights, the abolition of child labor, and
federal aid to education, and succeeded in convincing the
Resolutions Committee to adopt most of them.62
By presenting herself as a social reformer dedicated to the
advancement of the New Deal rather than as a feminist only
seeking women's interests, Dewson emerged as the most
prominent and politically effective division leader. She
gained the support and respect of Roosevelt, Farley, and other
male Democratic leaders by making them aware of how the
Women's Division's activities contributed to the Party's elec-
toral strength. Through her vigorous leadership of the divi-
sion, the number of female Democratic campaign workers
increased from 73,000 in 1936 to 109,000 in 1940.63 Dewson
wrote to Roosevelt in 1936, "The party organization has been
revivified by women who now see it as an instrument to
attain their hopes and dreams of a measure of economic
stability and security for every-day persons."64
Although Roosevelt hoped to coopt blacks into the Party
permanently, the role of the DNC's Colored Division was not
the dominant factor in this partisan realignment. The New
Deal's public works and relief programs, the president's char-
ismatic leadership, Eleanor Roosevelt's activism among
blacks, and the establishment of the Black Cabinet were
major factors contributing to the Democratic realignment of
blacks.65 During Roosevelt's presidency, moreover, there was
a substantial gap between blacks' expression of support for
Roosevelt and their identification with the Party.66
While Roosevelt and the DNC chairmen during his presi-
dency wanted to attract blacks, they did not want their cul-
tivation of the black vote to outrage and alienate southern
whites, the traditional base of their party. This cautiousness
further limited the role of the Colored Division within the
DNC. Instead of promoting causes dealing with such divisive
issues as anti-lynching laws, desegregation, and voting rights
for southern blacks, the Colored Division limited its publicity
campaigns to detailing and praising the economic benefits
that the New Deal provided for blacks. Likewise, this defer-
ence to southern racial views impelled the Colored Division
to avoid conducting voter registration and canvassing ac-
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tivities among southern blacks, except in the few southern
cities where blacks could vote.67
These limitations on the Colored Division prevented it
from gaining the type of stable, dynamic leadership the
Women's Division enjoyed under Mary Dewson and her suc-
cessors. In 1933, Director Joseph L. Johnson suggested that
the division became a larger, permanent part of the DNC and
establish "organizations in pivotal states where the Colored
vote is a determining factor."68 Johnson's suggestion was not
accepted by the committee.
The Colored Division was nearly neglected by Roosevelt
and Farley until the 1936 campaign. Black electoral support
for Roosevelt peaked at 76 percent in 1936 and declined
slightly to approximately 65 percent in 1940 and 1944.69
Hampered by frequent changes in leadership and inadequate
funding, the division was usually inactive between presiden-
tial campaigns.
The DNC's deference to southern white racial views, inad-
equate funding, and an unstable leadership pattern were not
the only factors that contributed to the division's failure to
achieve the degree of power and prominence which the
Women's Division enjoyed between presidential elections.
The prospect of the Colored Division becoming a powerful
vehicle of black political strength during Roosevelt's presi-
dency was further weakened by the decentralization and
diffusion of canvassing efforts among blacks by numerous
political organizations that were independent of the DNC.
Such organizations included the Good Neighbor League, the
National Council of Negro Democrats, the Colored National
Democratic League, urban Democratic machines, and CIO
unions.70 Even though the Colored Division did not develop
into a powerful, influential division, black affiliation with the
Party would increase after 1945.
The DNC's Labor Division experienced the most stable
leadership pattern of all the divisions with Daniel J. Tobin as
director. Shortly after being appointed chairman of the Labor
Bureau of the Democratic National Campaign Committee in
1932, Tobin sent a circular letter to the presidents of forty
different unions asking them to "become associated with us in
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this campaign as a member of Organized Labor's National
Advisory Committee of the Democratic National Commit-
tee."71 He also established a Women's Division of the Labor
Bureau, which was headed by Betty Hawley, vice-president of
the New York State Federation of Labor.
The rapid increase in the number of unionized workers
because of Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act
and the National Labor Relations Act, however, did not corre-
spond to a rapid increase in the Labor Division's power within
the DNC. Although most labor unions supported Roosevelt
and other Democratic candidates, they wanted to retain their
independence and, thus, refused to allow themselves to be-
come a subordinate appendage of the Party. Labor's desire to
maintain its independence from the DNC manifested itself in
the formation of Labor's Non-Partisan League and the Amer-
ican Labor party in 1936 in order to attract labor support for
Roosevelt's re-election while avoiding an official affiliation
with the Party. Formed by John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman,
the League asserted that it "is not associated with any politi-
cal party. It is a separate and distinct organization."72
Tobin's ability to exercise strong, centralized control over
labor's political activities was also prevented by conflicts
within the movement, especially between the AFL and the
newly formed CIO. Lewis and Hillman established the league
partially because they distrusted Tobin, vice-chairman of the
AFL.73 Lewis's endorsement of Willkie in 1940 made Hillman
the leader of the CIO's campaign activities on behalf of Roose-
velt in the 1940 and 1944 elections. The requirements of the
Hatch Act of 1940 impelled the CIO to make its fund-raising
and campaigning activities even more independent of the
DNC's Labor Division. As an AFL leader, Tobin had his
position as the Labor Division director further undermined
by the fact that Hillman's CIO unions contributed more votes
and funds to Roosevelt's 1940 and 1944 campaigns than the
more conservative, loosely organized AFL unions did.74
With the CIO overshadowing the Labor division in its
campaign efforts for Roosevelt, Tobin's role in Roosevelt's last
two campaigns consisted merely of trying to coordinate the
individual activities of the pro-Roosevelt labor unions. Roose-
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velt tried to increase Tobin's stature by appointing him as a
White House administrative assistant in 1940.75 In 1942, the
president appointed Tobin as his representative to investigate
labor conditions in Britain. However, the CIO's and the AFL's
independent yet pro-Democratic political action committees
would continue to overshadow the DNC's Labor Division
during presidential campaigns.
Richard Roper, the executive secretary of the DNC, took a
personal interest in the strength and vitality of the Young
Democratic Clubs.76 He did not believe that these clubs
should simply help attract votes for Democratic candidates.
He told the Young Democratic Clubs of Texas that they should
become "an outlet for liberal thought and opinion."77 In a
speech given to the Young People's Democratic League of
Illinois in 1934, Roper urged young Democrats to "open the
membership rolls to every young American who feels his
obligation of citizenship, Republican and Democrat alike,
Progressive, Communist and Socialist." 78
Comprised mostly of liberal college students, the Young
Democrats became even more enthusiastically supportive of
Roosevelt when his liberalism became more pronounced after
1936 as he was besieged by conservative opposition within the
Party.79 Consequently, Roosevelt delivered several major
speeches to Young Democrats in 1938 and 1939 concerning
the need to keep the Party distinctly liberal. He told a conven-
tion of Young Democrats in 1939 that if the Party should
nominate a conservative for president in 1940 he would "find
it impossible to have any active part in such an unfortunate
suicide of the old Democratic Party."80 In 1944, however, a
Pennsylvania Democrat complained to Dorothy Vrenden-
burg, president of the Young Democratic Clubs of America,
that unless these clubs were better coordinated "a young
organization with communistic ideals" might replace them.81
The different degrees of strength and activity of these four
DNC divisions during Roosevelt's presidency reflected the
growing diversity of the Party's membership and the increas-
ing intraparty influence of groups supporting the devel-
opment of a more liberal Party under the New Deal. As
Roosevelt's party leadership and the New Deal became more
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controversial and divisive after 1936, the four voting blocs
that these divisions represented became even more impor-
tant. The crucial electoral support that the constituencies of
these divisions contributed to Roosevelt's re-election in 1940
and 1944 enabled them to increase their power, status, and
influence within the Party.
DNC Chairmen (1932-1945)
In his 1905 analysis of the national Party chairmen's duties,
Jesse Macy wrote that "it is the national chairman, himself,
who determines just what role he will play in executing
them."82 Because of this ambiguity and flexibility regarding
the DNC chairman's duties between presidential campaigns,
the four chairmen who served under Roosevelt fulfilled their
duties according to the extent to which Roosevelt involved
hiself in intraparty affairs. During his first term, Roosevelt
worked closely with Jim Farley in revitalizing and expanding
the Party apparatus.83 Roosevelt agreed with Farley's pa-
tronage policy of providing federal jobs to both Party regulars
and activists who had supported Roosevelt in 1932 but were
not registered Democrats—at least not yet. Mary Dewson
commented in 1938 that "Farley's concern was not only to
build a powerful organization but an organization powerful
enough to establish the New Deal."84
Farley, like his three successors, Ed Flynn, Frank Walker,
and Bob Hannegan, was more concerned about maintaining
intraparty unity than he was about making the Party dis-
tinctly liberal by forcing conservative Democrats to support
New Deal liberalism or leave the Party. It is misleading,
however, to perceive him as a conservative who clashed with
Roosevelt after 1936 because of an ideological antipathy to-
ward liberalism.85 Instead, he was a nonideological power
broker who perceived his primary responsibility to be the
preservation of intraparty unity and harmony in order to win
elections. In a speech delivered to the American Political
Science Association in 1933, he stated that political principles
"are translated into action only by organized effort."86
Farley believed that organizational strength and internal
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harmony were more important in party politics than ide-
ological purity. This conviction led him to oppose Roosevelt's
attempt to "purge" selected conservatives in the Democratic
congressional primaries of 1938. Farley was convinced that
the "purge" would irreparably weaken intraparty harmony
and Roosevelt's party leadership.87 In general, his relation-
ship with Roosevelt deteriorated as the president relied more
on the "White House crowd", especially Tommy Corcoran and
Harry Hopkins, as his operatives on Party matters.88
Even though Farley's role as the DNC chairman dimin-
ished during Roosevelt's second term because of these factors,
Roosevelt realized that the movement Farley and Garner led
against a third term for him made essential the appointment
of an experienced Party professional as Farley's successor.
Thus, he chose Ed Flynn, the county Democratic leader of the
Bronx and a veteran of Tammany politics.
Flynn was experienced in internal Party affairs. He had
first become acquainted with Roosevelt during Al Smith's
campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination at the
1924 national convention. Roosevelt, who admired the organ-
izational skills and political savvy of this aloof, urbane
Irishman, appointed Flynn New York's secretary of state in
1929.89 During his governorship, Roosevelt directed Flynn
and Farley to expand the apparatus of the state Party in
traditionally Republican areas of upstate New York. He orig-
inally asked Flynn to travel throughout the nation and build
a network of contacts with Democratic politicians and Party
activists in preparation for his 1932 presidential campaign,
but Flynn suggested the appointment of the more gregarious
Farley for this task.90
Although he had supported Smith in 1928, Flynn opposed
Tammany Hall in 1932 by actively supporting Roosevelt for
the presidential nomination.91 He remained New York's sec-
retary of state until 1939. Thus, he mostly involved himself in
the local Democratic politics of New York City rather than in
national politics. With the support of Roosevelt and Farley,
through a generous flow of federal patronage, Flynn sought to
reform and reorganize Tammany Hall in order to reassert
Democratic control of the city's politics and government but
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failed to do so during Fiorello La Guardia's mayoralty.92 In
order to attract pro-New Deal, non-Democratic voters to
Roosevelt in 1936, Flynn helped Farley, Sidney Hillman, and
David Dubinsky establish the American Labor Party in
1936.93
Eleanor Roosevelt would later contend that Flynn, unlike
Farley and other Irish politicos, did not focus only on pa-
tronage distribution and understood the importance of prin-
ciples and ideas in Party politics.94 Nevertheless, Flynn, like
Farley, was a Party regular who disliked the idea of "purging"
fellow Democrats. He agreed to manage the 1938 purge cam-
paign against Representative John J. O'Connor of New York,
however, because of his personal loyalty to Roosevelt and his
antipathy toward O'Connor. He made it clear to Roosevelt,
though, that he would not share the management of James
Fay's primary campaign against O'Connor with Corcoran.95
O'Connor's defeat was the only successful purge of an incum-
bent congressional Democrat targeted by Roosevelt.
Farley resigned as DNC chairman and actively opposed
Roosevelt's renomination in 1940. Thus, Roosevelt realized
that he needed an experienced Party professional to unite the
machine bosses and Party regulars behind his candidacy and
crumble the Farley-Garner movement against him. Closely
cooperating with Ed Kelly and Harry Hopkins, Flynn man-
aged a smooth renomination process for Roosevelt at the 1940
convention.96
Flynn officially replaced Farley as DNC chairman on Au-
gust 17,1940. He was initially reluctant to succeed Farley; but
he was persuaded by Frank Walker, the former DNC treas-
urer who succeeded Farley as Postmaster General.97 Despite
his political skills and personal loyalty to Roosevelt, the intro-
verted Flynn was temperamentally ill-suited to perform the
extensive traveling and public relations tasks of the DNC
chairman.98 Instead, he focused on the less public functions of
distributing patronage and improving cooperation between
the DNC and congressional Democrats in raising and dis-
tributing campaign funds. Flynn proved to be more successful
than Farley in persuading Roosevelt to cooperate with the
DNC and Democratic state organizations on federal appoint-
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ments and to avoid allowing White House New Dealers like
Harold Ickes to distribute patronage."
In 1941, David Berenstein, a St. Louis Democrat, wrote to
DNC chairman Ed Flynn and stated, "the Democratic Organ-
ization's weakest link, at the present time, is its inability to
get and hold the active interest of the citizens in the affairs of
government."100 Berenstein suggested that the DNC revital-
ize the party apparatus at the local level by establishing a
highly participatory, decision-making process and set a mini-
mal membership fee of $5 each for up to one million activists
in these organizations.
When Senate consideration of his appointment as ambas-
sador to Australia was stalled in 1943 because of questions
about his personal finances, Flynn quietly resigned as DNC
chairman.101 Even after he was replaced in this position by
Frank Walker, Flynn continued to serve Roosevelt politically.
With Walker and Bob Hannegan, another future DNC chair-
man, Flynn persuaded Roosevelt to choose Harry S. Truman
as his running mate in the 1944 presidential campaign.102
Frank Walker served as the DNC chairman for less than a
year. A wealthy lawyer and businessman who served as the
DNC treasurer during the 1932 campaign, he had succeeded
Farley as Postmaster General in 1940.
As the Postmaster General during World War II, Walker
was too busy to devote himself to his chairmanship.103 Nev-
ertheless, in January 1944, he sent a form letter to the 3,048
Democratic county chairmen, asking for their "frank views
on the outstanding problems in your County which affect the
national political situation."104 In conjunction with Elmer F.
Kelm, the Democratic state chairman of Minnesota, Walker
helped to resolve conflicts between Democrats and the
Farmer-Labor factions of the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-
Labor party.105
Walker served less than a year as DNC chairman when he
was succeeded by Robert E. Hannegan, commissioner of in-
ternal revenue, on January 22,1944. A veteran of St. Louis
Democratic politics, Hannegan was instrumental in persuad-
ing Harry Truman to accept the vice-presidential nomination
at the 1944 convention. Like Walker, Hannegan also asked
102 Roosevelt the Party Leader
state and local party chairmen about local political condi-
tions and for their advice about how to strengthen the Party
apparatus.106 He resigned in 1947.
In conclusion, Farley's three successors used their posi-
tions as DNC chairmen to resolve intraparty conflicts and
assure Roosevelt's renomination and re-election in 1940 and
1944. Farley had already expanded the Party apparatus to
accommodate new voting blocs and interest groups attracted
to the Party by the New Deal and Roosevelt's leadership.107
His three successors did not have the degree of patronage
power and intraparty unity that Farley enjoyed during Roo-
sevelt's first term. But they did enjoy a greater degree of
discretion in fulfilling their duties as chairmen and thus
wielded greater influence over Roosevelt's Party leadership
as he concentrated on foreign policy matters after 1940 and
deferred to the chairmen on Party affairs.
By 1945, however, the concentration on the war effort
caused a decrease in the size, activities, and funding of the
DNC and its various appendages. DNC chairman Bob Han-
negan reduced, rather than expanded, the size of the staff and
budget of the DNC because of fiscal constraints. Neverthe-
less, when Hannegan asked local Party chairmen about the
health of their organizations, many of them claimed to have
strong, active Democratic committees.108 Although the DNC
itself remained the domain of Party insiders, the activities of
its special divisions and its encouragement of greater par-
ticipation by state and local Party committees combined with
the pursuit of the New Deal policy agenda stimulated the
development of a more open, inclusive, and participatory
Party in which leaders needed to become more responsive to
the policy interests of active, rank-and-file Democrats.
5 The Formation of an
Electoral Coalition:
1932-1936
The 1932 Election
Although the Depression began earlier than he had assumed
it would, Roosevelt had originally planned to run for presi-
dent in 1936 because he believed that a depression would
begin by the early 1930s.1 He and Louis M. Howe, his chief
political operative, realized, however, that the widespread
economic suffering and anti-Hoover sentiment that emerged
after 1929 would assure the victory of almost any Democratic
presidential nominee in 1932.2 The Party, though, needed a
nominee who could appeal to and unite its diverse, conflicting
interest groups and voting blocs. Throughout the 1920s, Roo-
sevelt had been carefully positioning himself so that he would
eventually be regarded as the strongest candidate, and one
who could appeal to all elements of the Party.3
Shortly after Roosevelt's landslide re-election as governor
in 1930, Howe and Farley began to visit Democratic politi-
cians throughout the nation to assess the strength of Roose-
velt's prospective presidential candidacy. By distributing
booklets providing impressive voting results from Roosevelt's
re-election as governor, Farley initiated letter-writing rela-
tionships with state chairmen, DNC members, and other
activists in the Party apparatus to cultivate their support for
Roosevelt and to learn about local political conditions rele-
vant to his campaign.5 To impress Democratic contacts in
rural areas with Roosevelt's success as a vote-getter, Farley
provided statistics from the 1930 gubernatorial election,6
pointing out that, in the landslide victory, he had not only
received an unprecedented 725,001 plurality but had distin-
guished himself as the first Democratic gubernatorial nomi-
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nee to receive a majority of votes in upstate counties.7 The
preconvention strategy of the campaign was to convince party
leaders, through Howe's voluminous correspondence and
Farley's extensive travels, that Roosevelt was the only Demo-
cratic candidate whose appeal was broad enough to unite the
diverse factions of the Party and attract enough votes from
anti-Hoover Republicans and independents to assure vic-
tory.8 Because only a few states would select their delegates to
the national convention through primaries, Howe and Farley
realized how essential this personal lobbying strategy was for
obtaining the endorsements of committee officials and politi-
cians who could influence the selection of delegates at cau-
cuses and state conventions.9
Farley and Howe cultivated the support of Party leaders
representing regions of political strength for the Party. They
gained the endorsement of Senator Cordell Hull of Tennes-
see, who mobilized Democrats in Congress behind Roosevelt's
candidacy.10 In particular, the Tennessee senator lobbied
southern Democrats who, like himself and Roosevelt, opposed
the high-tariff, protectionist policy proposals of the Raskob-
dominated DNC.11 Meanwhile, Senators Burton K. Wheeler
and Thomas Walsh of Montana and Joseph O'Mahoney of
Wyoming organized the support of western progressives.12
Southern and western Democrats admired Roosevelt's
knowledge about and sensitivity to the agricultural problems
that plagued their states. In addition to frequent public state-
ments and articles throughout the 1920s warning that the
farm depression threatened to lead to a severe, general de-
pression, Governor Roosevelt introduced innovative pro-
grams for New York farmers intended to stabilize farm prices,
reduce farm surpluses, and provide tax relief.13 Although he
did not specify exactly what programs he would implement to
solve agricultural problems nationally, he stressed that the
farm depression should be the federal government's top pri-
ority because the industrial and commercial sectors of the
economy were so dependent on the purchasing power of rural
consumers.14
A certain degree of evasive ambiguity by Roosevelt on
agricultural policy statements was necessary because of the
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baffling ideological diversity of the southern and western
Democrats who supported his nomination. His coalition in-
cluded segregationist southern conservatives such as Sen-
ators Joseph Robinson of Arkansas and Byron "Pat" Harrison
of Mississippi, as well as maverick, trust-busting western
populists such as Senators Walsh and Wheeler.15 Widely per-
ceived as a radical by southern conservatives, Wheeler briefly
left the Democratic party in 1924 to become the vice-presi-
dential nominee of Robert La Follette's National Progressive
party.16 Ideologically, though, the southern conservatives
and western populists had in common a contradictory desire
to solve the agricultural problems of their states through
federal action while avoiding a greater centralization of
power in Washington.17
To stimulate a nationwide bandwagon effect behind Roose-
velt's candidacy, Farley and Howe created the impression that
Roosevelt's nomination was inevitable by distributing polls
indicating the widespread support for Roosevelt among lead-
ing businessmen as well as delegates and alternates who
attended the 1928 national convention.18 Throughout the
preconvention campaign, Roosevelt attracted a broad coali-
tion by advocating greater federal intervention in the econ-
omy to relieve poverty and unemployment and end the
Depression while promising to cut federal spending, balance
the budget, and reduce the size of the federal bureaucracy.19
Columnists portrayed the New York governor as an unprin-
cipled opportunist, but his dichotomous rhetoric enabled him
to maintain the support of states' rights conservatives in the
South while attracting the support of Democrats and dis-
affected Republicans, who demanded greater federal efforts
to combat the Depression than the Hoover administration
was employing.20 Because only about 34 percent of the voters
were registered as Democrats in 1932, the Party would need a
candidate who had proven his ability to attract the votes of
Republicans and independents.21
Although Al Smith would not publicly announce his presi-
dential candidacy until February 1932 when he entered the
New Hampshire primary, Roosevelt and his campaign aides
had always suspected that Smith would challenge Roosevelt
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for the nomination. As early as 1931, anti-Hoover sentiment
and a desperate desire for a change in presidential leadership
had become so widespread that virtually any Democratic
nominee could win the 1932 election. For the first time in
fourteen years, the Democrats won a majority of seats in the
House of Representatives, while reducing the Republican
majority in the Senate to one seat in 1930.22 With such favor-
able electoral developments for the Party, it would be difficult
for Smith to resist entering the race.23
Despite his resounding defeat to Hoover, in 1928, Smith
still enjoyed a strong base of support within the Party, which
he could rely on for electoral support in northeastern pri-
maries and delegate support at the national convention. Al-
though Roosevelt had actively sought to endear himself to
Catholic Democrats through his courageous advocacy of
Smith's presidential candidacies in 1924 and 1928, his inspir-
ing denunciation of religious bigotry during his 1928 guber-
natorial campaign, and his appointments of Catholics to
prominent positions in New York's state government and
Democratic party apparatus, it was clear that most Catholic
Democrats would support Smith, their coreligionist.24 The
rules of the Democratic National Committee required that a
presidential candidate must receive the votes of at least two-
thirds of the delegates in order to be nominated; Smith could
gather enough support to deny Roosevelt the nomination,
even if he could not win it.25
There was a growing possibility that Smith would enter
the race to deny Roosevelt's presidential nomination because
of his vindictive, personal bitterness and his emerging con-
servative ideology.26 Smith resented Roosevelt's rising politi-
cal status while his own career was eclipsing and was angry
that Roosevelt had not consulted him on public policy and
party issues in New York. Smith had underestimated Roose-
velt by perceiving him as an aristocratic dilettante who could
not have succeeded in politics without the Tammany Demo-
crat's support.27
Besides this personal rancor, Smith had undergone an
ideological transformation that would motivate him to chal-
lenge Roosevelt in the 1932 nomination race and later to join
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the American Liberty League as a prominent critic of the
New Deal and an opponent of Roosevelt's re-election. Smith's
association with DNC chairman John Raskob, a former Re-
publican and a General Motors executive, led to the abandon-
ment of the urban liberalism he had exhibited as a state
representative and governor. During Smith's 1928 presiden-
tial campaign, Roosevelt and other Democrats were dismayed
that Smith and Raskob solicited the bulk of their campaign
contributions from big business interests and devised an
economic platform as conservative as the Republican one.28
Consequently, Smith's political strength was an aggregation
of his anticipated support from machine bosses, Catholics,
including a majority of New York's delegates, big business
conservatives who distrusted Roosevelt, and Raskob's intra-
party influence.
Although Al Smith had been defeated by Hoover by a wide
margin in 1928, he had distinguished himself as the first
Democratic presidential nominee to win a plurality of votes in
the nation's twelve largest cities.29 He had announced his
presidential candidacy in February 1932 and had defeated
Roosevelt in the Massachusetts primary in April, despite the
efforts of Boston mayor James M. Curley, a Roosevelt ally.30
Ethnic solidarity and a strong suspicion that Roosevelt was
an anti-machine reformer induced the major machine bosses
to support Smith.
As the dangers that the Smith forces could pose to his
nomination at the upcoming convention increased, Roose-
velt's popularity and delegate strength among southern and
western Democrats also increased in reaction to this develop-
ment.31 Perceiving Smith as Raskob's puppet, these Demo-
crats, mostly "dry" on the Prohibition issue, resented the
DNC chairman's arrogant, high-handed efforts to impose an
unequivocally "wet" position for the entire Party. Although
"dry" Democrats realized that Roosevelt and most Democrats
would support repeal of the 18th Amendment, they disliked
Smith's and Raskob's manipulation of the issue in order to
embarrass Roosevelt and obscure their own conservative posi-
tions.32 The Smith-Raskob economic platform was especially
repugnant to southerners who wanted a reduction in tariff
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rates and westerners whose specific economic policy goals
included an inflated currency backed by silver, strict reg-
ulations on private utility companies, and government-
sponsored hydroelectric power.33
With the upcoming convention in June scheduled to be
held in a city governed by a pro-Smith mayor, the Roosevelt
campaign now sought to prevent the election of Jouett
Shouse, executive secretary of the DNC and a close associate
of Raskob and Smith, as permanent chairman of the conven-
tion. Shouse, in conjunction with Raskob, had been trying to
block Roosevelt's nomination by urging pro-Roosevelt party
leaders to send their delegates to the convention uncom-
mitted to any candidate.34 Many party leaders and delegates
resented the blatantly biased manner in which Raskob and
Shouse had been using their positions to damage Roosevelt's
candidacy and favor Smith's. The Roosevelt forces, though,
succeeded in having the Arrangements Committee recom-
mend and the delegates elect Senator Thomas Walsh of Mon-
tana as permanent chairman and Senator Alben Barkley of
Kentucky as keynote speaker.35
Despite these victories and the growing popularity of Roo-
sevelt's candidacy among the delegates, he still lacked the
two-thirds majority needed to secure the nomination on the
first ballot. On the eve of the national convention, he had
approximately 690 delegates committed to him; but he
needed at least 768 votes in order to be nominated.36 Approx-
imately 209 delegates were committed to or favorable toward
Smith's candidacy.
Some delegates were initially committed to vote for their
states' favorite sons, such as Senators J. Hamilton Lewis of
Illinois and James A. Reed of Missouri. Other candidates
included Melvin Traylor, a Chicago banker; Owen D. Young,
chairman of General Electric; and Newton Baker, a corporate
lawyer who had served as Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of
War.37 Baker remained aloof in the conflicts between the
Roosevelt and Smith forces, evidently hoping that he would
be chosen as a compromise candidate in the event of a dead-
lock over the nomination.38
Some party leaders who opposed both Smith and Roosevelt
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united behind the candidacy of Representative John N. Gar-
ner of Texas, the Speaker of the House.39 Garner entered the
race with the strong backing of William Randolph Hearst,
wealthy newspaper publisher and political enemy of Roose-
velt. With Texas' forty-six delegates committed to Garner,
Hearst's sponsorship enabled him to gain the support of Cal-
ifornia's forty-four delegates.40
Some pro-Roosevelt party leaders suggested that the dele-
gates vote to repeal the two-thirds rule before the balloting
began.41 Because changes in convention rules required only
the votes of a simple majority, advocates of this tactic were
confident that there were enough pro-Roosevelt delegates to
overturn the rule, then nominate Roosevelt by a simple ma-
jority.42 Roosevelt and Farley briefly supported this repeal
movement, but ordered their delegates to stop the effort when
it became obvious that many pro-Roosevelt southern dele-
gates opposed repeal, which, historically, had enabled south-
ern Democrats to prevent the nomination of candidates
objectionable to them.43
After the third ballot was taken, it was evident that Roose-
velt would not be nominated unless he received some delegate
support from either the Smith or the Garner camp.44 With
Smith delegates determined to continue their opposition,
they enlisted Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas to per-
suade Garner to support Roosevelt on the fourth ballot in
exchange for being selected as his running mate. Concerned
about the need for party unity against Hoover, Garner agreed
to cooperate.45 The transfer of Garner's 101 delegate votes to
Roosevelt stimulated a bandwagon effect among the dele-
gates of minor candidates so that Roosevelt was easily nomi-
nated on the fourth ballot with 945 votes.46
The platform formulated at this convention reflected the
contradictory proposals Roosevelt had made during the pre-
convention campaign. He still supported "an immediate and
drastic reduction of governmental expenditures" while also
proposing a reduction of the federal bureaucracy and an ex-
pansion of federal public works programs.47 His speeches and
policy proposals after the convention, though, were bolder
and more specific.48 In major campaign speeches he envi-
110 Roosevelt the Party Leader
sioned a policy agenda in which the federal government pre-
vented monopolistic abuses by big business, ensured stable,
adequate farm prices for farmers, guaranteed economic se-
curity for wage earners, and provided affordable electricity
for rural Americans.49
Roosevelt's rhetoric during the general election campaign
reflected a suprapartisan approach in which he sought to
persuade the voters that he was concerned with solving the
nation's economic problems and restoring Americans' faith in
presidential leadership and not merely seeking an electoral
victory for himself and his party. This rhetorical strategy was
evident when he stated in his acceptance speech that he
would not use the words "Republican Party" in his campaign
addresses.50 Asserting that the Democratic party was the
"bearer of liberalism and of progress" that would save the
American political and economic systems from "unreasoning
radicalism," he invited the support of "those nominal Repub-
licans who find that their conscience cannot be squared with
the groping and the failure of their party leaders."51 Fur-
thermore, he warned staunchly conservative Democrats that
"they are out of step with their Party."52
Although Roosevelt's frequent identification of himself,
the Democratic party, and his policy proposals with liber-
alism—however vaguely defined—may have alienated some
of the most conservative Democrats, it helped to attract en-
dorsements and voter mobilization efforts from prominent
progressive Republicans, such as Senators Hiram Johnson of
California, George Norris of Nebraska, and Robert La Fol-
lette, Jr., of Wisconsin.53 Roosevelt's rhetoric pleased western
progressives with his promise of implementing federally
sponsored hydroelectric power projects.54 Roosevelt's guber-
natorial record and his fight against private utility com-
panies opposed to low-cost electricity for rural areas gave
credibility to this rhetoric.55 Norris organized the National
Progressive Republican League as a vehicle for cultivating
the support of anti-Hoover, progressive Republicans for Roo-
sevelt.56
Despite the opposition of some of his advisers who wanted
him to conduct a "front porch campaign" in Hyde Park, Roo-
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sevelt embarked on a cross-country, whistle-stop campaign
on September 12, 1932. He hoped that a vigorous speech-
making effort from coast to coast would assure the voters of
his physical stamina and acquaint them with his ebullient
personality, rhetorical talent, and leadership qualities.57
Voters would then note the sharp contrast between Roosevelt
and the dour, lackluster Hoover.
Two of Roosevelt's campaign speeches revealed how he
perceived and would address the economic crisis. While
speaking at Ogelthorpe University, he outlined three eco-
nomic concepts which would later be reflected in the National
Recovery Administration.58 First, he suggested that the
causes of the Depression were domestic, not international,
and required the federal government to pursue a recovery
policy of economic nationalism, not one stressing interna-
tional economic agreements, which Hoover had pursued.59
Second, he contended that the federal government must in-
crease its power over business in order to regulate stock
market practices and effect such reforms as the national
abolition of child labor. Finally, by advocating a program of
economic planning between government, business, and labor,
he rejected the trust-busting approach to economic reform of
earlier progressives.60
On September 23,1932, Roosevelt provided a more lucid,
articulate synthesis of his policy response to the Depression
in his address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco.61
He expressed a more conciliatory tone toward businessmen,
and urged them to regard their economic power as a public
trust and to exercise it with social responsibility. If business
did not comply, government would be forced to intervene to
protect the public interest. The reassuring tone of this ad-
dress, however, implied that a cooperative partnership be-
tween government and business would achieve economic
recovery. In short, Roosevelt welcomed business support, pro-
vided that businessmen were willing to contribute to the
reform of American capitalism.62
Near the end of the campaign, a columnist stated that
Roosevelt intended to make the Democratic party "the liberal
party, the party which will restore the balance of power
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between the rich and the poor and bring prosperity to the
'forgotten man' as well as to the Wall Street banker."63 Wide-
spread economic suffering and opposition to Hoover enabled
Roosevelt to win the electoral college votes of forty-two states
and 59 percent of the popular votes.64 With only about one-
third of the voters registered as Democrats, the unusually
high voter turn-out and the electoral support from anti-
Hoover Republicans and independents contributed to Roose-
velt's wide margin of victory.65
While blacks gave 65 percent of their votes to Hoover, the
electoral support for Roosevelt among non-southern whites66
was distributed broadly in urban and rural areas, among
WASPs and ethnics, and among the middle and lower
classes.67 It was unclear, though, if the traditionally Republi-
can voters had realigned themselves with the Democratic
party and preferred a liberal policy agenda or had simply
wanted to defeat Hoover.68
Roosevelt's objective during the 1932 campaign was to har-
monize and unite the elements of the Party that had been
bitterly divided by the Prohibition issue and Smith's nomi-
nation in 1928, especially northern ethnics and southern
WASPs. Before he could transform the ideology and policy
agenda of the Party into distinctly liberal alternatives to
those of the Republican party, he first had to unite these
diverse Democratic factions behind his Party leadership.
Through campaign rhetoric, he mixed the conservatism of
states' rights, a balanced federal budget, and less bureauc-
racy with social welfare liberalism in order to build a broad
coalition. Overall, though, his policy proposals expressed a
desire to increase the power of the federal government to
stimulate and regulate the economy and to address the eco-
nomic grievances of farmers and wage earners.69
Ernest K. Lindley stated in 1933 that Roosevelt's "consis-
tent ambition for many years . . . was to form a new liberal
party by attaching the Republican Progressives and mis-
cellaneous liberals to the Democratic party, thus effecting a
new political alignment which had meaning."70 Roosevelt
realized that to transform the Party and gain broad public
support for the early New Deal he needed to attract liberally
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inclined Republicans and independents.71 During the 1936
campaign, Roosevelt found the New Deal to be a powerful
vehicle for expanding and liberalizing the Party and ensur-
ing his own re-election.
The 1936 Election
The outcome of the 1936 presidential election would reveal
whether Roosevelt's victory in 1932 was merely the public's
reaction against Hoover's presidency or whether it fore-
shadowed an enduring realignment of the two-party system.
To maximize bipartisan support behind the early New Deal,
especially the NRA, Roosevelt did not want to appear to be a
narrowly partisan president who was exploiting the economic
crisis to benefit his party. Realizing that he needed the coop-
eration of big businessmen, who were predominantly Repub-
lican, in order for the NRA to succeed, he wanted to appear to
be a statesman who was mainly interested in achieving eco-
nomic recovery.72
As Benjamin Cohen later explained, Roosevelt shrewdly
realized that his projection of a suprapartisan image was
necessary for attracting the electoral support of liberally
inclined Republicans, independents, and third party mem-
bers.73 He believed that the transformation he desired for the
Party was not possible without the support of these non-
Democratic voters.74 In a 1934 letter to a Nebraska Republi-
can, Roosevelt wrote, "I have tried, more than most people
believe, to eliminate partisanship in the relief of human
needs and the improvement of the economic structure."75
In addition to his cultivation of a less partisan image and
leadership style as president, Roosevelt's nationally broad-
cast "fireside chats" and frequent, media-covered inspection
visits of New Deal projects made him familiar to the Amer-
ican public. Many believed he was personally aware of and
responsive to the economic problems they were suffering.76
Despite the failure of the NRA's price and wage codes to
induce economic recovery and reports of faulty bureaucratic
coordination within his administration, Roosevelt was per-
ceived as an inspiring, ubiquitous problem-solver, unlike
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any previous president.77 His leadership style and public
image provided a sharp contrast to his grim, withdrawn
predecessor.
New Deal programs gave credibility to Roosevelt's rhetoric
promising broad, immediate federal action against the eco-
nomic crisis. During his first term, the New Deal had
strengthened support for him in the South and West, his
regional political base at the 1932 convention. Reflecting his
belief that solving the farm depression was a prerequisite for
general economic recovery, the most innovative New Deal
programs focused on permanently reforming the agricultural
economy.78
Furthermore, the New Deal provided low-cost electricity,
soil and forest conservation, irrigation, flood control, paved
roads, and new public buildings for remote, rural areas of the
South and West.79 Southern Democrats, both Bourbon con-
servatives and hill country populists, and western progres-
sives, Republican and Democrat, cooperated in Congress to
enact such programs. Not until after the 1936 election did a
growing number of southern and western Democrats begin to
perceive the New Deal and the increasingly liberal national
Party as excessively and unfairly biased in favor of northern
cities and labor unions.80
The benefits of the New Deal solidified Roosevelt's pre-
viously monolithic electoral support in the one-party South
for the 1936 election, and its assistance to rural interests
proved especially advantageous in western states for gaining
broad electoral support for Roosevelt in 1936 and for pro-New
Deal Democratic candidates in the 1934 and 1936 congres-
sional and state elections. With a regional tradition stressing
maverick independence in politics, many western states pos-
sessed an unpredictable and unstable partisan configuration
regarding the voting behavior and party affiliation of their
voters.81 Progressive politicians in both major parties de-
nounced mining, banking, and electric utility interests for
abusing their economic power.82 Despite their support of New
Deal programs favorable to the interests of their states, Re-
publican and Democratic western progressives shared a dis-
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trust of centralized power, both on Wall Street and in Wash-
ington.83
The West was a region in which voters had proven to be
most likely to leave the two-party system and support popu-
list third parties. Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive party in
1912 and Robert La Follette's National Progressive party in
1924 received their strongest electoral support from western
states where these third-party presidential candidates heav-
ily outpolled their Democratic opponents.84 Consequently,
Roosevelt had to be concerned about the prospect of losing
votes in the West in 1936 if a strong, populist third party
emerged that was more appealing to the regional interests
and political principles of westerners.85
Roosevelt's suprapartisan image and solicitation of sup-
port from progressive Republicans and independents during
the early New Deal led to conflicts over patronage distribu-
tion between Jim Farley and less partisan cabinet members,
especially Harold Ickes, as well as between Farley and non-
Democratic politicians favored by Roosevelt, such as Fiorello
La Guardia.86 Likewise, some state and local Democratic
organizations complained that Republicans controlled fed-
eral relief programs in their states and, in some cases, dis-
criminated against Democratic voters in the distribution of
relief and public works jobs.87
Despite complaints from party regulars, Roosevelt under-
stood that many Democratic candidates outside of the South
would need the votes of non-Democratic voters to win the con-
gressional and state elections of 1934. This was especially
true in rural areas of the Midwest and West. Although this re-
gion was traditionally Republican, many distressed farmers
supported such leftist third parties as the Farmer-Labor Party
of Minnesota, North Dakota's Nonpartisan League, and the
Progressive party in Wisconsin established by Philip and
Robert La Follette in 1934.88 Roosevelt implicitly supported
the re-election of Floyd Olson, Minnesota's Farmer-Labor
governor, against John Regan, the conservative Democratic
nominee who opposed Roosevelt in 1932.89
In 1936, Roosevelt directed Ed Flynn and Jim Farley to
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establish the American Labor Party in New York City to
pressure Tammany Hall into becoming more liberal and re-
formed, and to attract non-Democratic voters, especially So-
cialists in the labor movement, to his candidacy.90 By taking
these actions during his early presidency, Roosevelt was not
neglecting or weakening regular Democratic organizations
and their candidates. Instead, he was trying to pressure these
Democratic organizations and candidates into becoming
more liberal and supportive of the New Deal and his party
leadership while making membership in the Party more
attractive to liberally inclined, non-Democratic voters.91
The ability of Roosevelt's presidential leadership and New
Deal liberalism to attract Republicans and independent
voters into the Party was especially pronounced in Pennsyl-
vania. As the largest overwhelmingly Republican state,
Pennsylvania was one of only six in which Herbert Hoover
received a majority of popular votes in 1932, and had not
given a Democratic presidential nominee its electoral college
votes since 1856.92 Two ambitious Democratic party-builders,
Joseph Guffey and David Lawrence, closely identified the
Pennsylvania state Democratic party with Roosevelt and the
New Deal in the hope of sweeping their state's congressional
and state elections in 1934.93 After coopting traditionally
Republican blacks, union leaders, and non-Irish urban eth-
nics while attracting a significant minority of rural WASPs,
the Pennsylvania Democrats won a majority of their state's
congressional seats and a majority of seats in Pennsylvania's
House of Representatives.94 Guffey was elected to the U.S.
Senate and soon distinguished himself nationally as a "100%
New Dealer."95 George Earle was elected as the first Demo-
cratic governor since 1890 and launched a "Little New Deal"
in state government.96
As in other heavily Republican states, Pennsylvania Dem-
ocrats conducted an extensive voter registration drive to pre-
pare for the 1934 and 1936 elections. The percentage of
Pennsylvania voters registered as Democrats doubled from 21
percent in 1932 to 42 percent in 1936.97 In California, where
Democrats had controlled only 10 of the 138 elective state and
federal offices in 1930, Upton Sinclair, a former Socialist and
An Electoral Coalition 117
the Democratic gubernatorial nominee in 1934, conducted a
highly successful voter registration campaign. By 1934, for
the first time in California history, Democratic voters out-
numbered Republican voters.98
Even though Republican voter registration still exceeded
Democratic registration in 1934, the Democrats actually in-
creased their majorities in Congress and their control of state
governments." Though Democratic candidates had attracted
Republican and independent voters by advocating the New
Deal, Roosevelt was confronted with opposition in the 1936
election from both the left and the right.100 Prominent Demo-
crats like Al Smith and John Davis formed the American
Liberty League to oppose his re-election by denying him the
Democratic business support he had received in 1932.101 A
number of leftist, populist movements led by Dr. Charles
Townsend, Governor Huey Long of Louisiana, and Father
Charles Coughlin threatened to attract ordinarily pro-
Roosevelt voters by nominating a presidential candidate for
1936.102
By 1935, the prospect of a leftist third party and growing
newspaper and business criticism of the New Deal led both
parties and the media to anticipate a close outcome for the
1936 presidential election.103 Because the economic crisis
had abated and stabilized by 1936, it was possible that many
middle-class Republicans who had voted for Roosevelt in
1932 would return to the Republican fold in 1936.104 To
attract traditionally Republican middle-class voters and
blacks, the Roosevelt campaign established the Good Neigh-
bor League and various "Republicans for Roosevelt" state
organizations.105 With many recently unionized workers
still not registered as Democrats, John L. Lewis, a Republi-
can, and Sidney Hillman, a Socialist, established Labor's
Non-Partisan League to support Roosevelt.106 To symbolize
the realignment they sought to effect, the Democrats se-
lected the staunchly Republican city of Philadelphia as the
site of their 1936 convention.107
Roosevelt realized that the types of enemies he had made
in big business, banking, Republican-owned newspapers,
and the Supreme Court would make him more attractive to
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voters if he portrayed himself as their champion against
powerful interests. In his campaign speeches, he denounced
the shortsighted selfishness of "economic royalists." He as-
serted that reforming American capitalism through the New
Deal was essential for preserving American democracy.108
Throughout his first term, and especially during the 1936
campaign, the president concentrated his rhetoric on as-
suring Americans that the New Deal would preserve and
strengthen democracy, capitalism, and basic values. The con-
cept and tangible development of a big, interventionist fed-
eral government disturbed many middle-class Americans,
who had absorbed the traditional American ideology of "neg-
ative government," and believed that big government would
threaten individual liberty, states' rights, economic freedom,
and democratic rule. To respond effectively to the Republican
and American Liberty League denunciations of the New Deal
as a radical philosophy detrimental to the values and institu-
tions of a democratic, capitalistic society, Roosevelt devoted
much of his campaign rhetoric to the theme that the New
Deal was compatible with such traditional American values
as the work ethic and individualism.109
Roosevelt adopted this theme in his first official speech of
the general election campaign, delivered in Syracuse, New
York, on September 29,1936. He asserted that liberalism as
manifested through the New Deal was the philosophy of a
farsighted conservative and that "never has a Nation made
greater strides in the safeguarding of democracy than we
have made during the past three years. Wise and prudent
men-intelligent conservatives-have long known that in a
changing world worthy institutions can be conserved only by
adjusting them to the changing time."110
In his speeches defending New Deal liberalism as a mod-
ern adaptation of traditional American political and eco-
nomic values to new conditions, he assured his listeners that
the social welfare, labor reform, and regulatory policies of his
administration would save the free enterprise system, not
destroy it. Although he realized that he would convert few
corporate executives into New Deal liberals, he sought to
convince businessmen that it was not necessary for them to
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perceive the New Deal and the labor union movement as
threats to capitalism. In a campaign address given in Cleve-
land, he stated that the "interest of every business man is
bound to the interest of every wage earner."111 He asserted
that higher wages and greater economic security for workers
would improve productivity and consumer demand, thus in-
creasing profits for businessmen.
Roosevelt used another rhetorical theme to legitimize New
Deal liberalism in the minds of the voters as a current reflec-
tion of the American political tradition. He frequently de-
scribed a correlation between economic democracy and
political democracy. No longer could Americans believe that
economic injustices and grievances would not affect the vi-
tality and integrity of their democracy. In Dallas, Texas, the
president asserted that "Any elemental policy, economic or
political, which tends to eliminate these dependable defend-
ers of democratic institutions, and to concentrate control in
the hands of a few, small powerful groups, is directly opposed
to the stability of government and to democratic government
itself."112
Roosevelt also compared his administration's struggle to
end the Depression and permanently reform the economy to
such earlier crises as the Revolutionary War and the Civil
War. As the campaign progressed, he began to adopt a more
antagonistic portrayal of anti-New Deal businessmen, accus-
ing them of hindering the advance of political and economic
democracy by their opposition to the New Deal.113 Drawing
parallels between the philosophy and policies of the New
Deal and the ideas of such highly respected presidents as
Jefferson and Lincoln, Roosevelt hoped to inspire the voters
to associate the New Deal with familiar, attractive patriotic
figures and perceive its opponents as threats to the American
political tradition.114
This class-conflict theme in Roosevelt's rhetoric was evi-
dent in his acceptance speech at the 1936 Democratic Na-
tional Convention. He asserted that "economic royalists" had
undermined and distorted the American economy by trans-
forming it into "privileged enterprise, not free enterprise."115
According to Roosevelt, it was the responsibility of the federal
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government to intervene effectively on behalf of average
Americans against the "economic tyranny" of wealthy busi-
ness elites. Consequently, the purpose of the New Deal was
not only to preserve American capitalism by reforming it but
also to win "a war for the survival of democracy."116
Such inflammatory rhetoric against economic interests
opposing the New Deal certainly appealed to the delegates of
the convention. Sidney Milkis estimates that about 50 per-
cent of them were federal job holders.117 The composition of
the delegations also indicated the emergence of blacks and
women as prominent party activists. Two hundred nineteen
women delegates attended the 1936 Democratic National
Convention while only sixty attended the Republican Na-
tional Convention that year.118 For the first time, Democratic
women served as alternates to the members of the Resolu-
tions Committee.
The historical "firsts" that blacks enjoyed at this conven-
tion, however, were more noticeable. For the first time, thirty
black Democrats served as delegates and black reporters
were admitted to the press box.119 Roosevelt's recognition of
the importance of the black vote in this election was more
powerfully symbolized by his choice of a black minister to
deliver the opening prayer and of Arthur Mitchell, the first
black Democrat elected to Congress, to deliver the welcoming
speech.120
The 1936 convention was the first since 1832 to conduct its
nomination process without the two-thirds rule, which re-
quired a nominee to receive votes from at least two-thirds of
the delegates at a national convention. Roosevelt supporters
had attempted to overturn the rule at the 1932 convention but
had failed because of their fear of alienating southern conser-
vatives.
The repeal clearly demonstrated the growing ability of
voting blocs and interest groups to overcome the resistance of
Party conservatives. It also demonstrated Roosevelt's ability
to secure reforms that would increase the intraparty power of
groups favoring the nomination of liberals committed to the
New Deal.
The two-thirds rule gave united southern delegations veto
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power during the nomination process if they opposed a candi-
date who was supported by only a simple majority. They
maintained that their region, the most loyally and consis-
tently Democratic, should have the right to ensure the nomi-
nation of presidential candidates acceptable to the South.
Opponents argued that the rule weakened intraparty
unity by enabling a determined, united minority of delegates
to prevent the nomination of a popular candidate with voter
appeal beyond the South. Even House Speaker Champ Clark
in 1912 and Senator William Gibbs McAdoo in 1924, both
popular among Southern delegates, had received wide dele-
gate support at their respective conventions. But Clark and
McAdoo failed to be nominated because they did not have
enough delegate support outside of the South and thus lacked
the necessary two-thirds majority.121 The presidential nomi-
nation was denied to them by northern and progressive Dem-
ocrats. At the 1932 convention, an obstructionist minority
comprised of the backers of Al Smith and John Garner had
threatened to deny Roosevelt the two-thirds majority.
In 1936, however, approximately 900 of the 1,154 delegates
attending the convention were committed to the abolition of
the two-thirds rule.122 Roosevelt, Farley, and Senator Ben-
nett Clark of Missouri, chairman of the Rules Committee,
were confident that the rule could be quietly repealed with a
minimum of intraparty conflict. As Harold F. Bass, Jr., has
persuasively contended, Roosevelt's choice of Clark to lead
the repeal effort was "truly inspired" and assured its suc-
cess.123 Clark received favorable media attention and wide-
spread sympathy within the party for his determination to
end the two-thirds rule because it had denied his father the
Democratic presidential nomination in 1912. Also, Clark's
ideological status as a conservative weakened the claim of
southern opponents that the repeal movement was a nefar-
ious plot by northern liberals like Joe Guffey who wanted to
liberalize the Party by increasing the intraparty power of
blacks, labor, and urban ethnics while weakening southern
influence.124
Although opposition to the repeal was led by southerners,
especially Representative Eugene E. Cox of Georgia and Sen-
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ator Harry Byrd, a significant minority of southern delegates
favored repeal.125 One Arkansas delegate even told the Rules
Committee that he "favored the reform as an incentive to
party building above the Mason-Dixon line."126 Clark's skill-
ful leadership of the Rules Committee, Farley's lobbying
efforts, and Roosevelt's status as a popular incumbent intimi-
dated and inhibited diehard supporters of the rule and facili-
tated its repeal.127
In 1938, Senator Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, an anti-
New Deal conservative and a defender of the rule, bitterly
lamented that the repeal would result in the Party and its
national conventions being controlled by "very objectionable
men whose politics are entirely distasteful to the Southern
Democracy. They get elected by the negro vote in New York,
Pennsylvania, Boston, Chicago, and the cities of the Middle
West."128 At the 1944 Democratic national convention, Eu-
gene E. Cox made a futile attempt to restore the rule, even
though only 21 percent of the delegates attending the conven-
tion were from the South. He ruefully concluded that the end
of the rule meant that "the South completely lost its power
independently to influence party affairs."129 Assessing the
impact of the repeal on the ideological and regional character
of the Party in presidential elections, Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., concluded that the end of the two-thirds rule would "accel-
erate the transformation of the Democracy into a more thor-
oughly northern party."130
Repeal of the rule proved to be crucial to the liberalization
of the Party's ideology and domestic policy objectives. At the
1940 and 1944 conventions, Roosevelt did not feel compelled
to choose a southern conservative as his running mate in
order to appease southern delegates and assure his renomi-
nation and instead, was free to choose a committed New
Dealer. The selection of presidential and vice-presidential
nominees and the adoption of major policy planks in the
platform now had to be acceptable, or at least not objection-
able, to the dominant liberal elements of the Party.131 In
short, Roosevelt's successful effort to repeal the two-thirds
rule was a major factor in preventing conservative Democrats
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from regaining control of national Party affairs after his 1936
campaign.
Roosevelt's willingness to risk alienating southern conser-
vatives, such as Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith who angrily left
the 1936 convention during the black minister's opening
prayer, revealed that southern support was not indispensable
to his re-election because Democratic electoral strength out-
side of the South had rapidly increased increased during his
first term. The repeal of the two-thirds rule and the fact that
only 23 percent of his electoral college votes in 1936 came
from the South indicated the beginning of the South's decline
in influence at Democratic national conventions.132
The prominence of blacks, women, urban ethnics, and
labor leaders at the 1936 convention also indicated the in-
creasingly pluralistic character of the Party's membership
that both coincided with and accelerated the onset of the
South's decline in power over national Party affairs. This
intraparty power shift from the mostly conservative southern
Democrats to more liberally inclined voting blocs and in-
terest groups emerging at the 1936 convention illustrated
the "redistribution of power" thesis formulated by Samuel
Beer.133 This redistribution of power resulted from the New
Deal's bias toward farmers, laborers, and small businessmen
and against big business interests, and was demonstrated by
such policies as the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the
WPA, the AAA, as well as higher taxes and stricter regula-
tions on big business. The bias stimulated the growth of
countervailing powers—especially labor unions and farm or-
ganizations—against big business.134
Just as the New Deal's policies broadened the distribution
of economic power in American capitalism, the growing
power of blacks, women, urban ethnics, and organized labor
within the national party signified the convergence of what
Beer called the democratic and national ideas in American
party politics. Prior to the New Deal, the southern-controlled
Democratic party had been "democratic" in the sense that it
stressed local-level democracy, states' rights, and minimal
federal intervention. The Republican party expressed the
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"national" idea of using a strong federal government to de-
velop and consolidate the nation, or at least its economy.135
By 1936, the Party under Roosevelt had combined the
democratic and national ideas through its espousal of New
Deal liberalism as the essence of its ideology and policy
agenda. It emerged from the 1936 convention as a more in-
clusive, pluralistic party which democratized national pol-
itics by embracing previously disadvantaged, neglected
groups. According to Beer, the Party encouraged these voting
blocs to become party activists and achieved this democratiza-
tion through governmental nationalism, formulating and im-
plementing federal policies which redistributed economic
power and wealth more broadly and thus benefited these new
coalition members.136
Although he employed more combative rhetoric in 1936
than he had in 1932, Roosevelt understood the ability of the
New Deal, as the dominant campaign issue, to build a con-
sensus behind his candidacy. His class-conflict theme ap-
pealed to Democratic and liberally inclined, non-Democratic
voters. The New Deal had served a broad spectrum of socio-
economic groups.137 For example, FHA mortgage subsidies
helped middle-class home owners while AAA price supports,
soil conservation, and rural electrification benefited farmers.
Federal relief and public works jobs aided working-class eth-
nics and blacks.
Recognizing the widespread popularity of New Deal pro-
grams, even among such traditionally Republican voters as
rural, non-southern WASPs, the Republican party pursued a
rhetorical strategy attacking such problems in New Deal
programs as partisan favoritism in the administration of pub-
lic works projects and Roosevelt's failure to fulfill his 1932
campaign promises of reducing federal spending and the size
of the federal bureaucracy.138 While asserting that they sub-
scribed to the humanitarian goals the Democrats claimed
were offered by the New Deal, Republicans denounced the
New Deal as a politically corrupt, incompetent, and fiscally
extravagant means for reforming capitalism. In short, Re-
publican speakers directly challenged Roosevelt's frequent
contention that the New Deal was a necessary adaptation of
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the American political and economic systems to modern con-
ditions.
Republican party leaders realized that they must not nom-
inate a presidential candidate who fit Roosevelt's depiction of
a callous "economic royalist" with Wall Street backing. They
knew that a clearly pro-big business conservative would be
doomed to a landslide defeat. The best Republican candidate
was perceived to be someone who had the image and back-
ground of a moderate progressive but was also a reliable
party regular and New Deal critic who espoused such tradi-
tional Republican policies as a balanced federal budget and
high protective tariffs.139
With little hope of receiving electoral majorities in the
South and major urban areas of the Northeast and Midwest,
the Republican party focused its strategy on farm states of
the Midwest and West. Because Roosevelt had attracted the
endorsements of prominent progressive Republicans in 1932,
Republican party leaders realized that they must prevent the
realignment of moderate to liberal Republican voters, many
of them living in the Midwest and West, with the Democratic
party. To appeal to farmers in these states, the Republican
platform was most specific and elaborate in its discussion of
agricultural issues, promising farmers high protective tariffs
against agricultural imports, low-interest loans, and subsidy
payments.140 It also promised black Americans, Hoover's
most loyal voting bloc in 1932, "equal opportunity . . . and
protection of their economic status and personal safety."141
Republican party insiders and their allies among news-
paper publishers decided that Governor Alfred "Alf" Landon
of Kansas was the ideal presidential nominee for 1936.
Landon, who appeared to be an effective vote-getter, was the
only Republican governor elected in 1932 who was re-elected
in 1934, even though Roosevelt carried his state in 1932.142
Republican supporters hoped that Landon would attract pro-
Roosevelt Republicans because he had been a leading Kansas
operative for Teddy Roosevelt's Bull Moose campaign of 1912
and Robert La Follette's third party presidential candidacy of
1924.143 Almost unanimously nominated by Republican del-
egates on the first ballot, Landon chose another former Bull
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Mooser, Frank Knox, as his running mate. The progressive
political backgrounds of Landon and Knox, combined with
the mildly reformist Republican platform advocating farm
subsidies, old age pensions, and federal regulation of se-
curities and utilities, held the possibility of a competitive race
between Landon and Roosevelt.
Landon, however, soon destroyed whatever potential he
had to prevent significant Republican defections to Roosevelt.
His choice of an unpopular conservative, John D.M. Hamil-
ton, as RNC chairman and campaign manager as well as his
solicitation of big business contributions led many liberal
Republican politicians to dismiss Landon as an insincere
opportunist.144 As in 1932, such nationally known liberal
Republicans as George Norris, Fiorello La Guardia, and the
La Follette brothers organized voter mobilization campaigns
for Roosevelt.145
The Republicans hoped that their nominee would appeal
to the midwestern farm belt. But many traditionally Republi-
can farmers there preferred Roosevelt, mostly because of the
New Deal's agricultural policies.146 Landon weakened his
own appeal and credibility by inconsistently alternating his
rhetoric between orthodox conservatism and progressive pro-
posals. Each time he attacked a New Deal policy, especially
the Social Security Act, he further weakened his own voter
appeal and strengthened Roosevelt's image as the common
man's champion.147 As the campaign progressed, Landon's
anti-New Deal rhetoric isolated him more and more from the
electorate and accelerated the momentum behind Roosevelt's
re-election.148 By the end of the campaign, Roosevelt was not
just the presidential nominee of the Democratic party but
also "the leader of a liberal crusade which knew no party
lines."149
Roosevelt's assertive, eloquent defense of the New Deal's
policy agenda and ideology, the broad consensus behind his
re-election, and a high voter turn-out combined to provide
him with over 60 percent of the popular vote and the electoral
college votes of all but two states.150 The Democratic party
formally became the majority Party in national politics as
registered Democrats outnumbered registered Republi-
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cans.151 Although Catholics, Jews, blacks, and low-income
Americans were more likely to vote for Roosevelt, his elec-
toral support from middle-income WASPs was high enough to
assure his victory in midwestern and western states.152
The voting statistics for the 1936 presidential election indi-
cated a reduction of ethnocultural and regional differences in
the voting behavior and party affiliation of Americans. Non-
southern white Protestants significantly reduced their pre-
viously overwhelmingly Republican voting behavior and
gave Roosevelt half of the total WASP vote outside the South.
Sixty percent of low-income non-southern WASPs supported
Roosevelt, while only 35 percent of the high-income members
of the group did.153 Roosevelt's attractiveness to Catholics
was evident as approximately 80 percent of them voted Demo-
cratic.154
Blacks and Jews, who had previously been the most loyal
ethnic voting blocs for the Republicans in major northern
cities, voted for Roosevelt by margins of 76 percent and 90
percent, respectively.155 Roosevelt's combined plurality of
votes in the nation's twelve largest cities nearly doubled from
1.8 million in 1932 to 3.5 million in 1936.156 In all, the results
of the 1936 presidential election suggested that the Demo-
cratic party could consistently succeed as the majority party
in national politics if it could continue to transcend regional
and ethnocultural differences among the electorate by identi-
fying itself with an ideology and policy agenda that ad-
dressed commonly held economic problems and grievances.
Roosevelt's overwhelming victory, however, revealed that
there were political forces and changes which would soon
weaken the popular, unifying appeal of the New Deal and his
Party leadership as well as divide the Democratic party,
whose size had expanded so rapidly during his first term. The
repeal of the two-thirds rule at the national convention and
the vigorous cultivation of the black vote suggested the de-
cline of southern power within the Party. With Roosevelt
receiving only 23 percent of his electoral college votes from
the South and with only 35 percent of Democrats in the
upcoming Congress from the South, it appeared that Roose-
velt had a nationwide mandate for the continuation of New
128 Roosevelt the Party Leader
Deal liberalism and thus could successfully defy and circum-
vent southern conservatives in Congress.157 Roosevelt's pur-
suit of further New Deal policy initiatives, however, would
prove to be as divisive for intraparty relations during his
second term as it had been conducive toward unity and party-
building during his first term.
6 The Purge
Campaigns of 1938
Roosevelt's relentless yet unsuccessful effort to persuade the
Democrats in Congress to pass the court reform bill early in
1937 permanently weakened his ability to convince the Dem-
ocratic Congress to pass further domestic policy proposals
from the White House.1 The bitter intraparty struggles over
the failed court reform bill and the close election of Alben
Barkley, a New Deal populist, as Senate majority leader over
Pat Harrison, a southern conservative, accelerated the bi-
furcation between northern liberals and southern conser-
vatives.2 These intraparty conflicts also made conservative
Democrats more openly hostile to Roosevelt's party leader-
ship and more likely to cooperate with the Republican minor-
ity in opposing White House bills.3
Despite the invigoration of the conservative opposition
that these conflicts stimulated, Roosevelt became more ag-
gressive, combative, and publicly critical toward his conser-
vative Democratic opponents. The legislative defeats that he
suffered at their hands during the 75th Congress made him
more determined to eliminate, or at least subordinate, the
power of anti—New Deal conservatives within the Party. Less
cautious about maintaining a consensus within the Party
than he had been during his first term, he delivered several
major addresses from 1937 to 1939 which emphasized his
determination to continue the development of a distinctly
liberal Party despite conservative opposition in the party.4
Roosevelt had become angry and frustrated with Demo-
crats in Congress who had rhetorically associated themselves
with the popular president and the New Deal in order to be
renominated and re-elected but then weakened or opposed
White House bills during the legislative process. Roosevelt
referred to these members of Congress as "yes, but—" Demo-
crats. As Roosevelt stated in 1941, the "quarrel in 1938 was
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with those who said they were liberals, but who, neverthe-
less, proceeded to stand in the way of all social progress by
objecting to any measure to carry out liberal objectives." 5 For
Roosevelt, therefore, a presidential effort to "purge" or at
least discipline anti-New Deal Democratic incumbents was
necessary to strengthen the clarity and integrity of a two-
party system in which the Democratic party represented
liberalism in public policy and the Republican party repre-
sented conservatism.
In 1938, Roosevelt claimed that the Party's identification
with New Deal liberalism was essential for its continuation as
the majority party and in order for it to attract the votes of
liberal Republicans and independents.6 He stated in a 1939
address to the Young Democrats that a liberal identity was
essential for his own support of the Party.7 He stated une-
quivocally that he would not endorse a conservative presiden-
tial nominee in 1940.
All of these factors motivated Roosevelt to embark on the
most politically courageous yet reckless endeavor of his presi-
dential leadership—his intervention against selected con-
servative incumbents in the 1938 Democratic congressional
primaries. Previously, Roosevelt's cautious, calculating politi-
cal acumen had impelled him to remain neutral in primaries,
even when pro-New Deal incumbents were threatened by
conservative opponents.8 At this time, Roosevelt wanted to
emphasize a consensual, inclusive Party leadership that
could expand the electoral base of the national Party by
attracting liberally inclined voting blocs while maintaining
the loyalty of southern conservatives.9 He did not want to
damage his party leadership and threaten New Deal bills
during his first term by intervening in primaries and antag-
onizing powerful conservative Democrats in Congress.
But the conservative Democrats' increasingly successful
opposition to further New Deal policies and to the liberal
transformation of the Party had emboldened Roosevelt to
seek the defeat of several prominent conservatives by openly
supporting their liberal challengers. The decision to take
such unprecedented action in intraparty affairs, however,
was not entirely of his own volition. His decision to purge se-
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lected congressional conservatives was influenced by Tommy
Corcoran, Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, and his son, James
Roosevelt.10 These White House New Dealers, especially
Corcoran, had begun to overshadow Jim Farley as Roosevelt's
operatives in intraparty affairs and in White House relations
with Congress. Farley and other party regulars opposed a
presidential purge of Democratic primaries; because of their
interest in maintaining intraparty harmony and unity, they
preferred the renomination of Democratic incumbents.11 The
White House purgers, more concerned than Farley with the
ideological transformation of the Democratic Party, were
willing to risk arousing further intraparty discord to attain
this objective.
Corcoran had quickly moved beyond his position as legis-
lative draftsman and Capitol Hill lobbyist for White House
bills. He sought an influential role in Party affairs as Roose-
velt's liaison.12 He assumed that the defeat of the court re-
form and the original executive reorganization bills were
harbingers of further defeats of White House legislation if
pro-New Deal Democrats were not elected to Congress.
After their modest success on January 4, 1938, in Ala-
bama's special Democratic primary for a Senate seat, Cor-
coran, Hopkins, and the other members of the purge
campaign were confident that they could help nominate
Democrats loyal to Roosevelt. After Hugo Black vacated his
Senate seat in order to become a Supreme Court justice,
Congressman Lister Hill and J. Thomas Heflin, a former U.S.
senator, competed in a special Democratic primary to replace
Black. Hill was a New Deal supporter who stressed his ad-
vocacy of the wages-and-hours bill. This bill was repugnant
to Alabama industrialists, who perceived the South's lower
wages as an advantage against their northern competitors.13
Heflin, a shrill race baiter and an opponent of the wages-
and-hours bill and most New Deal policies, succeeded in
gaining the endorsements and campaign contributions of
Alabama business interests. Heflin, ironically, was embar-
rassed by an attempt of his business supporters to damage
Hill's voter appeal by criticizing his support of the wages-and-
hours bill. In November 1937, Heflin's business supporters
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distributed copies of Republican Congressman J. Will Tay-
lor's speech criticizing this bill and Hill's support of it.14
Because of his endorsement of Herbert Hoover in 1928,
Heflin's fidelity to the Democratic party was already ques-
tionable. Use of a Republican congressman's speech to attack
Hill led Hill supporters to denounce this tactic as Republican
carpetbagging. They also repeatedly reminded the public of
Heflin's support of Hoover.15 With the Civil War and Recon-
struction not yet forgotten in the Deep South, this was an
effective rhetorical tactic by the Hill campaign.
Even though Heflin was on the defensive for the remainder
of the primary campaign, Hill sought White House help to
secure his nomination. The congressman met with Hopkins,
Ickes, and Attorney General Robert Jackson at Roosevelt's
suggestion. They decided to distribute pamphlets in Alabama
in which Roosevelt would state the importance of passing the
wages-and-hours bill as an implicit endorsement of Hill.16
Hill's support of this bill also gained the endorsements of the
AFL and CIO unions of Alabama. Under pressure from Cor-
coran, Governor Bibb Graves broke his neutrality and agreed
to use his organization to support Hill.17 Hill also had the
opportunity to accompany the popular president on a well-
publicized train ride across Alabama.18
The January 4 primary resulted in an impressive victory
for Hill. He won 61.8 percent of the votes.19 Heflin, who was ill
with pneumonia at the time, received only 34.2 percent.20
While the president's assistance had been an asset for Hill,
it was not crucial to his nomination. Union endorsements, the
support of the Graves machine, rumors of a Republican "con-
spiracy" to aid Heflin, and Heflin's clumsy campaign be-
havior were the main ingredients of Hill's landslide victory.
Nevertheless, involvement in Hill's nomination campaign
encouraged the White House political team to commit itself
to a more challenging electoral objective—the renomination
of Senator Claude D. Pepper of Florida.
Pepper, an Alabama native and a brilliant graduate of
Harvard Law School, had distinguished himself as the most
consistently liberal southern senator, especially on labor is-
sues. Unlike such New Deal populists as Senator Theodore
The Purge Campaigns of 1938 133
Bilbo of Mississippi, Pepper did not balance his economic
liberalism with racist rhetoric. Although he joined his fellow
southern senators in defeating a 1937 anti-lynching bill, an
action which he later regretted, Pepper emphasized the
achievement of New Deal policy objectives as the means for
improving the economic security of southern farmers and
workers.
Pepper wrote in his diary in November 1937 that New Deal
liberalism would be the theme of his renomination campaign.
"The issue is the New Deal or not—liberalism vs. reaction.
. . . I think this campaign shall determine the political char-
acter of Florida for some time to come. I want to make
the state liberal, which it has never been, and now is my
chance." 21 The Roosevelt administration perceived Pepper as
a model New Deal politician for the New South in which a
concern for economic justice superseded racial antagonism.22
Whereas the issue of the wages-and-hours bill had proven
to be an asset for Lister Hill, it appeared to be a liability for
Pepper. Like their counterparts in Alabama, Florida business
interests vehemently opposed a minimum wage law.23 The
major beneficiary of the Florida business community's fi-
nancial support was Representative Mark Wilcox, who had
opposed the wages-and-hours bill in the House of Represen-
tatives.24 Wilcox had also opposed the court reform bill and
the executive reorganization bill in 1937.25 He accused Pep-
per of exploiting the state's WPA for political support. Despite
his general fiscal conservatism, Wilcox sought to attract Flor-
ida retirees by pledging to support the Townsend Plan, which
promised generous old age pensions to the elderly.26
David Sholtz, who served as governor from 1933 to 1937,
had an ideology midway between those of Pepper and Wilcox.
Telling Pepper that DNC chairman James Farley supported
him, Sholtz remained noncommital on the wages-and-hours
bill.27 Sholtz was a political pragmatist who recognized the
popularity of the New Deal and simply allowed the federal
government to spend money on relief and public works in his
state.28 His reluctance to provide the necessary state match-
ing funds for the implementation of WPA programs in Flor-
ida infuriated Hopkins.29
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Nevertheless, Sholtz wanted the voters to associate him
with Roosevelt as he repeatedly referred to the president as
"My good friend in the White House." 30 A leading member of
the Florida Chamber of Commerce, he was a tireless, amiable
campaigner. Unlike Wilcox, he already enjoyed statewide
name recognition. These factors made Sholtz appear to be a
formidable primary opponent of Pepper.
Although his campaign organization was solid, Pepper
wanted some indication of White House support to counteract
Farley's favoritism toward Sholtz and his public prediction
that the former governor would defeat Pepper in a second,
runoff primary.31 After some prompting from Pepper, James
Roosevelt announced to the press his hope that Pepper would
be re-elected.32 Earlier, in a December 27,1937, letter, the
young Roosevelt urged his father to give public support to
liberal candidates such as Pepper in Democratic primaries.33
Soon, the purgers mustered the federal forces in Florida to
assist Pepper. Corcoran organized federal appointees, es-
pecially U.S. attorneys, IRS officials, and postmasters, be-
hind Pepper. Well-publicized meetings between Roosevelt
and pro-Pepper Florida Democrats were held in Washington.
Pressured by Roosevelt, Farley used the dedication of new
post offices in Florida as an opportunity to praise Pepper's
Senate record.34
The White House support helped to accelerate the momen-
tum that favored Pepper's renomination. Because Pepper's
pro-labor appeal was most attractive to low-income voters, the
abolition of the poll tax and the implementation of voting
machines induced an unusually large voter turn-out.35 Con-
sequently, Pepper won a decisive victory in the May 3 pri-
mary with over 58.4 percent of the vote, compared to 12.7
percent for Sholtz and 26.6 percent for Wilcox.36 Pepper's
majority obviated the need for a runoff primary.
The White House was elated that Pepper's electoral success
in a campaign in which the beleaguered senator stressed his
support of the wages-and-hours bill had emboldened New
Deal Democrats in the House of Representatives to pass a
discharge petition forcing the conservative Rules Committee
to send the bottled-up labor bill to the floor for a vote.37
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Commenting on the White House purgers" assessment of
Pepper's victory in 1939, J.B. Shannon stated, "It appeared to
make it safe, according to New Deal reasoning, for national
leadership to intervene in local elections. Had not James
Roosevelt's actions in Florida proved it?"3 8
The activities of the purgers helped to facilitate Pepper's
decisive margin of victory. Nevertheless, they certainly were
not indispensable to his renomination. His victory, however,
served to strengthen the purgers' confidence that they could
nominate liberals and defeat conservatives in selected pri-
maries.
Though the purgers were primarily interested in electing
liberal Democrats to Congress to support further New Deal
legislation, they decided to intervene in Oregon's Democratic
primary for governor. Harold Ickes, secretary of the interior,
was especially interested in preventing the renomination of
Democratic Governor Charles H. Martin. Martin had opposed
Ickes's efforts to build a government-owned power plant at
the Bonneville Dam.39
Martin, who was elected as governor in 1934 on a pro-New
Deal platform, soon antagonized the coalition that had sup-
ported him. The former Republican and retired army general
sought to minimize state spending on relief and acerbically
denounced the organizing efforts and strikes of labor unions
in Oregon.40 He publicly warned CIO president John L. Lewis
to stay out of Oregon.41 He had gained national attention and
the disdain of liberal Democrats for his outspoken criticism of
Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins and the National Labor
Relations Board.42
Despite his tactless rhetoric and growing unpopularity,
Martin's renomination campaign was bolstered by a law-and-
order platform which appealed to voters' concern about labor
unrest.43 He also enjoyed the implicit endorsement of Farley.
He emphasized his loyalty to Roosevelt in order to compen-
sate for his conservative policy behavior and rhetoric.44
Ickes, though, was determined to defeat Martin and end
this source of opposition to the Bonneville Dam project. An-
other leading advocate of public power with an interest in this
project, Senator George Norris of Nebraska, a former Repub-
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lican re-elected as an independent in 1936, joined Ickes in
endorsing Henry L. Hess, a former state senator, to challenge
Martin in the gubernatorial primary.45 Federal appointees
were organized behind Hess. In the May primary, Hess nar-
rowly defeated Martin, by 57,727 votes to 50,905 votes.46
When Hess was later defeated by the Republican guber-
natorial nominee, Farley told Ickes that, if Martin had been
renominated, the Democratic ticket in Oregon would have
succeeded in the general election. Ickes exemplified the per-
spective of his fellow purgers, saying, "For my part, I want to
see the Democratic party made the liberal party of the coun-
try and so it doesn't matter whether a man calls himself a
Democrat or not. It is what he is and not what he accounts
himself that matters."47
Roosevelt recognized the difficulty of preventing the re-
nomination of well-entrenched incumbents, especially in the
South where voters highly valued an incumbent's seniority
in Congress. He did not initially identify himself at White
House press conferences with the purge campaign being con-
ducted by his staff.48 Instead, he gave the purgers a free hand
under Corcoran's leadership during the initial period of the
campaign and allowed them to provide pro-New Deal candi-
dates with assurances of federal patronage for attracting
supporters. Roosevelt, though, waited until the purge cam-
paign indicated the potential for success before he publicly
identified himself as the leader.49
In Iowa's June primary, the purgers sought to achieve a
much more difficult objective—the primary defeat of a popu-
lar, incumbent senator. Just as the defeat of Martin in the
Oregon primary had been Ickes's pet project, the Iowa-born
Hopkins wanted to deny renomination to Democratic Senator
Guy Gillette. In late May, Hopkins publicly endorsed Gil-
lette's primary opponent, Representative Otha D. Wearin, a
fellow alumnus of Grinnell College and a reliable New Deal
liberal.50 Likewise, James Roosevelt, as he had done for Pep-
per, announced his support of Wearin.51
Encouraged by their success in assisting Pepper and Hess,
the purgers failed to realize the advantages that a popular,
broadly supported incumbent senator enjoyed. Cautious lead-
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ing Democrats, including Senator Clyde Herring, readily
endorsed Gillette.52 Most farm organizations also supported
the incumbent. Even Henry Wallace, the secretary of agri-
culture and an Iowa native, refused to endorse Wearin against
Gillette.
It was unusual that Hopkins and the other purgers tar-
geted Gillette. He certainly ws not a conservative ideologue.
He had supported most New Deal policies, especially on agri-
cultural and public utility issues.53 However, he had been a
vocal opponent of the court reform bill. For Roosevelt, this
was a key indication of disloyalty to his party leadership in
Congress.54
Gillette, however, like other incumbent senators targeted
by the purge, was careful not to single out Roosevelt for
criticism. Instead, he castigated the purgers for abusing their
administrative positions and trying to dominate intraparty
affairs.55 As most political observers anticipated, Gillette
easily defeated Wearin and his two other primary oppo-
nents.56
Gillette's victory, the purgers' first defeat, impelled Roose-
velt to assume full command of the purge campaign publicly
by mid-June.57 Although he had continued publicly to assert
his neutrality in Democratic primaries as late as early June,
he realized that he was widely perceived in Congress and the
press as the prime mover behind the purge strategy.58 If the
campaign proved to be unsuccessful, its failure would be
widely interpreted as a major defeat for Roosevelt and lead to
a further erosion of his policy influence in Congress, regard-
less of whether or not he formally and publicly directed it.59
Consequently, Roosevelt delivered a nationally broadcast
radio address on June 24 explaining his reasons for interven-
ing in upcoming Democratic primaries on behalf of pro-New
Deal candidates. He justified his rhetorical intervention in
the primaries as attempts to educate primary voters on con-
tradictions that appeared in the legislative voting records of
conservative incumbents who had previously been elected on
"a platform uncompromisingly liberal."60 He asserted that
the sincerity and consistency of the two-party system in the
American republic were jeopardized if winning candidates
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did not behave in government according to their party plat-
forms, and that "I feel that I have every right to speak in those
few instances where there may be a clear issue between
candidates for a Democratic nomination involving these prin-
ciples, or involving a clear misuse of my own name."61
His son James withdrew from the purge campaign; Roose-
velt relied less on Corcoran and Ickes and more on Harry
Hopkins and such experienced Party professionals as Steve
Early, Marvin Mclntyre, and Joseph Keenan, the assistant to
the Attorney General. He was partially motivated to assume
leadership of the purge campaign publicly because of the
importance of the next primary in which the White House
would intervene—the Kentucky senatorial primary.62 Roo-
sevelt regarded the renomination of Senate majority leader
Alben Barkley as the most important objective of the purge
campaign because of the president's determination to retain a
loyal New Dealer in this position.63
As early as February, columnist Arthur Krock had re-
ferred to Barkley's primary race as the "Gettysburg of the
party's internecine strife over national control in 1940. Every
prospective element in the impending contest between Sen-
ator Alben W. Barkley and Governor Albert B. Chandler
unites to provide an unmistakable test of the President's
political leadership."64 Barkley, conspicuous in the Senate as
one of a handful of diehard supporters of the doomed court
reform bill, needed to win renomination and re-election in
order to direct New Deal forces in the Senate.65 If he were
defeated, it was probable that Senator Byron "Pat" Harrison,
an increasingly conservative Democrat, would replace him as
Senate majority leader.66
Barkley, a veteran of Kentucky politics, was first elected to
the House of Representatives in 1912 and to the Senate in
1926. Throughout his career in Congress, he distinguished
himself as a sincere and consistent liberal.67 He was one of
the first Democratic senators in 1932 to endorse and actively
support Roosevelt's presidential nomination. Grateful for
such assistance, Democratic delegates chose Barkley as the
keynote speaker of the 1932 and 1936 Democratic national
conventions.68
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As a two-term incumbent, the Senate majority leader
enjoyed the support of most federal officials. In particular,
Barkley was supported by George H. Goodman, the state's
WPA administrator; Seldon R. Glenn, collector of internal
revenue for Kentucky; and Judge Elwood Hamilton of the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Louisville circuit.69
Because the coal industry was a major employer in Kentucky,
the endorsement of Barkley by UMW president John L. Lewis
was a major asset for soliciting votes and campaign contribu-
tions among coal miners.70
Despite Barkley's incumbency and his powerful positions
in the Senate, his renomination was uncertain.71 He con-
fronted a formidable opponent in the Democratic senatorial
primary, Governor Albert B. "Happy" Chandler. Chandler
had a powerful machine consisting mostly of state employees.
Furthermore, the Democratic primary for senator would not
be a clear-cut ideological contest between a New Deal liberal
and an anti-New Deal conservative. Like Barkley, Chandler
presented himself as a New Deal populist who supported
Roosevelt.72
Ironically, both Barkley and Roosevelt had provided cru-
cial support to Chandler in his 1935 gubernatorial campaign
when he confronted an unusually strong Republican oppo-
nent, King Swope. Chandler, as lieutenant governor, had
angered and alienated Democratic Governor Ruby Laffoon
when he opposed the sales tax sponsored by Laffoon and
enacted by the Kentucky state legislature.73 Laffoon, how-
ever, had antagonized Barkley and the Roosevelt admin-
istration by obstructing the implementation of New Deal
programs in Kentucky.74
Chandler defeated Thomas Rhea, Kentucky's highway
commissioner and Laffoon's handpicked successor, in the
Democratic gubernatorial primary of 1935, and was then
faced with a divided Party.75 Laffoon and Rhea refused to
support Chandler against Swope.76 Chandler, however, re-
ceived significant support from Barkley and the Roosevelt
administration. Hopkins approved a sharp increase in WPA
funds for Kentucky so that the number of WPA workers
increased from less than 5,000 in September 1935 to over
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30,000 by November.77 Farley spoke in Kentucky on Chand-
ler's behalf, and Barkley abruptly canceled an official visit to
the Philippines in order to campaign for him.78
Chandler, a Democratic governor who was more cooper-
ative in administering federal programs in Kentucky than
Laffoon had been, campaigned for the Senate nomination as a
New Deal Democrat. He contended that Barkley was too old
and neglectful of his home state.79 The forty-year-old gover-
nor was a dynamic, colorful campaigner who frequently en-
tertained audiences with jokes and songs. Chandler even
musically identified himself with Roosevelt by preceding his
visits to Kentucky communities with sound trucks playing
"Happy Days Are Here Again."80
Although Chandler certainly was not a conservative ide-
ologue, his rhetorical identification as a New Deal liberal was
somewhat exaggerated and misleading. He eagerly sup-
ported the flow of federal funds into Kentucky through New
Deal programs, but he prided himself on being a fiscal conser-
vative regarding state taxes and spending.81 He considered
Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, one of the most bitterly anti-
Roosevelt Democrats in Congress, to be his friend and men-
tor.82 After gaining the repeal of the state sales tax, he based
many of his fiscal and government reorganization reforms
on Byrd's governorship.83 Distrustful of Chandler's pro-
Roosevelt rhetoric, the president told Ickes at a March cabi-
net meeting that Chandler was a "dangerous person," similar
to Huey Long.84
Consequently, Barkley could expect most conservative
Democrats in Kentucky to support Chandler.85 In addition to
his fiscal conservatism, Chandler might be able to attract
some votes by appealing to the race issue. Barkley was the
only southern senator who had voted for the failed Wagner-
Van Nuys anti-lynching bill in 1937.86 One Barkley Demo-
crat warned Marvin Mclntyre, a Kentucky-born White House
aide, that Barkley's support of this anti-lynching bill would
damage his appeal among Kentucky voters.87 Fortunately for
Barkley, this issue did not become a liability during the
primary campaign, and Chandler did not exploit it.
Barkley would later write in his autobiography that White
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House intervention was not necessary for his victory in the
primary and implied that Roosevelt's efforts may have actu-
ally reduced his plurality of votes.88 Nevertheless, Barkley
clearly behaved in early 1938 like an incumbent worried
about losing his Senate seat to Chandler and sought assis-
tance from the Roosevelt administration.89 In February, Bark-
ley received financial contributions from Bernard Baruch, a
prominent Wall Street financier and Democratic insider, and
a lucrative fund-raising dinner sponsored by the Democratic
National Committee.90 White House press secretary Steve
Early regularly provided the press with statements critical of
Chandler's gubernatorial record and campaign rhetoric. Roo-
sevelt sent the director of the DNC's Colored Division to
Kentucky to attract black voters for Barkley.91
Barkley's rhetorical strategy emphasized how much the
New Deal had helped Kentucky and how instrumental he had
been in sponsoring or supporting key New Deal policies and
assuring that Kentucky received a fair share of federal funds
and public works projects.92 Barkley's use of the WPA, how-
ever, as a source of votes and campaign contributions soon
became a major source of controversy. In late May, Judge
Brady M. Stewart, Chandler's campaign manager, charged
that "every agency of the Federal Government dispensing
relief is resorting to methods and policies that are crudely
reprehensible to force the citizens of the great Common-
wealth to support Senator Barkley."93
State WPA Director George Goodman, a leading supporter
of Barkley, denied that the WPA was being used to promote
Barkley's renomination.94 Investigative reporter Thomas
Stokes, however, conducted extensive research in Kentucky,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and several other states experienc-
ing contentious Democratic primaries.95 He concluded that
Harry Hopkins knew about, allowed, and even directed the
use of the WPA to benefit pro-New Deal Democratic candi-
dates, including Barkley. Although Hopkins articulately
denied all but two of Stokes"s charges, the Senate committee
investigating political exploitation of the WPA, chaired by
Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas, sent an agent to investi-
gate the situation in Kentucky on July 15.96 The agent subse-
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quently reported to the Sheppard Committee that not only
the WPA but most other federal agencies in Kentucky, es-
pecially the Federal Housing Authority and IRS, were can-
vassed for votes and campaign contributions by Barkley's
campaign.
Barkley denied any personal instigation of such political
manipulation and frequently asserted that all federal em-
ployees and recipients of federal relief in Kentucky had a
right to vote for whomever they wished.97 The equally well-
known and credible charges that Chandler's campaign was
blatantly soliciting votes and contributions from state em-
ployees, especially in the highway department, minimized
any damage to Barkley these charges might have created.98
As early as February, a Kentucky Democrat informed Marvin
Mclntyre, "Probably you have heard something about the
little 'blue books' that the members of the highway depart-
ment and other state employees have been given with in-
structions that each man who works on the highway must get
22 people to sign his little blue book agreeing to vote for
Chandler."99 Chandler also had state employees promoting
his candidacy as they personally delivered Social Security
checks.100
In a July visit to Kentucky, Roosevelt made it clear to
Kentucky voters that he favored Barkley over Chandler. The
President reiterated Barkley's theme about the substantial
financial benefits that the New Deal had given Kentucky.
With the governor and senator next to him as he spoke in
Latonia, Kentucky, Roosevelt stated that although Chandler
was a capable governor he would need "many, many years to
match the national knowledge, the experience and the ac-
knowledged leadership in the affairs of the nation" that
Barkley had demonstrated in the Senate.101 Two weeks after
Roosevelt's visit, a bizarre incident caused the Chandler cam-
paign to lose momentum and support. While giving a radio
address from his hotel room in Louisville, Chandler and two
of his aides drank several glasses of ice water delivered by the
hotel's waiter. All three men were stricken with stomach
pains and fever.102 Chandler's physicians and body guards
claimed that he had been poisoned. The Louisville police,
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however, immediately dismissed and ridiculed the charges of
poisoning as a campaign gimmick.103 Subsequently, Barkley
entertained audiences by satirically asking them, "Has it
been tested?" before drinking a glass of ice water.104 This
incident would lead more voters to question Chandler's judg-
ment and integrity.
The full exertion of Roosevelt's party leadership and the
mobilization of federal resources in Kentucky enabled Bark-
ley to gain a decisive victory over Chandler in the August 6
primary with 56 percent of the votes.105 Although Barkley
later discounted the importance of these federal forces and
Roosevelt's intervention, it is very possible that Chandler
could have defeated Barkley if the incumbent senator had had
to rely entirely on his own efforts.106 Barkley's WPA support
was previously estimated to be worth 200,000 of the 525,555
votes cast in the primary.107 The political use of the WPA in
Kentucky spawned additional Senate investigations which
resulted in the passage of the Hatch Act of 1939.108
In the cases of Pepper and Barkley, Roosevelt and the
purgers were supporting the renomination of incumbent sen-
ators.109 In Democratic senatorial primaries in Maryland,
Georgia, and South Carolina, however, they attempted a
much riskier venture—the defeat of well-entrenched incum-
bents—by supporting weak, often obscure candidates. Sena-
tors Millard Tydings of Maryland, Walter George of Georgia,
and Ellison "Cotton Ed" Smith of South Carolina were all
vocal critics of the court reform bill, the wages-and-hours
bills, and the New Deal in general. In his campaigns against
Tydings and Smith, Roosevelt supported experienced politi-
cians—Congressman David J. Lewis of Maryland and Gover-
nor Olin T. Johnston of South Carolina.
Tydings's voting record in the Senate distinguished him as
the second most consistently anti-New Deal Democrat, with
Carter Glass being the most conservative.110 Even during the
First Hundred Days, he opposed the TVA, NRA, and AAA.
Tydings, a corporate lawyer, maintained close ties with Wall
Street and persistently opposed virtually all major New Deal
measures as being detrimental to American capitalism. He
was imperious and aloof, and was intensely disliked by his
144 Roosevelt the Party Leader
more liberal colleagues and the Roosevelt administration.111
The purge campaign against Tydings was the only one in
which Farley readily and fully participated, because of his
own rancor toward Tydings.112
Tydings had never paid rhetorical homage to Roosevelt
and the New Deal as an easy way to sustain popularity with
his constituents. His unequivocal opposition to New Deal
bills in the Senate was reflected by equally blunt public
statements.113 Although he was well-financed and confident
of renomination, he moderated his rhetoric somewhat as the
September primary approached by vaguely stating that he
was "not running as an Old Dealer nor particularly as a New
Dealer but I hope as a Square Dealer."114
A shrewd, cautious campaigner, Tydings did not want to
jeopardize his already commanding lead by launching an
ideological assault on New Deal liberalism or a personal
attack on Roosevelt.115 Instead, he explained and justified
his opposition to White House bills as a noble example of
independence and intellectual integrity.116 He succeeded in
arousing feelings of state pride and resentment toward politi-
cal interference from Washington that engendered positive
support for his renomination.117
Roosevelt and the purgers considered two other candidates
before Representative David J. Lewis was recruited and
agreed to challenge Tydings in the September 12 primary.
Roosevelt's preference was Harry C. Byrd, president of the
University of Maryland.118 Byrd declined the proposition,
and Roosevelt hoped that the more politically ambitious at-
torney general of Maryland, Herbert O'Conor, would enter
the race, but he also refused.
The purge campaign's offer was finally made to Lewis, who
accepted. At the age of sixty-nine, Lewis was twenty-one
years older than Tydings. He also differed greatly from Ty-
dings in personal background and political perspective. In
sharp contrast to the urbane aristocrat from the eastern
shore, Lewis was a mostly self-educated former coal miner
from western Maryland who was determined to improve the
economic security and working conditions of manual laborers
through federal policies.119
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A pro-labor populist and leading supporter of the Social
Security Act of 1935, Lewis was hardly known outside of his
district. Nevertheless, Roosevelt and the purgers fully mobi-
lized the resources and tactics they had employed for Barkley
in the Kentucky primary. CIO unions and federal appointees,
such as postmasters and IRS officials, were organized behind
Lewis's candidacy.
The Roosevelt-sponsored campaign, however, began only
three weeks before the primary. Leading Democrats in Mary-
land, including Senator George L. Radcliffe, Roosevelt's for-
mer business partner, supported Tydings.120 In an attempt to
discredit the big business conservative, Secretary of Com-
merce Daniel C. Roper generated unfavorable publicity about
Tydings's business dealings.121
Hoping that a personally delivered endorsement of the
liberal congressman would stimulate some momentum for
Lewis, Roosevelt traveled to Maryland in early September.
Speaking in Denton, a Tydings stronghold, on Labor Day,
Roosevelt explained the mutual interests of farmers and ur-
ban laborers. He contended that the further development of
the New Deal would create a more just and prosperous econ-
omy for both groups, and that "Economic lesson number one
of the past twenty years is that men and women on farms,
men and women in cities, are partners. America cannot pros-
per unless both groups prosper."122
The president then praised Lewis, who as a state represen-
tative, sponsored and helped to enact Maryland's workmen's
compensation law, the first in the nation, and later the Social
Security Act. To emphasize the importance of electing New
Deal Democrats like Lewis, Roosevelt stated that the Amer-
ican government needed to secure economic justice to avoid
the political oppression and growing international tensions
in Europe, and that "the best contribution that we at home
can make to our own security is to eliminate quickly all
feelings of injustice and insecurity throughout our land. For
our own safety, we cannot afford to follow those in public life
who quote the Golden Rule and take no steps to bring it
closer."123
Unfortunately, Roosevelt could not easily transfer his pop-
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ularity and name recognition to Lewis. Furthermore, Ty-
dings effectively distracted any public attention from his
anti-New Deal voting record by charging that federal em-
ployees were being pressured by their pro-Lewis superiors to
vote for the congressman.124 To add credibility and prolonged
media exposure to these accusations, he formally submitted
them to the Sheppard Committee. The committee later found
no evidence to implicate Lewis.125
Tydings's campaign expenditures exceeded Lewis's by a
ratio of almost two to one.126 Tydings was constantly on the
offense with charges of Lewis's exploitation of federal employ-
ees and programs. He criticized Lewis's receipt of support
from "Reds" in the labor movement and made appeals to state
pride. He expressed his resentment against Roosevelt's car-
petbagging "invasion" through a puppet candidate. Lewis,
meanwhile, struggled simply to hold his hastily organized
campaign structure together and to achieve greater name
recognition throughout Maryland.127 Despite their efforts,
the purgers failed to win the primary for Lewis as Tydings
received 59 percent of the votes cast on September 12.128
Lewis had been a congressman with an electoral base,
however small, but Roosevelt also supported a New Deal
candidate with no current electoral base, U.S. attorney Law-
rence Camp of Atlanta, who ran against Senator Walter
George in Georgia's September 14 Democratic primary.129
Roosevelt's first choice to oppose George was Governor Ed
Rivers, a popular and loyal New Dealer. However, Rivers's
previous affiliation with the Ku Klux Klan was regarded as
a liability for a purge effort that wanted to make the Dem-
ocratic party in Congress more liberal.130 Furthermore,
Rivers then decided to run for re-election.
Unlike Tydings, George was not a thoroughly anti-New
Deal conservative. As a matter of fact, he had supported most
major New Deal measures during Roosevelt's first term, in-
cluding the AAA and Social Security Act. Near the end of
Roosevelt's first term, however, he had become critical of what
he perceived as an anti-business bias in the tax and regula-
tory legislation that the White House sponsored.131 He selec-
tively supported New Deal programs according to Georgia's
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interests and had been a vocal critic of the court reform bill
and the wages-and-hours bill.132
Consequently, it would be difficult for Camp and the pur-
gers to convince most Georgia voters that George was an
enemy of the New Deal133; he was able to point to a voting
record in the Senate that had mostly supported it.134 Roose-
velt, however, sensed that George was becoming increasingly
hostile to the New Deal and was determined to unseat him. As
in other purge campaigns, Roosevelt hoped that his chosen
candidate's support for the wages-and-hours bill would at-
tract the votes of most blue-collar Georgians.
In Georgia, however, most poor white voters, especially in
rural areas, were mesmerized by the demagogic appeal of
Eugene Talmadge, a former governor who had entered the
Senate race. Talmadge's rhetoric consisted of a dichotomous,
opportunistic mixture of denunciations of George as a pawn of
big business interests, and castigations of New Deal agencies
for excessively intervening in state affairs and not adequately
addressing the economic problems of poor farmers and la-
borers.135 Among his more dramatic promises, Talmadge
pledged that relief would be ended and free farm land would
be given to tenant farmers.136
Roosevelt, having long regarded Georgia as his adopted
state and having developed a warm rapport with Georgians,
hoped that a personal endorsement of Camp would provide
name recognition and voter appeal to his Senate campaign
and stimulate public interest in it. The president also wanted
to establish the dominant issue and parameters of debate for
the campaign. He sought to do this in his August 11 speech in
Barnesville, Georgia. Beginning in a friendly, sentimental
tone, Roosevelt proceeded to remind his listeners about the
benefits of the New Deal to Georgia, especially rural elec-
trification.137
He asserted that more New Deal economic reforms were
necessary. To substantiate this contention, he referred to an
economic study recently completed by the National Emer-
gency Council which identified the South as the nation's chief
economic problem. Thus, he argued, it was the region in
greatest need of further New Deal measures. To make their
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region's economy more just and humane, the voters of Geor-
gia and other southern states must elect loyal New Deal
liberals to Congress because the "task of meeting the eco-
nomic and social needs of the South, on the front that is
absolutely necessary, calls for public servants whose hearts
are sound, whose heads are sane, whose hands are strong,
striving everlastingly to better the lot of their fellowmen
[sic]."138
Arguing that the policies of New Deal liberalism were
necessary for the enhanced well-being of Georgians, the pres-
ident stated that George "cannot possibly in my judgment be
classified as belonging to the liberal school of thought."139
With George sitting nearby on the same platform, Roosevelt
continued his criticism of the Senator by suggesting a clear
discrepancy between George's recent voting record and his
campaign rhetoric regarding the New Deal.140 After dismiss-
ing Talmadge as someone who "would contribute very little to
practical progress in government," the president heartily
endorsed Camp as "a man who honestly believes that many
things must be done and done now to improve the economic
and social conditions of the country, a man who is willing to
fight for these objectives."141
Until Roosevelt's Barnesville speech, George had been
careful not to criticize Roosevelt and even to praise the pop-
ular president. In June, suspecting that Roosevelt would
support Camp against his candidacy, George had sent a cour-
teous, almost deferential letter to Roosevelt apologizing if his
rhetoric and voting record during the 75th Congress had of-
fended the president.142 Shortly before Roosevelt's arrival in
Barnesville, however, George was furious that a close politi-
cal ally of his, Earl Cocke, had been abruptly removed from
the National Emergency Council.143 The political purpose of
this action was obvious since Cocke was replaced by Clark
Foreman,144 an Atlanta native who served as a racial adviser
to New Deal agencies and was sent to Georgia by Roosevelt to
manage Camp's campaign.145
Charges by Camp and Talmadge that George was a tool of
business interests and insensitive to the working conditions
and incomes of blue-collar Georgians were weakened by the
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AFL's endorsement of him.146 Rivers, concerned about his
own gubernatorial campaign, did not want to alienate pro-
George voters who might be favorable to his own re-election.
Consequently, Rivers, Senator Richard Russell, whom Roose-
velt regarded as more loyal to the New Deal than George,
and most Georgia congressmen either remained neutral or
quietly supported George.147 The Atlanta Constitution, na-
tionally respected as a voice of enlightenment and moder-
ation in southern politics, strongly endorsed George and
acrimoniously castigated Roosevelt's purge campaign as an
unjustified and inexcusable violation of a state's right to
nominate and elect its own officials.148
More vehemently than Tydings had done in Maryland,
George capitalized on this popular outrage against presiden-
tial interference in a primary. He compared the purge to
Sherman's infamous march through Georgia and the presi-
dent and his aides to Reconstruction carpetbaggers.149 While
denouncing the purge, George directed most of his fire at
White House aides, not Roosevelt. According to George, Roo-
sevelt had been manipulated and duped into leading the
purge by the "little group of Communists" around him,
namely, Corcoran and Cohen.150
Meanwhile, Camp identified himself as a "100% New
Dealer." His initial campaign theme simply claimed that
voting for him was the equivalent of voting for Roosevelt.151
Ridiculed by George and Talmadge as nothing more than a
White House puppet, he made a feeble attempt to project
political independence by stating his opposition to anti-
lynching legislation.152 Regardless of the content of his
speeches, Camp was a dull, uninspiring speaker whose rhet-
oric lacked the rousing effect of George's righteous indignation
against the purgers' invasion of the primary or Talmadge's
magnetic charisma among poor whites.
White House efforts to manipulate federal positions and
funds to help Camp either failed to generate additional votes
or added credibility to George's accusations of carpetbag tac-
tics. Federal appointees, such as Edgar Dunlap of the RFC,
were suddenly fired for refusing to end their active support of
George's nomination.153 Extra WPA and PWA funds were
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funneled into Georgia in early September, and Camp argued
that Georgia would benefit more from these programs if he
were elected senator.154
Unfortunately for Camp and Roosevelt, most WPA and
PWA workers were blacks and poor whites who would not
vote in the primary.155 The sudden flood of federal funds
created further suspicion that Roosevelt was trying to bribe
them into nominating Camp. A Gallup poll conducted one day
before the primary indicated that, of the Georgia voters ques-
tioned, Camp was strongest among lower-income voters in
cities and larger towns. But even there, Camp could not
expect more than 29 percent of the votes.156 Talmadge was
strongest among lower-income farmers. George, however,
was the most popular candidate among most categories of
voters.
On September 14, at the last primary of the purge cam-
paign, the voting results reflected the statistics of recent
public opinion polls and the assumptions of most political
observers. Of the popular votes, George received 43.9 percent,
Talmadge 32.1 percent, and Camp 23.9 percent.157 Georgia's
county unit system, however, gave George 59 percent of the
410 unit votes and Camp only 4.9 percent.158
George occasionally used the 1937 anti-lynching bill as a
rallying issue in his campaign, but there was only one purge
campaign in which race baiting was a major theme—South
Carolina's Democratic primary for senator. Even more sig-
nificant in this August 30 primary was that both major candi-
dates, Senator Ellison D. "Cotton Ed" Smith and Governor
Olin T. Johnston, would exploit the race issue in order to
attract support. Although he was a New Deal populist en-
dorsed by CIO unions, Johnston, like traditional populist
politicians in the heavily black Deep South, was careful to
combine his pro-labor economic positions with segregationist
rhetoric in order to counter the accusations of conservative
opponents that he was a radical who threatened southern
society.159
Johnston had announced his senatorial candidacy from the
White House on May 17.160 At that time, however, Roosevelt
did not announce an endorsement of Johnston to the press.
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He was less active in the South Carolina primary than in
other primaries with an incumbent targeted for purging for
several reasons. First, an open endorsement of Johnston
might antagonize Smith voters and jeopardize the guber-
natorial nomination of Burnet Maybank, the progressive
mayor of Charleston, who was admired by Roosevelt.161 Sec-
ond, Johnston did not solicit White House intervention in the
form of federal funds and personnel. If substantial presiden-
tial assistance had been requested and provided, Johnston's
chances of defeating Smith might be damaged rather than
enhanced by risking additional accusations of a carpetbag
invasion. Finally, among all of the pro-Roosevelt candidates
who challenged an incumbent opposed by the purgers, John-
ston was in the strongest position. He was a popular governor
with a strong organization and labor support, significant in a
state where the votes of textile mill workers were often de-
cisive in electoral results. Thus, Johnston was already capa-
ble of waging a competitive campaign against Smith on his
own.162
Smith was widely criticized for his callous remarks oppos-
ing a minimum wage, and Johnston decided to make Smith's
opposition to the wages-and-hours bill his chief issue.163
In a trip through South Carolina, Roosevelt met Johnston in
Greenville on August 11 and asserted the need to elect candi-
dates to Congress who would support the wages-and-hours
bill and other New Deal policies beneficial to wage earners
and farmers. Although he did not specifically endorse John-
ston and rebuke Smith in this speech, the president implied
his preference for Johnston.164
Realizing his vulnerability to Johnston on the minimum
wage issue, Smith effectively deflected attention from this
issue by arguing that further federal intervention by the New
Deal threatened white supremacy and states' rights.165 He
greatly exaggerated and misled audiences about Roosevelt's
minor role in the campaign by accusing the president of
invading South Carolina and trying to manipulate voting
behavior.166 The conservative incumbent also denounced
Johnston for receiving the support of CIO unions which he
suggested were controlled by radicals who sought the end of
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segregation and the political empowerment of blacks.167 De-
termined not to be perceived as a race-mixing liberal, John-
ston angrily castigated Smith for supporting a bill earlier in
his career which would have ended segregation in railroad
cars.168
Johnston's prospect of victory was threatened by the Sen-
ate candidacy of state Senator Edgar A. Brown.169 Also run-
ning on a pro-New Deal platform, Brown had narrowly lost to
Smith in the 1926 Democratic primary for the U.S. Senate. He
was, however, a relentless political foe of Johnston and di-
rected much of his criticism toward the governor. Johnston,
distracted by Brown's candidacy, was outraged when he with-
drew from the race two days before the August 30 primary
and then used the media attention to criticize the governor's
candidacy.170
Meanwhile, Smith was able to solidify his forces during
the final days of the campaign. Senator James F. Byrnes of
South Carolina, a moderate Democrat who had previously
contributed to Tydings's campaign, organized federal ap-
pointees behind Smith.171 The primary's results revealed
that Smith had been renominated with 55.4 percent of the
votes to Johnston's 44.6 percent.172
The purge campaign succeeded in defeating only one con-
gressional incumbent, Representative John J. O'Connor of
New York.173 As chairman of the House Rules Committee,
O'Connor had proven to be an obstacle to White House bills,
especially regarding business regulations and taxes.174 Roo-
sevelt's success in defeating O'Connor and nominating James
Fay as his successor resulted mostly from the purgers1 ef-
fective exploitation of local political factors that threatened
O'Connor's renomination. O'Connor's working-class constitu-
ents resented their congressman's long absences from their
district.175
Fay, who had narrowly lost to O'Connor in the 1934 pri-
mary, was popular in the district and received the support of
WPA workers who canvassed voters and solicited campaign
contributions for him. O'Connor's charges that this purge was
part of a Communist conspiracy won him little support. With
Ed Flynn managing his campaign, Fay defeated O'Connor
The Purge Campaigns of 1938 153
with 8,352 votes to the incumbent's 7,779 votes in the Sep-
tember 20 primary.176 O'Connor, though, received the Repub-
lican nomination in this heavily Democratic district, which
elected Fay in November.
Roosevelt's failure to defeat all but one of the conservative
congressional incumbents he tried to defeat in the Demo-
cratic primaries led most journalists at this time and later
scholars to conclude that the purge campaign was a reckless,
ill-conceived, badly managed strategy that weakened Roo-
sevelt's party leadership and emboldened southern con-
servative Democrats in Congress to cooperate more with
Republicans in weakening or defeating liberal policy pro-
posals.177 In 1940, Thomas L. Stokes asserted that Roosevelt's
purge campaign "did not liberalize the Democratic Party"
but instead "only ripped it wider apart."178 Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., would refer to the purge as "an almost com-
plete failure"; and William E. Leuchtenburg called the purge
"a humiliating drubbing" for Roosevelt.179 E. Pendleton Her-
ring stated that the purge failed "as a disciplinary measure"
against congressional Democrats who had defied Roosevelt
on New Deal bills, while William Riker claimed that the
campaign "had no significant effect, except perhaps in New
York City."180
Critics of the purge, however, disagree over what Roose-
velt's long-term objective was. Jim Farley bitterly claimed
that Roosevelt merely wanted to establish a "personal party"
and succeeded in weakening the structure and exacerbating
the division between the liberal and conservative wings of the
Party.181 James T. Patterson argues that Roosevelt intended
the purge to stimulate an ideological realignment of the two-
party system but failed by showing that "the New Deal, far
from nationalizing or regimenting the nation, was all but
helpless when confronted by determined state organizations
in the South."182 Likewise, Alan Brinkley suggests that
while Roosevelt wanted the purge to strengthen pro-New
Deal, liberal Democrats in the South, his unprecedented
intervention in these primaries offended the regional pride of
both liberal and conservative Democrats in the region.183
Raymond Clapper concluded shortly before the congressional
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elections of 1938 that Roosevelt intended the purge to achieve
the more modest, limited objectives of making southern Dem-
ocrats in Congress more supportive of his bills and "of drama-
tizing his struggle to imprint the New Deal indelibly on the
party majority."184
Although Roosevelt failed to defeat any of the southern
incumbents, J.B. Shannon argued in 1939 that these electoral
defeats for Roosevelt did not represent a repudiation of Roose-
velt and the New Deal by southern voters. He calculated that
53.4 percent of all southern voters in 1938 voted for pro-New
Deal candidates in the primaries while 67 percent of the
southern voters polled by the American Institute of Public
Opinion expressed approval of Roosevelt.185 He attributed
the victories of conservative incumbents to a myriad of local
political factors peculiar to each contest and to the incum-
bents' appeals to racial fears and states' rights in order to
avoid discussing Roosevelt and the New Deal. Consequently,
Shannon infers that although Roosevelt's "effort to remake a
political party in the form of political philosophy" failed in
the purge, the widespread popularity of Roosevelt and the
New Deal among southern voters compelled these conserva-
tive incumbents to avoid specifically attacking Roosevelt and
the New Deal in their speeches.186
In short, Roosevelt's failure to defeat the southern conser-
vative incumbents did not represent a rejection of the New
Deal and Roosevelt's party leadership by southern voters.
Most southern voters in these primaries resented and re-
jected the principle and practice of presidential intervention
in local politics. By contrast, Charles M. Price and Joseph
Boskin found that northern, urban, working-class Democrats
who were polled in 1938 were more likely to express support
for the purge. This regional difference of public attitudes
toward the purge may partially explain why Representative
John J. O'Connor of New York was the only congressional in-
cumbent defeated in the campaign.187
It is evident, therefore, that the conservative incumbents'
victories did not necessarily reflect their constituents' rejec-
tion of Roosevelt and New Deal liberalism or even of Roose-
velt's desire to make the Party a more distinctly liberal party
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so that congressional Democrats would be more supportive of
further New Deal measures. But the question remains: Did
the purge of 1938 detract from his short-term objective of
pressuring Democrats in Congress to become more suppor-
tive of New Deal bills and from his long-term objective of
making the Party more distinctly liberal?
John E. Hopper persuasively contends that Roosevelt's
purge campaign accomplished the first objective because it
stimulated the passage of the previously stalemated wages-
and-hours bill. According to Hopper, the mere prospect of
Roosevelt intervening against recalcitrant Democratic con-
gressmen in their future renomination campaigns pressured
enough wavering Democrats in Congress to support the
wages-and-hours bill and other bills favored by the White
House.188 Moreover, Hopper cites a fact often ignored by
critics of the purge: that Roosevelt's intervention helped ten
liberal Democratic incumbents whose renominations were
threatened by conservative challengers. Hopper asserts that
these victories were crucial for achieving the second, long-
term objective of liberalizing the Party by solidifying the
strength of New Deal liberals within the Party and assuring
their dominance over national Party affairs, thereby prevent-
ing conservatives from seizing control of the Party in 1940.189
Sidney Milkis claims that the purge campaign stimulated
the growth of a coalition of conservative Democrats and Re-
publicans which would dominate Congress and obstruct the
passage of further liberal policy proposals for the next twenty
years.190 He further contends that the decentralized nature
of American party politics ensures that such presidential
intervention intended to centralize control of party affairs
under the president will inevitably result in intraparty dis-
cord and in even weaker presidential control.191 According to
Milkis, the purge's failure convinced Roosevelt that he should
focus on reorganizing the executive branch and expanding its
administrative powers over public policy so that the Party
would be subordinated into "a temporary waystation on the
way to administrative government, that is, a centralized de-
mocracy."192
Milkis suggests that Roosevelt sought to transcend par-
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tisan politics and expand the power and efficacy of the ex-
ecutive branch in policy matters so that the Party would not
be essential for achieving New Deal policy objectives. He also
suggests that "Roosevelt's aggressive partisan efforts were
primarily rhetorical after 1938."193 This assessment, how-
ever, underestimates the vigor of some of Roosevelt's partisan
efforts after 1938, especially the assiduous efforts he and the
White House New Dealers made to control the nomination
and platform-making processes at the 1940 Democratic na-
tional convention to prevent conservatives from seizing con-
trol of the Party.
Milkis*s analysis also overemphasizes the policy role of a
party by neglecting a major role of the increasingly liberal
Party that Roosevelt recognized. Since the 1920s, Roosevelt
had recognized that a liberal Party needed to fulfill the role of
an inclusive, pluralistic party that would serve as a vehicle
for integrating, assimilating, and empowering previously dis-
advantaged voting blocs and interest groups into national
politics. According to Samuel Beer, the more liberal, plu-
ralistic Party that emerged under Roosevelt's leadership pro-
vided such previously politically disadvantaged groups as
blacks, urban ethnics, and labor unions with greater power,
status, and opportunity in the national political process and
in society in general.194 Would these newly empowered mem-
bers of the New Deal coalition become merely passive bene-
ficiaries of the administrative state's liberal policies? Or
would they become active participants in the national politi-
cal process and part of an enduring, liberal Democratic party?
Bernard Donahoe argues that the 1938 purge clarified the
ideological and factional divisions between liberal and con-
servative Democrats. Instead of permanently frustrating the
Party under presidential leadership, the results of the purge
made Roosevelt and the New Deal liberals determined to
engineer the 1940 Democratic national convention so that
they would firmly control the nominating and platform-
making processes, thus assuring the continuation of lib-
eralism within the national Party. Donahoe writes, "The
conservatives were left without a place on the ticket or a place
in the platform, and it seemed. . . that the days of Democrats
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like Garner, Farley, Tydings, Van Nuys, and Harrison were as
much a part of the past as those of Al Smith, John Raskob,
John W. Davis, and James Reed."195
Furthermore, E.E. Schattschneider indicates that the in-
crease in congressional power the southern conservatives
enjoyed as a result of their victories in the purge and their
growing cooperation with Republicans in Congress did not
translate into control of the national Party, and, "as viewed
from 1940, the 'purge' of 1938 does not seem to have been a
failure."196 The aftermath of the 1938 purge and the events of
the 1940 Democratic national convention indicated the south-
ern conservatives' growing isolation from and declining influ-
ence in national Party affairs.
The purge of 1938, therefore, did beneficially contribute to
the long-term, liberal transformation of the national Party
by dramatically publicizing the ideological-policy differences
and conflicts between the liberal and conservative elements
of the Party. If Roosevelt had not chosen to attempt a purge,
the anti-New Deal conservative Democrats would have con-
tinued to identify themselves rhetorically with the president
and the New Deal for electoral purposes while sabotaging
New Deal bills in Congress.197 As Rexford Tugwell and Sam-
uel Rosenman have indicated, Roosevelt wanted the conser-
vative incumbents targeted by the purge to be held publicly
accountable to their constituents for their anti-New Deal
voting records in Congress.198
The purge was a milestone in Roosevelt's Party leadership
because it was a public expression of his willingness to direct
both his rhetoric and political action against well-entrenched
Democratic incumbents who endangered his efforts to im-
plant New Deal liberalism as the Party's ideological-policy
identity. He realized that the national Party could not become
distinctly liberal if southern conservatives continued to be
"the ball and chain which hobbled the party's forward move-
ment."199 Morton Frisch contends that for the purpose of
"providing a formulation or definition of what the Democratic
party was to stand for, the purge was a significant success." 200
Even though Roosevelt lost individual battles against sev-
eral conservative incumbents in 1938, he won the war for
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control of the ideological character and policy agenda of the
Party.201 Southern conservatives in Congress would feel in-
creasingly alienated from the national Party's liberal domes-
tic policies as they recognized the decline of their power in
national Party affairs and the rising power of interest groups
and voting blocs, especially labor unions and blacks, which
favored a distinctly liberal Democratic Party.202 The seem-
ingly unsuccessful purge of 1938 served as the harbinger of
the truly successful "purge of 1940" in which New Deal Demo-
crats succeeded in renominating Roosevelt, choosing his run-
ning mate, and dominating the formulation of the Party's
domestic policy platform.203
7 The Struggle to
Maintain a Liberal
Party: 1940-1944
The 1940 Election
The Democratic party that emerged in 1940 to renominate
and re-elect Roosevelt to an unprecedented third term re-
flected the political changes that had occurred since 1936.
The intraparty discord wrought by the policy conflicts of the
75th Congress, the 1938 purge, and Farley's alienation made
conservative Democrats increasingly rebellious toward Roo-
sevelt's Party leadership. The Republican resurgence in the
1938 congressional elections revealed the return of many
non-southern WASPs to the Republican party.1 Conse-
quently, Roosevelt could not expect to receive the large
number of votes from disaffected Republicans and indepen-
dents that he had received in 1932 and 1936.2 This was es-
pecially true after the Republicans nominated Wendell
Willkie, a former Democrat, who proved to be attractive to
previously pro-Roosevelt Republicans and independents.3
The Democrats had been steadily increasing their number
of seats in Congress since 1930. It seemed inevitable that the
Republicans would gain seats in Congress after voters be-
came dissatisfied with the New Deal policies.4 A solid major-
ity of Americans polled continued to approve of Roosevelt's
performance, but, between 1936 and 1940, there was growing
public opposition to further New Deal reforms. A Gallup
public opinion poll conducted on August 28, 1938, revealed
that 66 percent of the voters polled wanted Roosevelt to pur-
sue more conservative domestic policies.5
The recession of 1937-1938 generated further dissatis-
faction with the New Deal, especially among non-southern
farmers. After briefly cutting domestic spending in an effort
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to balance the federal budget, Roosevelt reluctantly returned
to "pump priming" through higher spending on relief and
public works to reduce unemployment and increase consump-
tion.6 The high deficit spending, however, did little to satisfy
the grievances of farmers in the Midwest and West who were
suffering low farm prices, especially for wheat and corn.7
Exploiting such discontent among middle-class voters to
assure their own electoral success, the Republicans realized
that they must not appear to be conservative ideologues who
simply denounce the New Deal while spouting platitudes
about rugged individualism and laissez-faire capitalism. The
electoral results of 1936 and public opinion polls revealed that
most voters, including most Republicans, accepted the idea
that there was a need for permanent federal intervention in
the economy.8 In a 1938 poll, 56 percent of all Republican
voters questioned stated that they wanted their party to be-
come more liberal.9
This public mood influenced the campaign strategy that
most successful Republican nominees pursued in 1938 and
the type of presidential nominee that their party would
choose in 1940. This moderate, pragmatic approach, which
most Old Guard conservatives disdainfully referred to as "Me
Too-ism," basically agreed with the broad New Deal policy
objectives of greater economic security for farmers and wage
earners and regulations against big business abuses.10 In-
stead, Republican candidates criticized Roosevelt's policies as
being fiscally extravagant, politically corrupt because of the
Democratic machines involved in public works projects, and
ineffective as evidenced by the recent recession.11
Realizing that the Party under Roosevelt and New Deal
liberalism had proven to be especially popular among the
youngest voters, the Republican party recruited young, dy-
namic candidates in 1938. Friction between the Democratic
and Farmer-Labor parties of Minnesota enabled thirty-three-
year-old Republican Harold Stassen to win the Minnesota
gubernatorial election of 1938.12 Enjoying national fame for
crusading integrity and competence as a racket-busting dis-
trict attorney, Thomas E. Dewey, the thirty-six-year-old Re-
publican nominee for the governorship of New York, lost
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to the Democratic incumbent, Herbert Lehman, Roosevelt's
chosen successor, by only 64,000 votes—1 percent of the state-
wide vote.13 Without votes from the ClO-created American
Labor Party and the Communist party, Lehman would have
been defeated. Meanwhile, two nationally prominent "Little
New Deal" Democratic governors, Frank Murphy of Michi-
gan and George Earle of Pennsylvania, were defeated.14
One successful Republican nominee for senator, Robert A.
Taft of Ohio, did not dilute his thoroughly anti-New Deal
conservative ideology to adapt to public opinion. In a cam-
paign address delivered on September 14, 1938, Taft criti-
cized New Deal regulations on farmers and businessmen and
stated that prosperity in the United States "can be more
effectively restored by individual freedom and free competi-
tion under the American Constitution and the American way
of life than by the importation of ideas from Russia or from
Germany."15 Determined to keep the Republican party dis-
tinctly conservative, Taft, like Dewey, became a leading can-
didate for the Republican presidential nomination of 1940.
The results of the 1938 congressional elections encouraged
Republicans about their prospects for winning the 1940 pres-
idential election. They gained eighty-one seats in the House
of Representatives, almost doubling their current number of
eighty-eight.16 In the Senate, the Republicans increased
their number of seats from fifteen to twenty-three.17
Although the Democrats still held a comfortable majority
of seats in the House and a two-thirds majority in the Senate,
the enlarged Republican presence could diminish Roosevelt's
influence on the passage of White House bills in two ways.
The increased number of Republicans and conservative Dem-
ocrats alienated from Roosevelt would make it very difficult
for New Deal Democrats in Congress to obtain the number of
votes necessary to suspend the rules or issue a discharge
petition to a recalcitrant committee chairman in order to
facilitate the passage of the president's bills.18 Also, coopera-
tion between Republicans and conservative Democrats in
defeating the court reform bill and heavily amending the
wages-and-hours bill set a precedent for bipartisan opposi-
tion to Roosevelt in Congress. This coalition would give Re-
162 Roosevelt the Party Leader
publican members of Congress a degree of policy influence
beyond their number of seats.19
In the hope of accurately understanding the causes of the
Democratic reverses of 1938 in order to prepare for the 1940
election, Farley asked state and local Democratic commit-
teemen for analyses of Democratic defeats in their states.20
For the most part, Democratic defeats were attributed by
these Party activists to candidates and issues peculiar to each
state.21 In particular, unusually acrimonious and divisive
Democratic primaries, especially in Pennsylvania and Illi-
nois, weakened the ability of Democratic nominees to win
elections.22
Nevertheless, Farley's analysis did reveal certain nation-
wide themes and issues that had hurt the voter appeal of
Democratic nominees. Many farmers outside the South were
angry with the AAA for its regulatory and subsidy policies
and with the WPA for reducing the availability of cheap farm
labor.23 Some reports even contended that higher WPA
spending did not make WPA workers and recipients more
supportive of Democratic candidates because many of them
were dissatisfied with the amount of their benefits.24 More
significantly, though, the Party's humanitarian image under
the New Deal was tainted by widespread accounts of Demo-
cratic manipulation of the WPA and other federal agencies for
electoral purposes.25
What lessons could the Party learn from its 1938 defeats to
prepare for the 1940 election? Although it was not clear that
the election results of 1938 expressed a public rejection of New
Deal liberalism and the Democratic Party, Farley and other
Party regulars perceived the need to shift the Party's policy
agenda and image toward the center and soothe conservative
Democrats in Congress, who were enraged by the purge cam-
paign and the divisive bills of the 75th Congress. They be-
lieved that, because a majority of the voters were Democrats,
the key to electoral success for the Party was to maintain a
high degree of intraparty harmony through the judicious
distribution of patronage and the avoidance of presidential or
DNC intervention in conflicts at the state and local levels.26
Farley had assumed from the beginning that a purge cam-
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paign, especially one led by White House New Dealers like
Corcoran and Hopkins, would irreparably fragment the
Party and lead to Republican victories. He said, "I trace all
the woes of the Democratic party, directly or indirectly, to this
interference in purely local affairs. In any political entity
voters naturally and rightfully resent the unwarranted in-
vasion of outsiders."27
Further angered by Roosevelt's favoritism toward such
non-Democratic liberals as Fiorello La Guardia and George
Norris, Party regulars could not understand why Roosevelt
and the White House New Dealers would risk dividing and
weakening the Party to strengthen its candidates' commit-
ment to New Deal liberalism. What Roosevelt believed and
Farley failed to realize is that principles and policy objectives
were more important for stimulating voter interest and for
governing responsibly than patronage distribution and party
organization were.28 A more moderate, cautious Democratic
party, reminiscent of its status during the 1920s as a party
vague and vacillating in its ideology and policy agenda, would
alienate the liberally oriented voters and interest groups that
it had coopted since 1932. In particular, organized labor, with
its substantial amount of votes, campaign contributions, and
campaign services given to liberal Democratic candidates,
could desert the Party in 1940 if it nominated a moderate or
conservative who was antagonistic toward labor's policy inter-
ests.29
While the conventional wisdom among party regulars as-
sumed that Roosevelt must become more cautious and moder-
ate in his rhetoric, policy efforts, and party leadership to
assure victory in 1940, the president continued to assert that
the Party needed to maintain and even further enhance its
liberalism in public policy and its ideological identity. Two key
addresses by Roosevelt in 1939 underscored this theme. In his
speech at the Jackson Day dinner on January 7, he stated that
the effect of the Republican resurgence "should be to bring us
real Democrats together and to line up with those from other
parties, those who belong to no party at all, who also preach
the liberal gospel, so that, firmly allied, we may continue a
common constructive service to the people of the country."30
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The president's August 8 address to a national convention
of Young Democrats criticized Republican and Democratic
conservatives equally as obstacles to the nation's progress.
More significantly, Roosevelt firmly stated that his own
Party loyalty was not absolute and unqualified. He revealed
that he definitely would not support a conservative nominee
for president in 1940. He told the group, "If we nominate
conservative candidates, or lip-service candidates, on a strad-
dle bug platform, I personally, for my own self respect and
because of my long service to and belief in, liberal democracy,
will find it impossible to have any active part in such an
unfortunate suicide of the old Democratic Party."31
As early as 1938, Harold Ickes had publicly stated that
there was nothing sacred about the two-term tradition for
presidents and that Roosevelt was "the only man capable of
carrying on the liberal tradition who can be both nominated
and elected."32 Even without an outbreak of war in Europe,
Ickes and several other New Deal liberals believed that Roo-
sevelt was the only liberal Democrat who could win.33 As
early as April 1939, Kelly was advocating a third term for
Roosevelt. While the president was publicly denying that he
wanted to serve a third term, Kelly was quietly building a
nationwide network of support for a "Draft Roosevelt" move-
ment.34 Most of the early support for a third term came from
other machine bosses, such as Frank Hague of Jersey City
and Ed Crump of Memphis.
Roosevelt, however, continued to avoid answering ques-
tions about any plans for running in 1940.35 There are two
possible reasons for Roosevelt's evasion. He may have wanted
to wait until as near as possible to the 1940 Democratic
National Convention to see if the development of interna-
tional affairs justified and warranted a third term.36 Also, his
evasion was a source of power with the press, Congress, and
his opponents within the Party. If he had unequivocally
stated before 1940 that he would not run again, he would have
been branding himself as a lame duck, thereby diminishing
his policy influence in Congress.37 Furthermore, Roosevelt's
conservative Democratic opponents would be reluctant to
fully finance and publicly endorse a presidential candidate if
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there was a constant possibility that Roosevelt would sud-
denly announce his candidacy and secure the nomination.
Another effect of Roosevelt's evasion was to stimulate minor,
exploratory presidential candidacies among three Democrats
in particular. Harry Hopkins had become increasingly am-
bitious since the 1936 campaign and was widely perceived as
Roosevelt's likely successor. His appointment as secretary of
commerce in 1939 was regarded by political observers as his
first step toward a presidential candidacy.38 As the WPA
administrator, Hopkins certainly enjoyed greater public
name recognition than such presidential possibilities as for-
mer Governor Paul McNutt of Indiana and Secretary of State
Cordell Hull.39 If nominated and elected, he would be the
candidate most likely to continue New Deal liberalism in
domestic policy.
Hopkins, however, faced serious obstacles to the nomina-
tion. Within the Party apparatus, politicians were angry with
Hopkins for a variety of reasons. Some disliked the reduction
in patronage that occurred when Republicans were allowed
to serve as WPA personnel. Others resented control over WPA
appointments and projects in their states by rival Democratic
politicians.40 Hopkins was also detested by southern conser-
vatives and Party regulars for his prominence in the 1938
purge.
Besides these political factors, Hopkins's status as a di-
vorced man and his deteriorating health due to stomach
cancer were additional liabilities.41 In a Gallup poll released
on December 2, 1938, Democratic voters were asked whom
they would prefer as the Democratic presidential nominee in
1940 if Roosevelt did not run again. Of the ten most fre-
quently mentioned candidates, Hopkins ranked ninth in
order of preference.42
If Roosevelt were not a presidential candidate in 1940,
Farley and Vice-President John Garner were the chief prefer-
ences among Party regulars.43 As the primary distributor of
federal patronage, the genial Postmaster General was re-
spected by many party regulars, had accumulated many po-
litical debts, and had carefully remained neutral in most
intraparty conflicts.44 But even if Farley were nominated as a
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compromise presidential candidate in the event of a deadlock
at the convention, it was doubtful that his voter appeal would
be broad enough to defeat an attractive Republican nominee.
Having no experience in elective office except as a one-term
assemblyman, his qualifications for the presidency would
certainly be questioned, especially during a period of growing
international crises.45 Finally, Farley's church affiliation
might limit his voter appeal to his fellow Catholic Democrats.
A more feasible presidential "boomlet" was that of the vice-
president. The conservative Texan had become alienated from
Roosevelt over domestic policy issues since the 1936 election.
He had not only refused to support the president on such key
legislation as the court reform bill, the wages-and-hours bill,
and higher WPA spending to alleviate the recession, but
quietly lobbied members of Congress for the opposition.46
The first Garner for President Club was opened in Dallas in
May 1939 by Texas oil barons. It was obvious that Garner's
strongest support came from conservative businessmen op-
posed to New Deal economic policies.47
Although Garner had the potential to attract the endorse-
ments of fellow southern conservatives and Liberty League
Democrats, his candidacy was clearly repugnant to liberal
interest groups, especially organized labor and blacks. The
vice-president avoided public speaking and passively allowed
his supporters to establish campaign organizations in several
primary states during the spring of 1940. In these states, most
notably California, slates of Democratic delegates committed
to Roosevelt trounced the Garner forces.48
Roosevelt, meanwhile, was concentrating on foreign policy.
Since the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, he
had sought to strengthen the American military and in-
directly aid Britain while maintaining neutrality.49 He re-
alized that he needed to conduct his implicitly pro-Allies
foreign policy cautiously to avoid inflaming isolationist opin-
ion to the extent that it would intimidate Congress into
opposing a military build-up.50 In October 1939, he succeeded
in persuading Congress to repeal the 1935 Neutrality Act's
arms embargo, enabling the Allies to buy arms from the
United States.51
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To counter the isolationist opposition of western progres-
sives such as Burton Wheeler, Roosevelt sought to build an
internationalist majority in Congress favorable to his foreign
and defense policies. He cultivated the support of southern
conservatives and eastern Republicans.52 His appointment of
Republicans Frank Knox and Henry Stimson as, respectively,
the new secretary of the navy and secretary of war symbolized
Roosevelt's effort to establish bipartisan support for his
foreign policy.53 The fall of France to Hitler in June 1940
convinced Roosevelt and most Democratic delegates at the
national convention that he should run for a third term.54
With both northern liberals and southern conservatives in
the Party committed to an internationalist platform, the
future course of American foreign policy was not expected to
be a divisive issue at the Democratic National Convention.55
The formation of the Republican platform toward Europe,
however, was expected to be a contentious issue among the
Republican delegates.56 Despite the increasingly pro-Allies
trend of public opinion, including among Republican voters,
most Old Guard conservatives and western progressives in
the Republican party were determined to draft an isolationist
platform.57
To the dismay of the most committed isolationists, the
Republican delegates drafted an ambiguous foreign policy
platform which equivocally combined internationalist and
isolationist elements. Even though Republicans in Congress
led the opposition to a defense build-up, their party's platform
accused the Roosevelt administration of having "left the Na-
tion unprepared to resist foreign attack" and "ignoring the
lessons of fact concerning modern, mechanized, armed de-
fense."58 With equal vigor, the Republicans expressed their
firm opposition to "involving this Nation in foreign war."59
Alf Landon, whom Roosevelt had originally wanted to ap-
point as the new secretary of war, had tried to strengthen the
wording of the platform's defense plank but was defeated by
the prevailing isolationist sentiment.60
Isolationist Republicans at the convention still had to
make their party's platform on foreign policy and defense
vague and flexible in order to accommodate their unorthodox
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nominee, Wendell L. Willkie.61 A utility company executive
and former Democrat, Willkie had not become a registered
Republican until 1940.62 In fact, the only elective office that
Willkie had held was his position on the Tammany County
Committee in New York City's 15th assembly district in
1935.63 As recently as 1938, Willkie had voted for Governor
Herbert Lehman and the rest of New York's Democratic
ticket.64
Willkie's meteoric rise as a Republican presidential candi-
date from 1938 to 1940 can be mainly attributed to shrewd
publicity efforts promoting his candidacy and the zeal of his
grass roots campaign activists, many of whom were not party
regulars.65 In 1936, Alf Landon lost by a landslide as his
rhetoric tried to appease both conservatives and progressives
in the Republican party. Since Landon's spurious dichotomy
succeeded in offending liberal Republicans and driving them
into the Roosevelt camp, it seemed sensible to such leading
Republicans as House minority leader Joseph Martin of
Massachusetts and Republican national chairman John D.
Hamilton that a maverick like Willkie would have enough
popular support among liberal Republicans, independents,
and disaffected Democrats to win an upset victory in 1940.66
The rapid proliferation of Willkie clubs and the impressive
enthusiasm and diligence that young Republicans in par-
ticular exhibited in campaigning for Willkie's nomination
seemed to confirm these assumptions.67
This populist, bandwagon effect behind Willkie at the Re-
publican National Convention overwhelmed more conserva-
tive GOP delegates who resented the former Democrat's
candidacy. The presidential candidacies of Senator Robert A.
Taft of Ohio, Senator Arthur Vandenburg of Michigan, and
District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey of New York quickly
disintegrated under the ebullient momentum of Willkie's
candidacy.68 Willkie was nominated on the sixth ballot,69 and
he chose Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon, the Senate
minority leader and a western progressive favoring public
power, as his running mate.70
Willkie's rhetoric and campaign strategy generally re-
flected the "Me Too" approach. He basically agreed with the
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humanitarian and reformist objectives of the New Deal while
criticizing its level of federal spending, regulatory control,
and burdens on business operations. Willkie usually avoided
discussing foreign policy issues since he agreed with Roose-
velt on the defense build-up and peacetime draft and did not
want reminders of these agreements to damage his appeal
among isolationists.71 The amiable nominee's speeches, how-
ever, became more strident as he charged that the New Deal
was stifling economic growth and that a third term for Roose-
velt would lead to totalitarianism.72
Whereas Willkie had relied on the enthusiasm of grass
roots activists and favorable newspaper publicity to overcome
the reluctance of Republican bosses toward his candidacy, the
support of Democratic machine bosses and their delegates
proved to be instrumental to Roosevelt's renomination. To
assure his re-election, Roosevelt had to rely on the machine
bosses more in 1940 than he had in 1932 and 1936.73 Deter-
mined to renominate the president as a proven vote-getter to
head their Democratic tickets and to continue the benefits
of New Deal programs for their cities, the machine bosses
emerged as Roosevelt's most powerful, reliable allies in the
1940 campaign. Before the convention opened, Roosevelt real-
ized that he especially needed the bosses' support to coun-
teract whatever appeal Garner and Farley's anti-third term
movement might have among disaffected Party regulars and
southern conservatives. Through Roosevelt's influence, Chi-
cago, Ed Kelly's domain, was chosen as the site of the 1940
Democratic National Convention even though it did not offer
the highest bid.74 By controlling the galleries and the agenda
of the convention, Kelly could minimize the prospect of a
"Stop Roosevelt" movement suddenly emerging and growing
among the delegates.75 Roosevelt later confided to Ickes that
Kelly's ability to pack the galleries with supporters of a third
term was an important factor in the choice.76
Roosevelt realized, though, that even Kelly's machinations
might not prevent Farley and Garner from bitterly dividing
the delegates through their anti-third term coalition. Garner
had declared his candidacy at the convention to express his
conviction against a third term.77 Farley had briefly thought
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that he could run in 1940 as Secretary of State Cordell Hull's
running mate. But Hull had revealed no desire to run for
president, and his appeal was limited to the South.78
Farley's presidential candidacy, however, appeared to be
mostly a matter of personal opportunism and bitterness to-
ward Roosevelt as the president relied more on Hopkins and
Corcoran for political advice after 1936. Farley had not be-
come a conservative ideologue. He had lavishly praised the
New Deal's social welfare liberalism in his first autobiogra-
phy.79 During his service as DNC chairman and Postmaster
General, he had been oblivious to ideology and public policy.
Except for his involvement in the campaign against Millard
Tydings, he opposed the 1938 purge because he feared that
it would irreparably damage intraparty relations, and not
because of an ideological preference for the conservatives
targeted by the purge. His cooperation with Garner in the
anti—third term movement was caused more by mutual bit-
terness toward Roosevelt than because of a shared ideology.
Once he decided to run for a third term, Roosevelt was
determined to choose a committed New Deal liberal as his
running mate. As early as May 1937, the president told
Henry Morgenthau that he needed to force conservatives such
as Garner out of the Party in order to pursue New Deal policy
objectives.80 Except for a few diehard, anti-Roosevelt conser-
vatives like Millard Tydings and Carter Glass, most southern
Democrats who had opposed major New Deal bills in Con-
gress and were outraged by the 1938 purge united behind
Roosevelt instead of Garner.81 Their bitterness toward Roose-
velt had been reduced by his solicitation of their support on
foreign policy and defense measures.82 Moreover, the 1938
purge had made them reluctant to incur the president's
vengeful wrath in the event of his re-election.83
When the Democrats met, therefore, in July 1940, at their
national convention in Chicago, they were more united than
they had been in the previous year. Growing Nazi aggression
and the weakness of Farley's and Garner's candidacies had in-
creased support for Roosevelt's renomination. Senator Jimmy
Byrnes of South Carolina, who had supported "Cotton Ed"
Smith against the purge, became Roosevelt's floor leader.84
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Moreover, there was a growing realization among Democratic
politicians and delegates that Roosevelt was the only candi-
date behind whom all of the diverse, conflicting elements of
their Party would unite.85
The diverse coalition that supported Roosevelt's renomina-
tion was personified by its leading organizers—Ed Kelly,
Harry Hopkins, and Jimmy Byrnes. Hopkins served as the
liaison of the president, who remained in Washington, while
Byrnes lobbied the southern delegates.86 But Kelly had the
responsibility for planning and implementing an overwhelm-
ing demand among the delegates for Roosevelt's renomina-
tion. He had arranged beforehand to have his machine create
a bandwagon effect that would provide the necessary momen-
tum. Although Harry Hopkins was not a delegate, Kelly
made him a sergeant at arms so that he could be admitted to
the floor of the convention and organize pro-Roosevelt dele-
gates for the planned demonstration.87 As soon as Alben
Barkley, the convention chairman, finished delivering a mes-
sage from Roosevelt telling the delegates that they could vote
for any candidate they wished, a voice from the loudspeakers
bellowed, "We want Roosevelt!" 87 A boisterous, pro-Roosevelt
demonstration began and lasted nearly an hour.88
The voice that initiated this "spontaneous" demonstration
belonged to Thomas Garry, Chicago's superintendent of
sewers. Kelly had arranged for Garry's shout to be the signal
that would initiate the demonstration. The burst of enthusi-
asm, meticulously planned by Kelly, had the desired effect.90
By the next day, 86 percent of the delegates voted for Roose-
velt on the first ballot; and the remaining delegates divided
their votes among Farley, Garner, Hull, and Tydings.91
Unfortunately for the machine bosses and the White
House New Dealers who engineered the proceedings of the
convention, the nomination of Roosevelt's running mate
could not be implemented as smoothly. Hull, a moderate re-
spected by all factions, had firmly rejected White House sug-
gestions that he run for vice-president.92 A vice-presidential
nomination for Jimmy Byrnes might prove to be offensive to
blacks, labor unions, and Catholics because of his position as a
segregationist, an opponent of pro-union bills, and an ex-
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Catholic.93 Furthermore, Roosevelt's anger at Garner for his
secret lobbying in Congress against New Deal bills had made
him determined to choose a liberal running mate who was
unequivocally committed to the New Deal.
Roosevelt informed Kelly, Hopkins, and Byrnes that he
wanted Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace as his
vice-presidential candidate.94 He informed his operatives in
Chicago that he would not accept his own renomination un-
less they convinced the delegates to support his choice of
Wallace. Wallace's status as a former Republican, his lack of a
political base, and his rather eccentric interest in mysticism
were regarded by this triumvirate as liabilities for "selling"
him to the delegates.95 With most of the opposition to Wallace
coming from southerners and pro-Farley New York delegates,
Wallace won the nomination by the embarrassingly close vote
of628to459.96
Roosevelt, by choosing Wallace as his running mate, hoped
to improve his voter appeal in the midwestern farm states.
The recession of 1937-1938 had lowered farm prices, which
farmers blamed on the New Deal, and led to a strong Republi-
can resurgence in the 1938 congressional elections in these
states.97 Furthermore, this region was strongly isolationist
and opposed Roosevelt's increasingly internationalist foreign
policy and defense build-up. Roosevelt also had to be con-
cerned about his pro-British foreign and defense policies
losing him votes from traditionally Democratic German, Ital-
ian, and Irish ethnics.98
The limitations on campaign finance imposed by the Hatch
Act on the national party committees led to the proliferation
of publicity activities by state party committees and indepen-
dent organizations. It was very difficult for the Roosevelt and
Willkie campaigns to control the activities of these autono-
mous campaign committees and prevent their distribution
of scurrilous, irresponsible campaign literature.99 Some
Willkie clubs portrayed Roosevelt as a dictator similar to
Stalin and Hitler while the DNC's Colored Division claimed
that Willkie's German ancestry made him a Nazi sympa-
thizer.100
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Willkie, though, avoided personal attacks on Roosevelt and
portrayed himself, to the dismay and anger of Old Guard
Republicans, as being basically supportive of the New Deal
philosophy and of an internationalist foreign policy.101 He
tried to win the election by maintaining Landon's Republican
base of 1936 while attracting dissident Democrats and pre-
viously pro-Roosevelt Republicans and independents.102 V.O.
Key, Jr., later estimated that approximately 4.7 million
Americans who voted for Roosevelt in 1936 cast ballots for
Willkie in 194O.103 Willkie also hoped that John L. Lewis's
nationally broadcast endorsement would swing labor support
to his campaign. Nevertheless, Sidney Hillman, the CIO's
vice president, undermined Lewis's endorsement of Willkie
so that approximately 72 percent of the organized labor vote
went to Roosevelt on election day.104
Despite defections to Willkie from voters who had sup-
ported Roosevelt in 1936, the president won the election with
approximately 55 percent of the popular votes and the elec-
toral college votes of thirty-eight states.105 Eight of the ten
states that Willkie carried were in the Midwest and West.106
Although their members of Congress chafed under Roose-
velt's increasingly combative liberalism, all southern states
provided Roosevelt with their electoral college votes by a
wide margin of victory.107
Thus, Roosevelt had succeeded in being renominated and
re-elected to an unprecedented third term in the presidency,
even though his more aggressive liberalism since 1936 had
alienated many conservatives within the Party. In choosing a
running mate and in affirming his commitment to the con-
tinuation of liberal domestic policies, Roosevelt had refused to
make concessions to conservative Democrats. These intra-
party victories by Roosevelt were enabling him to gradually
fulfill the resolution, which he had expressed to Rexford
Tugwell shortly after the 1932 election, to make the Demo-
cratic party a progressive party after eight years in the White
House.108 "In effect, Roosevelt's drive to liberalize and mod-
ernize the Democratic party which had apparently foundered
for good in the Purges of 1938 had at last borne fruit."109
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The 1944 Election
The congressional elections of 1942 resulted in the smallest
majorities in Congress that the Democrats would hold during
Roosevelt's presidency. Due to this Republican resurgence,
Democratic majorities had been reduced to twenty-one seats
in the Senate and only nine seats in the House.110 During the
1940 campaign, Roosevelt hoped to attract bipartisan support
for his foreign policy by appointing Knox and Stimson to his
cabinet, and he offered Willkie a position as an arbitrator on
the War Labor Board in 1942.111 After the United States
entered World War II, he increased the appointment of Re-
publicans to defense-related agencies and commissions. This
bipartisan gesture, however, failed to increase Republican
support in Congress for his policies as the opposition fre-
quently criticized him for mismanaging the civilian economy
and war production.112
As in the congressional elections of 1938, successful Re-
publican candidates castigated the federal bureaucracy un-
der the Roosevelt administration for being incompetent,
ineffective, fiscally wasteful, and devoid of clear lines of au-
thority and responsibility among the wartime agencies.113 In
particular, they benefited from the dissatisfaction of farmers
with AAA policies and farm price limits imposed by the
Office of Price Administration. Generally, though, many
voters were dissatisfied with the rationing and shortage of
consumer goods, inflation, higher income taxes, and the
seemingly constant regulation of their daily lives by bu-
reaucratic decisions.114
An added feeling of frustration and discontent among the
voters was caused by the sense that these sacrifices and
inconveniences imposed by the Roosevelt administration
were not clearly contributing toward victory in the Pacific
and European theaters of the war. The American assault on
Guadalcanal in the Pacific had sustained heavy casualties
and still faced fierce Japanese resistance by late October.115
The long-awaited Allied invasion of North Africa was delayed
until after the 1942 congressional elections because of logis-
tical problems.116 This stagnant situation made it feasible—
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and beneficial—for Republican candidates to criticize Roose-
velt's conduct of the war without appearing to be unpatriotic
toward their commander in chief.117
The Party also suffered from a low voter turn-out in the
1942 midterm elections. Although registered Democrats had
outnumbered registered Republicans since 1936, voting be-
havior revealed that traditionally Republican middle-class
voters were more likely to vote than traditionally Democratic
working-class voters, especially in midterm elections.118
Thus, Democratic nominees outside of the South suffered
from the fact that only 26,000,000 Americans voted in 1942,
half as many as in 1940.119 Military service and relocation to
defense plant jobs led to especially low turn-out rates among
two of the most Democratic voting blocs, young voters and
factory workers.120 Consequently, a major goal of Roosevelt's
campaign managers for the 1944 election was to increase
voter turn-out among these groups.121
During the sessions of the 78th Congress, the increased
Republican membership enabled the conservative coalition
in Congress to end such major New Deal programs as the
WPA, CCC, and NYA.122 Despite resistance from Congress,
Roosevelt wanted to finance as much of the war expense as
possible on a "pay as you go" basis, partially through high
taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals. His request
that Congress limit Americans' salaries during the war to
$25,000 was easily defeated.123 Besides wanting to minimize
the post-war debt and control wartime consumer spending
and inflation, Roosevelt also wanted to prevent big business
interests from substantially increasing their economic and
political power because of the war boom.124
Therefore, despite his Republican appointments and solic-
itation of business's cooperation for the sake of national unity
behind the war effort, Roosevelt had not weakened or compro-
mised his New Deal liberalism in domestic policy areas. On
December 28, 1943, he stated at a press conference that the
federal government must implement policies that would re-
sult "in more security, in more employment, in more recrea-
tion, in more health, in better housing for our citizens."125
Two weeks later, he delivered his State of the Union address
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in which he proposed an "Economic Bill of Rights."126 James
MacGregor Burns referred to this address as "the most radi-
cal speech of his life."127
In this speech, he unequivocally claimed that there was a
direct link between economic security and political democ-
racy. Once the war ended, Roosevelt wanted the New Deal
policy agenda expanded so that Americans would have their
"rights" to adequate medical care, housing, education, full
employment, and even recreation fulfilled.128 Securing these
economic "rights" would result in the attainment of "new
goals of human happiness and well-being."129
Just as he became more combative from 1938-1940 due to
intraparty conflicts and legislative defeats, Roosevelt as-
serted his liberalism on domestic policy issues during 1943
and 1944 as both Democrats and Republicans in Congress
successfully overrode his vetoes of a tax relief bill, the anti-
union Smith-Connally Act, and a bill increasing farm parity
prices.130 Even Senate majority leader Alben Barkley, usu-
ally a staunch Roosevelt ally, briefly vacated his leadership
position in protest of the president's veto of the tax relief
bill.131
Roosevelt, though, would be able to rely on the leadership
of Barkley, Guffey, and other liberal Democrats in Congress
in the prolonged struggle over extending to servicemen vot-
ing opportunities in the 1944 election.132 Supporters of this
suffrage extension argued that it would enable servicemen to
participate in the democracy they were defending.133 Oppo-
nents retorted that such a federal suffrage law represented
excessive federal interference with the states' right to deter-
mine voter qualifications and administer elections.134
Northern Democrats in Congress such as Guffey and Wag-
ner wanted a special federal ballot distributed to servicemen
to expedite their voting and the tabulation of the results.
Republicans and most southern Democrats wanted the states
to print and distribute absentee ballots to retain control over
their particular registration requirements.135 Southerners
in Congress feared that a federal ballot would enfranchise
black servicemen from their states, which usually denied
them the right to vote through poll taxes, literacy tests, and
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intimidation.136 Southern segregationists were already con-
cerned about the Supreme Court's 1944 decision in Smith v.
Allwright striking down Texas's white-only primary.137
If a federal ballot were adopted, it would be administered
by the Department of War. Even though the secretary of war
was a Republican, leading Republicans in Congress sus-
pected a partisan bias in this department.138 Thus, many
Republicans perceived a federal ballot as a devious ploy to
assure Roosevelt's re-election by pressuring servicemen to
vote for their commander in chief.139
The compromise bill that finally emerged from the con-
ference committee was clearly favorable to the bipartisan
states' rights coalition.140 According to its provisions, the
federal ballot could be obtained by a serviceman only if he
had first requested an absentee ballot from his state and his
state legislature had accepted the federal ballot.141 Southern
states that usually disfranchised blacks could prevent black
servicemen from their states from voting, and only twenty
states would accept these federal ballots.142
To express his opposition to the weaknesses of this suffrage
bill while also allowing its enactment, Roosevelt refused to
either veto it or sign it.143 Instead, he delivered a carefully
prepared speech criticizing the state-oriented provisions of
this bill for complicating the voter registration process for
servicemen, especially those overseas who were constantly
moving. Such unnecessary red tape would discourage and
even prevent voting by American citizens serving in the mili-
tary. According to Roosevelt, the facilitation of voting oppor-
tunities for servicemen is a national obligation for those "who
are at the front fighting with their lives to defend our rights
and our freedoms."144
Encouraged by such legislative victories over Roosevelt
and expecting a low voter turn-out among traditionally Dem-
ocratic voters, Republican delegates convened in Chicago on
June 26 to nominate a presidential candidate and wage a
competitive campaign against Roosevelt.145 Widely dis-
dained within the Republican party for the rapport he had
developed with Roosevelt since the 1940 election, Willkie was
not a viable candidate for the nomination.146 The best possi-
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ble nominee would be a candidate who possessed a record and
rhetoric that would appeal to the more liberal, international-
ist wing of the Republican party but who, unlike Willkie, was
clearly a party regular and proven vote-getter with years of
service to the party.
After easily defeating Willkie in several Republican pri-
maries, it was evident as early as April that Governor Thomas
E. Dewey of New York would be nominated at the Republican
National Convention with only token opposition.147 Elected
by a landslide as the first Republican governor of New York
since 1920, Dewey had distinguished himself as an efficient
administrator who championed tax reform, a streamlined
state bureaucracy, and an end to favoritism and featherbed-
ding in state employment.148 The forty-two-year-old former
prosecutor projected the image of a competent, efficient pub-
lic manager who readily accepted the need for social welfare
programs, labor reforms, and business regulations while de-
crying fiscal waste, bureaucratic incompetence, and excessive
federal control under the Roosevelt administration. In short,
the crusading young governor personified the "Me Too" phi-
losophy and record of the moderate Republican politicians
who had emerged since 1936.149
Dewey, nevertheless, was careful not to repeat Willkie's
mistake of antagonizing the GOP's Old Guard. He chose as
his running mate Governor John Bricker of Ohio, a conserva-
tive isolationist favored by party regulars.150 Dewey's deci-
sion was facilitated by Earl Warren's announcement that he
would not pursue the vice-presidential nomination. Warren,
the liberal Republican governor of California and the conven-
tion's keynote speaker, was broadly supported as Dewey's
running mate.151
As a further concession to the more conservative party
regulars, he generally allowed them to dominate the drafting
of the party's national platform. While agreeing with the
military strategy of Roosevelt, the party platform concen-
trated its attack on the New Deal's centralization of govern-
ment and damage to economic growth and vowed to "avoid
federalization of government activities."152 In more caustic
language, the Republican platform rebuked Roosevelt's labor
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policies for representing "one of the New Deal's steps toward a
totalitarian state."153 One day after the convention, Dewey
admitted to the press that his party's platform contained
inconsistencies and that his own positions reflected only
parts of it.154
Willkie's 1940 campaign had been plagued by frequent
squabbles and lack of coordination between the Willkie clubs
and regular party organizations, but Dewey, because of his
compromises, enjoyed a degree of intraparty harmony behind
his candidacy.155 Consequently, Dewey was able to concen-
trate fully on his theme that the nation needed to change its
presidential leadership and policy direction. Unlike Willkie,
Dewey would challenge Roosevelt's foreign policy decisions,
suggesting that Roosevelt and other New Deal Democrats
were "afraid of peace" because of the depressing effect that
the end of the war was expected to have on the economy.156
Despite several legislative defeats and Senator Harry F.
Byrd's threat to establish an anti-Roosevelt third party, Roo-
sevelt's renomination in 1944 was accepted by most Dem-
ocrats.157 The Texas delegation for the 1944 convention,
however, was evenly divided between opponents and support-
ers of Roosevelt's renomination.158 Roosevelt had again as-
sured the selection of Chicago as the site of the Democratic
national convention and assumed that Ed Kelly could skill-
fully manage another "controlled" convention. The only ma-
jor source of contention within the Party was the choice of a
running mate.
The diverse elements of the Democratic Party agreed on at
least one matter—the need to replace Henry Wallace as vice-
president. Southerners disliked his outspoken support of ra-
cial integration. The White House staff and top advisers,
especially Harry Hopkins, regarded his eccentric personality
and politically inept statements as embarrassing. Robert
Sherwood suggests that Roosevelt had decided to dump Wal-
lace as early as July 1943 after the vice-president had pub-
licly and tactlessly criticized Secretary of Commerce Jesse
Jones's policies with the Board of Economic Warfare.159
Busy with his military strategy and foreign affairs, Roose-
velt did not want Wallace's renomination to threaten his re-
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election. He briefly suggested that Supreme Court justice
William O. Douglas replace Wallace, but he realized that
there was little support for Douglas from the Party lead-
ers.160 He readily accepted DNC chairman Bob Hannegan's
suggestion that Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri be
given the nomination. Despite Jimmy Byrnes's vigorous
lobbying for the vice-presidential nomination, Kelly and
Hannegan dismissed his candidacy as being unacceptable to
blacks, Catholics, and labor.161
Because he wanted to spend little time campaigning, Roo-
sevelt tried to assure a consensual nomination process for
a vice-presidential candidate. Truman would at least be
grudgingly acceptable to all of the diverse elements of the
party—blacks, southern whites, labor unions, and the ma-
chine bosses. Despite the general unity behind Roosevelt's
renomination at the 1944 convention, Senator Harry F. Byrd's
candidacy attracted the votes of 100 southern delegates.162
Byrd's candidacy revealed the growing alienation of southern
conservatives from the more liberal national Democratic
party that had emerged under Roosevelt's leadership. It also
served as a harbinger of the Deep South's noisy defection from
Truman at the next national convention.
The greatest concern of Bob Hannegan, Ed Flynn, and
other managers of Roosevelt's campaign was that voter apa-
thy and the overconfidence of Democratic campaign workers
would result in a low voter turn-out and an upset victory for
Dewey. The youngest voters would be most likely to vote for
Roosevelt.163 However, military service or relocation because
of defense plant employment meant that many of these Dem-
ocratic voters would be unable to vote.164 Because of the
weak, heavily compromised provisions of the Servicemen's
Voting Act, only about 85,000 servicemen would receive spe-
cial federal ballots for the 1944 election.165
With the servicemen's vote expected to play such a minor
role in the 1944 campaign, the DNC concentrated more on the
micromanagement of voter mobilization efforts at the pre-
cinct level than it had in Roosevelt's three previous presi-
dential campaigns.166 The DNC sought to energize and
coordinate the efforts of the approximately 125,000 Demo-
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cratic precinct organizations throughout the United States. It
provided detailed suggestions for registering and mobilizing
voters and scheduled an October 5 nationwide radio broad-
cast by Roosevelt to all Democratic campaign workers.
The war effort and the anticipated low voter turn-out gave
Democratic women a disproportionate degree of influence
and responsibility in the 1944 campaign. In a memo to local
Democratic committees, the DNC urged these committees
not to segregate or subordinate female activists in assigning
campaign responsibilities and tasks. Moreover, the memo
urged local Democratic organizations to provide women with
an equally important role and status in the voter mobiliza-
tion drive. According to this memo, "Just as women are doing
the work formerly performed by men in industries so we as a
Democratic organization must realize that the women can go
out and do the party job that in previous years has been done
by men."167
As Republicans and southern conservatives frequently
charged that Roosevelt was a political captive of the "Com-
munist" CIO, Roosevelt became even more dependent on
Sidney Hillman for the mobilization of labor's votes and cam-
paign contributions in 1944 than he had been in 1940.168 The
Smith-Connally Act of 1943, which was passed over Roose-
velt's veto, prohibited labor unions from contributing cam-
paign funds to party committees, such as the DNC, once the
presidential candidates were nominated.169 The CIO circum-
vented this law by forming its own political action committee,
CIO-PAC, in 1943 and collected approximately $647,000 from
CIO unions before the national convention was held. Closely
associated with the CIO-PAC was the National Citizens Polit-
ical Action Committee (NC-PAC).170
After the Smith-Connally Act's prohibition of union con-
tributions took effect, the CIO-PAC and the NC-PAC began a
vigorous campaign to encourage CIO members to make indi-
vidual contributions to the Roosevelt campaign.171 The CIO-
PAC and the NC-PAC raised approximately $470,000 and
$378,000, respectively, in this manner. Besides financially
contributing to Roosevelt's campaign outside of the DNC, the
CIO provided essential campaign services, such as canvass-
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ing voters and distributing leaflets.172 The electoral support
of the ClO-dominated American Labor Party combined with
Democratic votes enabled Roosevelt to carry New York by a
narrow margin in the 1944 election.
The results of the 1944 election were similar to those of the
previous presidential election. Roosevelt won 53 percent of
the popular votes and 432 electoral college votes.173 As in
1940, most of the twelve states that Roosevelt lost to the
Republican nominee were in the midwestern and western
farm belt.174 As many non-southern rural WASPs continued
to reaffirm their Republican allegiance, Roosevelt became
increasingly dependent on urban voters for his margin of
victory.175 Whereas only 25 percent of Roosevelt's plurality of
votes came from the nation's twelve largest cities in 1932,65
percent of his margin of victory came from these cities in
1944.176
Despite his desire to achieve bipartisan support for his
foreign policy through Republican appointments, Roosevelt
did not weaken or compromise his liberal policy objectives
to achieve that support or the cooperation of conservatives
within his Party. Nor did the legislative defeats that he suf-
fered in Congress in 1943 weaken his determination to rep-
resent the Party as a distinctly liberal one which would
advocate federal efforts to provide greater economic security
and better public services for average Americans. On the
contrary, his 1944 address outlining the "Economic Bill of
Rights" was the most comprehensive agenda of liberal policy
objectives he had ever announced. Although the southern
conservatives' support of Harry Byrd's candidacy at the 1944
convention indicated their willingness to oppose Roosevelt's
renomination openly, Roosevelt did not abandon his liberal
principles and policy objectives to appease them. By 1944, the
voting blocs and interest groups that favored the continuation
of New Deal liberalism as the Democratic party's ideology
and policy agenda were strong enough to defeat opposition by
conservatives within the Party.
EPILOGUE
FDR's Legacy in
the Democratic Party
The Democratic party's electoral success and general direc-
tion on ideological and policy matters after Roosevelt's death
in 1945 would reveal whether he had built an enduring elec-
toral base and ideological-policy identity for the Party or if he
had merely attracted a personal following that would disinte-
grate shortly after his death. Critics of Roosevelt's Party
leadership, both Republicans and conservative Democrats,
would dismiss his four elections to the presidency as merely
being the result of the back-to-back crises of the Great De-
pression and World War II or the "purchase" of votes from
economically desperate Americans through the "bribery" of
New Deal welfare and subsidy programs.1 Apparently, they
assumed that Roosevelt's and his party's electoral success
would evaporate shortly after these crises ended and the New
Deal had lost its "vote-buying" appeal.2 Such an assessment
of Roosevelt's party leadership dismisses his political skills
and the popularity of the New Deal's ideology.3
Roosevelt had consistently revealed his willingness to
arouse intraparty opposition and threaten his own political
position to maintain the clarity and consistency of his liberal
principles as well as his determination to make the national
Democratic party a distinctly liberal majority party.4 Critics
of his presidency appear to regard his liberal posture as an
expedient adaptation to the political climate of the Depres-
sion, with its widespread economic discontent that produced
leftist, populist movements.5 They neglect the importance of
the long-term strategy for expanding and liberalizing the
Party that Roosevelt had developed during the 1920s.
At crucial times, therefore, Roosevelt's ideological commit-
ment to the liberal transformation of the Democratic party as
an enduring majority superseded expedient, momentary con-
cerns for his own position in the Party. The ideological com-
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mitment also explains the qualified, conditional nature of his
loyalty to an identification with the Party as a political in-
stitution.6 His party loyalty had always been qualified ac-
cording to the extent to which he could reform the principles
and policy objectives of the Party.
Harry Truman's upset victory in 1948, despite intraparty
discord resulting in the defections of the Progressives and the
Dixiecrats, demonstrated the enduring quality of the accom-
plishments of Roosevelt's party-building efforts.7 Truman's
victory revealed that Roosevelt's personal leadership was not
indispensable for maintaining a liberal Democratic party
that could win a presidential election and regain control
of both houses of Congress. What did appear to be crucial,
though, for the continuation of Democratic hegemony was
the maintenance and further enhancement of Roosevelt's
ideological-policy legacy of New Deal liberalism.8
Despite the concern of some Roosevelt loyalists that
Truman would prove to be a do-nothing moderate, the new
president demonstrated his fidelity to New Deal liberalism
by proposing what he called the Fair Deal.9 Besides strength-
ening such existing New Deal policies as Social Security,
public housing, and farm subsidies, the Fair Deal proposed to
advance such unfulfilled liberal policy objectives as national
health insurance, federal aid to education, and civil rights
legislation for blacks. After Truman's presidency, these three
major policy goals would be a focus of liberal Democrats in
Congress and of the next two Democratic presidents.10
Like Roosevelt, Truman campaigned as a combative lib-
eral instead of a cautious moderate. Despite criticism of Tru-
man's civil rights plank among black leaders and some white
liberals for being too mild and inadequate, it was strong
enough to enrage the most committed white supremacists in
the Deep South to support Strom Thurmond as the presiden-
tial nominee of the States' Rights party.11 This intraparty
rebellion by southern segregationists against Truman served
to galvanize black support for the president. Because black
electoral support of the Democratic party, especially among
the middle class and intelligentsia, had declined somewhat
during the 1940s because of military segregation during
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World War II and the strong support of Willkie and Dewey for
civil rights, the Dixiecrat revolt and Truman's civil rights
plank helped to swing undecided black voters to Truman.12
Even though Truman consistently received low approval
ratings in Gallup polls and experienced fierce intraparty
opposition from both the left and the right as well as from
Eleanor Roosevelt and her sons, he succeeded in winning an
upset victory and assuring the continuation of the Democratic
party as the majority party by constantly reminding voters of
the New Deal's policy accomplishments and the Republicans'
threat to their continuation.13 In particular, Truman con-
vinced labor unions and farm organizations that a Republi-
can victory would threaten New Deal programs that had
benefited their interests.14 In short, Truman won the election
and helped to regain Democratic control of Congress by
making Democratic policy accomplishments under the New
Deal—and not his own personal leadership—the dominant
issue of the campaign.
Likewise, Roosevelt's policy legacy, presidential style, and
liberal transformation of the Party proved to have an endur-
ing impact on Truman's successors in the White House. To
assure victory in the 1952 presidential election, Republicans
realized they needed to nominate a candidate who basically
accepted the New Deal policy foundation and who possessed
an attractive suprapartisan image. Consequently, the Repub-
lican National Convention of 1952 nominated Dwight Eisen-
hower, who had been courted by Eleanor Roosevelt, Claude
Pepper, and other liberal Democrats as their party's presiden-
tial nominee in 1948, instead of the staunchly conservative
Robert A. Taft.15
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson realized the polit-
ical importance of maintaining the New Deal coalition for
electoral purposes as well as for eliciting public and congres-
sional support for their domestic policy agenda. In preparing
for and conducting their 1960 campaign, both Kennedy and
Johnson found it necessary to assure the Party's liberal activ-
ists and interest groups that they were faithful to Roosevelt's
ideology and policy objectives.16 Under the pressures of cur-
rent events and their party's expectations, Kennedy and
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Johnson, especially the latter, proved to be more liberal in
their rhetoric and policy behavior than they had been in
Congress. Although generally regarded as a conservative
during his tenure in the Senate, Johnson began his presi-
dency determined to equal and even surpass Roosevelt as
the liberal champion of the underprivileged in American
society.17
Toward the end of Johnson's administration, however, it
became apparent that the Party had reached the limits of
Roosevelt's legacy. Its ability to build coalitions, elect presi-
dents, and dominate the domestic policy-making process had
clearly declined. The intensity of intraparty conflicts over
the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War badly frag-
mented the electoral coalition built by Roosevelt. Societal
changes and court decisions led to the emergence of such
politically divisive social issues as abortion, school prayer,
and forced busing to achieve racial integration in public
schools, which further weakened the party loyalty of Demo-
cratic voters.18 Democratic candidates could no longer suc-
ceed by simply following Roosevelt's example of focusing on
economic issues while generally ignoring social issues like
race relations and the relationship between church and state.
The Republican landslides of 1972 and 1984, however, did not
effect the massive change in the party registration and identi-
fication of voters that Roosevelt's 1936 re-election had done
for the Democratic party.19
The fact that the liberal Democratic Party developed by
Roosevelt's party leadership could continue its electoral suc-
cess and endure as the nation's majority, even when it was
led by a beleaguered, controversial successor like Truman,
widely perceived as being inferior to Roosevelt, revealed that
Roosevelt had not built a fragile, ephemeral personal follow-
ing that would quickly disintegrate after his death.20 In-
stead, his party leadership and party-building strategy
under the New Deal had transformed the Party into the
enduring majority party among the electorate at large, in
Congress, and, until 1968, in the presidency.21 By instilling
New Deal liberalism in the Party as the essence of its ide-
ology, domestic policy objectives, and the policy interests of its
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major voting blocs and interest groups, Roosevelt provided
liberal Democrats with a degree of clarity and cohesion that
the Party had not enjoyed since the Age of Jackson.22 He
operated within the American federal system, whose struc-
tures and forces discourage and hamper strong party lead-
ership by a president.23 When Franklin D. Roosevelt's Party
leadership and party-building efforts are assessed according
to these criteria, he can be regarded as one of the most
successful and effective party leaders in American history.
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